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Part I. The J' orthern Counties, the Norsemen. 
Chapter I. 
The Standard. 
Section 1. Preliminary operations. 
No army representative of the kingdom of 
Scotland as a whole marched to war before the days of David 
I. The struggles of 1 ectansmere and Carna.m, decisive as they 
were, were part of the consolidation of trie country, vinifie 
the fights of i alcclm Canx ore were border raids of a type 
well kno«il in later days. David's army was the first which 
could be said to stand for all Scotland and to show the 
methods of fighting employed by the Scots of the twelfth 
century. 
The causes of the campaign of 1138 were simple. 
The northern counties were, during that period, a constant 
bone of contention between the two countries, and David, 
like many of his predecessors and successors, was eager to 
secure the for Scotland. The civil war raging in England 
between the partisans of Sterheiï and those of Matilda 
seemed likely to prevent any effective opposition to a 
Scottish attack, while David's close relationship to one of 
the contending parties provided him with a sufficient 
pretext for intervention in the struggle. 
e trouble started very soon after the death of 
henry I of England. In December, 1135, and January, 1136, 
David made a sudden attack on the north of England and 
seized the towns of VTa.rk, Alnwick, Carlisle, Nornam, and 
Keweastle. He failed to Gain Banüburgh and was prevented 
from besieging Durham by the arrival of Stephen with a 
strong; force. A prolonged parley ensued and a peace was 
patched up on Stephen investing Prince henry, son of David, 
with the earldoms of huntingdon and Carlisle.' 
/. icnard of i+exh m, fo.3; John of hexhaii, .ar.3. 
PC. 
Carlisle./ 
In 113Y, Stephen being overseas in Normandy, 
liavid again prepared to attack, but on this occasion the IX 
threat was promptly islet by the formation of an English force 
at Newcastle. This force, which was apparently large enough 
to deter David from his intended invasion, seems to have 
included a number of barons and knights from the southern 
parts of England,. who had gone north at the request of 
Stephen. Thurstan, archbishop of York, negotiated a truce 
with the Scots, which was to last till the return of Stephen 
from Normandy. Cn his return, a request by David that 
Northumberland be given to Prince Henry was rejected; as a 
consequence the somewhat shadowy truce was broken of and a 
state of open warfare prevailed.! 
Early in January, 1138, David's nephew, 
William, attempted to surprise Wark castle by a night attack, 
but was repulsed. David and henry joined the attacking force 
and for a period of three weeks attempts were made to capture 
the castle, siege engines being used in the assault.. he 
garrison, coinanded by Jordan de Bussy, nephew of Walter 
l'Espec, held out in stubborn fashion, and all the attacks 
of the Scots were repulsed with loss, David's standard - 
bearer being among the slain.3'Thus early it is apparent 
that the Scots were by no means adept in regular siege 
operations, a branch of warfare in which they never greatly 
distinguished themselves. The Scots, disappointed in the 
event of the siege, spread over the north, plundering and 
burning, and laid waste the country as far as Corbridge; a 
massacre took place at 'T'anfield.4, 
/. xichard of Hexham,fo.40; John of Hexham, par.4. 
2.Ballistas are mentioned by Richard of Hexham, fo.40b. 
3. John of Hexham, par.4. 
4.John of Hexham, par.4. It is as well to state here, once 
and for all, thattthe atrocities repeatedly alleged by 
English chroniclers are probably exaggerations; but even the 
bare truth of a border raid must have been bad enough. 
3. 
'!'anfield. / 
On the approach of Stephen with a force of 
N 
barons and men -at -arms, the Scots retreated over the boIder 
and took post in the difficult land in the vicinity of 
Roxburgh,tready to fall on Stephen, if he should act 
carelessly. Here first appears the familiar Scottish strategy 
of avoiding a'pitched battle with a better -equipped army in 
favour of a policy of attrition by ambushes and surprises. It 
is improbable that David had a large force with him at that 
time. After a successful raid there would naturally be a 
diminution in numbers caused by the departure of men intent 
upon securing their plunder. In this respect it must be re- 
membered that not a tenth part of David's force was amenable 
to any form of discipline, in the modern sense of the word. 
In_ any case David could not have kept together his whole 
force from January to August, when the battle itself was 
fought. 
Stephen remained some time in the south of 
Scotland and did some damage to the border districts, but 
retired in the second half of February, probably because of 
lack of food and the absence of any enemy with whom he might 
fight.David had now a period of quiet in which he could 
plan a serious invasion of the northern counties, for he had 
certain knowledge that Stephen would be kept busy in the 
south by the supporters of Matilda. Attention must now be turn 
ed to the forces with which the main attack of 1138 was made. 
,X 
I.ramiliarly known as the forests of Jedworth. 
.2hichard of Hexham, fo.41b. John. of Hexham, par.4, alleges 
that there was some treachery among the notables of Stephen's 
camp and that Stephen discovered this. If the dishonest 
policy of suporting the highest bidder, adopted by most of 
the English barons of this period, is any indication, the 
allegation is probably true. 
. 
Section 2. Composition and equipment of the Scottish array. 
The heavily armed portion of David's army was made 
up of the barons and knights of English and Norman families 
who had settled in Scotland, either after the Norman conquest 
of England or at the invitation of David himself, with their 
men -at -arms. This body would not be a very large one. The 
Normanisation theory, as far as Scotland is concerned, has 
probably been overdone,Land the number of settlers of that 
race in Scotland could not have been very large. As a proof 
of the smallness of this force we have the statement in 
Aelred of Rievaulx that Prince Henry, who commanded the 
division containing most of the mounted men, had only a force 
of two hundred in his charge on the English line. The equip- 
ment of this body would be similar to that of the knights on 
the English side, that is defensive armour consisting of the 
conical helmet with nasal, the quilted hauberk or shirt with 
overlapping scales of armour and a pectoral to protect the 
neck and shoulders, the Norman kite shield, somewhat 
shortened since the time of Hastings, and some protection for 
the front of the legs secured by lacing. Chain mail, a very 
expensive item at any time, was not yet widely introduced. 
For offensive purposes the cavalry carried lances, swords, 
and in some cases maces. The horses were heavily built and 
clumsy, with the result that the cavalry charge of the period 
probably never exceeded in speed a smart trot or canter. 
The levies of the eastern Lowlands would to some 
extent resemble the English fyrd. Some slight discipline would 
exist, but not by any means enough to make the men an 
organised body of footmen. The arms consisted of shield, 
wooden, leather, or metal -studded, and a pike or sword; a 
certain number had bows of short or Norman type, not so 
effective as the longbow, which, as the result of contact 
with the Welsh, was beginning to come into use among the 
English at this time. The guisarme or bill, which appeared it 
warfare at this period, never became popular in Scotland. 
/.See E.M.Earron's Scottish War of Independence. 
 
Scotland./ 
The great bulk of David's host was composed of 
the wild clansmen of Ualloway and the Highlands, fighting 
under their on chiefs, and armed only with target, dart, and 
sword. They were brought into the field by their local chiefs 
on the summons of the king, and were, of course, quite 
undisciplined, being probably more concerned in acquiring 
plunder than in trie result of trie campaign. Such a body of 
men would be very useful in a pursuit or in skirmishing war- 
fare, but, in a pitched battle with a better equipped force, 
its value was small; nor could it be held together for any 
length of time. 
The Scottish host could not have fallen far 
short of twenty thousand men./ In the absence of any organised 
commissariat, a body so large was bound to feed on the countr 
as it progressed, and concentration could only be possible 
for 'a day or two a time. There is no trace of any organis- 
ation intended to weld the whole into a fighting instrument 
of value. For a raid David's force was too large; for a 
regular conquest of the north the dependable portion of his 
army was too small. 
Section 3. The battle. 
In April David again marched south and resumed 
his devastation of the land. He laid siege to iorham, which, 
through lack of help from its lord, the bishop of Durham, was 
compelled to surrender and was destroyed. While the siege was 
Ì 
progressing, David's nephew, William, had been sent south 
with an irregular force and, possibly, a few khightsa.and had 
q5 
routed a body of English at Clitheroe on qth June.3. 
x 
/,The usual number, given by the chroniclers and accepted by 
uT 
Professor Oman, is ienty -six thousand. 
,a.Richard of Hexham, fo.41b. "cum Pictis et parte exercitus 
sui." 
;3,Jonn of Hexham, par.5. 
G, 
Luring the siege David's communications had been 
harassed by the garrison of Wark, and, result, he made 
another attack on that stronghold; this attempt was a failure, 
and David, leaving the siege to two of his thegns, advanced 
south, destroying Bamburgh as he passed. he was joined by an 
adherent of Stephen, Eustace FitzJohn, who offered to 
surrender his castle at Malton. It wa6 probably this tempting 
proposition that drew David so far south.!. 
As Yorkshire was now in-danger, the barons of the 
county met at York to arrange measures of defence. Some seem 
to have wavered i-n/ their allegiance to Stephen, but the 
exhortations of-6iti4i,Ae41, the archbishop of -York, and the 
opportune arrival of Bernard de Baliol from the south, with a 
force of cavalry sent by Stephen, brought about a determin- 
ation to fight..Tne barons and_their retainers, together with 
the fyrd of the York district, advanced as far as Thirsk, 
thirteen miles south of Northallerton, and from that place 
sent Baliol and Robert de Bruce to request David to desist 
from his ravaging in return for the gift of the earldom of 
Northumberland to ¡UK Íxiamt Prince Henry. David refused the 
offer and proceeded to cross the Tees, probably in the 
neighbourhood where Darlington now stands. Hearing of this, 
the Yori.shiremen, reinforced by a body from Nottinghamshire 
under William Peverel and one from Derbyshire under Robert de 
Ferrers, advanced past Northallerton, and took post about 
three miles to the north to await the arrival of the Scots.3. 
The position on Cowton or wiske4moor gave a very slight 
advantage by the slope of the ground, but the effect was 
negligible in the battle. X 
The English, heavily outnumbered, but probably 
!ÚRichard of nexham, fo.42. L Ibidem, fo.42b. 
3.Ibideiu, fo.43. 
/Roger of rioveden, p. 193, rias "in Çutune moil but the position if. 
practically a utile to the east of trie village of Danby Wiske. 
Y 
probably/ 
superior in cavalry, formed the fyrd into a single body facing 
the _Scots advance, and stiffened the ranks by the introduction 
of dismounted knights and men-at-arms. Thus the Scots were 
confronted by a line of mingled pikemen and archers, backed 
up by the heavily armed men. The reiiiainder of the English 
barons grouped themselves round the Standard to direct the 
battle and to form a rallying -point for the host. /'The most 
notable among there were William de Albemarle, Walter de Gant, 
Bruce, Baliol, Walter l'Espec, Richard de Courcy, Robert 
d'Estuteville, Peverel, and Ferrers. They made no attempt to 
use their superiority in cavalry, probably because they felt 
that the fyrd must be directly supported. 
David at first intended to attack the English 
with one dense column, which would have dismounted knights and 
the archers as its spearhead. He realised that the English 
line would not be easily broken by the half -naked Galloway met 
and But his proposal roused into activity the 
dormant jealousy, dating from the time of Malcolm Canwore, 
which existed between the Teutonic and Celtic elements in his 
army. A fierce quarrel broke out between the Celtic chief, 
Malise, earl of Strathearn, and the Norman, Alan de Percy, and 
David, fearing a breakup of his army, consented to a new arrar 
genents2.'l'his consisted in dividing the army into four section:. 
The ualloway ;lien formed an advanced centre, while two slightly 
withdrawn wings were formed, by the Lowlanders on the left, 
and Prince Henry, with the.Teviotdale men and the bulk of the 
knights on .the right. David himself, with the Highlanders and 
the men of Moray, and with certain dismounted knights, formed 
a reserve.3 It is probable that David intènded all three 
divisions of the front line to attack simultaneously, and 
that it was the reckless courage of the Galwegians that carri( 
lAelred of Rievaulx, fo. 199. 02.Ibidera, fo.198b. 
3,Ibidem, fo.199. 
carried/ 
them in advance of the two wings. 
With a yell of "Albanach" the men of ualloway 
hurled themselves on the English and breached the front lines 
of the fyrd)But the ;_;ap was quickly closed by the knights 
and.the Scots recoiled, losing many men under the constant 
shower of arrows. A second and a third time they returned, 
wounded and whole, to the attack, but at length, dispirited 
by their lack of success and by the loss of their chiefs, the, 
broke up and fledtMeanwhile the Lowlanders on the lefS had 
lost their chief by an arrow shot and the division melted 
away witn hardly an effort.îOn the right Prince Henry by a 
¿allant charge with his mounted men opened a way for his 
Teviotdale infantry through the ranks of the fyrd; but his 
footmen were slow in coming up and the gap was closed by the 
English before further damage could be done. Henry and his 
knights were left on the wrong side of the English line, while: 
David advanced with his reserve in a last effort to gain the 
day; but the king's followers slipped away from him and he was 
finally dissuaded from attacking by his attendant knights and 
chiefs. The Scots drew of the field, but rallied a short 
distance away and effectually prevented any successful pursuit 
There was no semblance of a rout, but a cerliin number of 
stragglers were cut off in the retreat. Prince Henry and his 
mounted men mostly escaped by working through the English 
ranks under pretence of being part of the English army. David 
was still strong enough to besiege and capture Wark on his 
way north. 
The Scottish losses would naturally be much greate 
than those of the English, and several knights were taken 
L Henry of iiuntingdon, par.9. Q,Aelred of Rievaulx, fo. 193b. 
3,henry of Huntingdon, par.9. 
;They would have been distinguished by being mounted, but pro- 
bably many of the English knights had remounted in order to 
pursue. 
taken/ 
prisoners. On the English side some of the fyrd were slain, 
together with one knight, the brother of Ilbert de Lacy./ 
Section 4. Conclusions. 
Apparently the Scots had no regular plan, either 
for the campaign or for the battle. David appears, not as a 
general with regular aims, but as an opportunist, ready to 
turn in whatever direction should be cost suitable at the 
moment. It is very doubtful if he should have crossed the 
Tees at all. By doing so he passed into territory which he 
could not hope to hold, and roused a spirit of resistance, 
which did not appear so long as he was content to occupy the 
north. An additional proof of his incapacity is the manner in 
which he left Wary; castle untaken, with a garrison able to 
upset his communications. He does not seem to have taken any 
effective measures to mask the fortress until a successful 
raid had been made on his transport. 
In the battle itself the Scots army made no atte:ip 
to manoeuvre. Although deficient in cavalry, David's force, 
thanks to the presence of the light- footed dalwegians and 
Highlanders, was much more mobile than the English fyrd. The 
Yorkshire barons had drawn up their force in a formation whic 
made rapid manoeuvring impossible.,Both English flanks were 
absolutely in the air. If David, using his superior numbers, 
had combined a holding attack in front with a flanking move- 
ment of his light troops, the position of the English would 
have been very serious. At t :le best their whole line might 
have been rolled up, and at the worst a flank attack would 
have been far less exposed to the English archery. 
Even David's first plan of an attack by a single 
¡,Henry of Huntiggdon, par.9. 
.2, They were probably driven to this to support the morale of 
their footmen, who seem to have been very shaky at the start 
of the battle 
/Cl 
single/ 
massed column was preferable to the scheme finally adopted. 
The column might have shared the fate of Mar's attack at 
Dupplin iiioor, but, taking into consideration the fact that the 
English archery had not reached a very high state of develop- 
ment in 1138, it might, by sheer wei,]ht of numbers, have 
smashed through the English line. As matters actually were, 
David anticipated the error of Napoleon at Waterloo and, by 
throwing his men at the Englistl line in detachments, allowed 
the English, though inferior in numbers over the whole, to 
meet each attack with a superiority at the critical point. 
The truth is that the tail wagged the dog. There was 
deep racial jealousy and a lack of the most elementary 
discipline in the Scottish army, while the kind himself 
wavered at the critical moment. As a result the part of the 
army which had the least fighting value was allowed to dictate 
the policy of the mass. ». 
The picture is, as a whole, a depressing one. The 
Scots were still at a primitive stage in the organisation of 
warfare. With advantages in numbers and mobility, buoyed up by 
previous successes, and favoured by the error of their 
opponents in taking up an exposed position, they ignominiously 
failed in the battle itself; nor could the failure be 
attributed to lack of courage or resolution. It is clear that 
outside the limited body of knights and men -at -arms, there was 
no force on which reliance could be put and that the Scottish 
people had everything to learn in the art of scientific 
warfare as distinguished from mere random melees. 
This does not mean that the ualwegians were not good fighters. 
In a different type of action their value would probably have, 
been greater than that of the rest of the army. 

Chapter II. 
The Campains of William the Lion. 
Section 1. The invasion of 1173. 
In that year, henry II being engaged overseas in 
France, William judged the occasion a suitable one for a 
further attempt to secure the northern counties for Scotland. 
The army, wich assembled at Caldenlea in Selkirkshire, 
probably did not differ much in com,Jositiori and equipment fro 
that led by David forty years earlier. That it was a national 
force and that it contained a large proportion of the wild 
irregulars, who figured so prominently in the battle of the 
Standard, is shown by the presence of contingents from the 
districts of Ross and moray, and by the reference to many of 
the Scots as "naked men" made by the chronicler of the 
campaign. /.There were present of the notable men of Scotland, 
Uilibrede, earl of Angus, and Colban, earl of rife. 
What the numbers were is, as usual, difficult to 
ascertain. Fantosme gives a total of forty tnousand men, but 
that'io certainly an exaggeration. Possibly trie army, raised 
under similar circumstances and by similar means to that o?' 
David, was not very different from ids in point of size. The 
estimate of the knights and men-at-arms as totalling one 
thousand is probably pretty near the mark, as the number of 
such in Scotland would naturally have increased since the tim4 
of the Standard. The arms of the heavy cavalry, offensive and 
defensive, had made little progress, though chain mail was 
becoming a little more widely used in Europe generally at thif 
time. Otherwise there was little change; the seal of vvilliam 
shows, on the reverse, the king wearing the pointed helmet 
and nasal, which had been introduced by the Normans; he also 
carries shield and lance.2. 
Jordan rantosiae, 1.460. .?,t3ain'e Documents, I.105. 
On crossing; tae border William's first move was t, 
attack the castle of Wark, which, from its position, constiti 
ted a threatX to all invading forces. me governor, Hoger 
d'Estuteville, doubtful of _lis ability to fold out against sc 
large a force, obtained from William a truce for forty days 
in order tnat ne mignt communicate with henry. William, havir 
thus, rather astutely, got rid of all danger to his rear for 
lengthy period, pressed his advance south. lie seems to have 
contemplated an attack on Newcastle, but abandoned the idea 
because of his lack of siege engines. Carlisle was, nowever, 
besieged by tree Scots, but tae governors Hobert de Vaus, was 
able to repulse the attack. The usual ray..ging had, of course 
been going on throughout the invasion. 
A relieving English force under the command of to 
Justiciar, Richard de Lucy, and tine Constable, numl,hrey de 
:ohun, was now advancing north, and William, just as David 
had done under similar circumstances, abandoned his attack 
and retreated into trae Roxburgh district, the wild nature of 
taac region affording a secure refuge to the Scots. The 
English forces crossed the Tweed in October and proceeded to 
lay waste part of Lothian, but their progress was checked by 
news from the south that the insurgent earl of Leicester had 
landed in England. Faced with the necessity of a hurried 
withdrawal, de Lucy obtained William's consent to a truce 
which would last till the following summer./ 
Section 2. The invasion of 1174. 
In April David main crossed tine border and renewe 
the attack on Wark castle, while the light troops scoured the 
country in the vicinity of Belford. In the siege William 
employed Flemings, probably mercenaries, a sufficient 
com^lentary on the ability of the Scots to conduct sieges 
successfully. The Flemings pierced the chevaulx -de -frise and 
/.Jordan Fantosme; William of Newburgn, II.Cn. 30; iioger of 
noveden, II.b4. 
and/ 
actually reached the ditch of the castle, but were unable to 
penetrate further and fell back after suffering heavily. An 
arbalast was brought up to help the attackers, but this 
expedient proved unavailing. Finally, when an attempt to burn 
the castle had also failed, the siege was abandoned and 
William retreated, after burning his hut encampment. /. 
The Scots next proceeded towards Carlisle, Willia 
adfceed 
being apparently \to adopt this course by his immediate 
attendants Roger de Mowbray, 3alpit4T de Port, and Walter de 
Berkeley. The town was summoned, but de Vaus refused to 
capitulate. No attempt was made at a storm, but a detachment 
of the Scottish army established a blockade of tne place. 
this blockade was slowly taking effect, William turned 
to Appleby, which surrendered without resistance. Brough, a 
tower protected by a stockade, both probably of wood, was 
next taken by the use of fire.3The castles of Liddel; 
Warkworth, and larbottle also fell into tne hands of the 
Scots at the same time4Robert de Vaus was now seriously 
alarmed at tree successes of the enemy and the pressure of the 
blockade and agreed to surrender Carlisle, if help did not 
come from Henry within a fixed period. 
having thus cleared his rear William attacked 
Prudhoe, a fortress belonging to Odinel de umfraville, but 
gave up the attempt at the end of three days.srnis attack at 
aroused the English of the north and de Umfraville busied 
himself in securing help in Yorkshire. he received promises 
of assistance from William d'Estuteville, Ranulph de Glanvill; 
/.Jordan Fantosme, lines 1150s. 
.2. Roger of hoveden, II.60. 
3.Jordan Fantosme. 
4Roger of Hoveden, II.60. 
S.he seems, however, to have done some damage to the fort; see 
Bain, I.130. 
Glanville,/ 
William de Vesci, and Bernard de Baliol.Sixty knights were 
contributed to the force by the archbishop of York, and the 
total reacned the number of four aundred heavy cavalry. /. 
Meanwhile William, hearing tna-t a force was being 
formed in Yorkshire, crossed the Tyne into the county of 
Northumberland, and settled down to the blockade of Alnwick 
with his knights, while the light troops roamed far and wide, 
plundering the country in merciless fasnionA,'i'hese raiders 
seem to have been divided into two sections, one under 
Duncan, earl of Fife, and the other under Richard de More - 
ville, the constable of Scotland. 
The English force came north by forced marches, 
una gompanied by footmen. On 12th July they reached Newcastle 
and there a council was held to settle what action should be 
taken. The barons were now aware that Prudhoe was safe and 
that the immediate danger to Yorkshire had vanished.3Jor some 
It seemed the height of rashness to march against William 
with his infinitely larger force. Eventually the arguments of 
tne bolder element carried the day and it was determined to 
advance. Through the niEnt and in the early dawn the march 
northwards was carried on and the English approached 
Alnwick in tne forenoon of the 13th. During the last stages 
of the journey a dense mist is said to have prevailed and 
this may explain how the English were able to pass through 
the Scottish outpsrts5without the alarm being given. Some 
of the party were eager to turn back, but Baliol heartened 
them by his resolution. Close to the river the English came 
upon William himself with a small body of sixty cavalry in 
4 Jordan Fantosme. 
Wyntoun, ch. 8. 
3-Jordan Fantosme. 
Á.Wiilliam of Newburgh, ch.:53. 
T If there were any. 
in/ 
a meadow. /. 
Apparently William at(first imagined that the 
advancing force was part of nis mwn army, but a closer scrutiì 
snowed the presence of English standards. The obvious course 
for the kin was to retreat until he could bather sufficient c 
his forces to overwhelm the English, but instead of doing thiE 
he adopted the foolish course of charging the enemyr2.tie struci 
down his first opponent, but a sergeant killed his horse, and 
William was pinned to the ground by its dead body. Unable to 
make any furtner resistance* he surrendered to Ranulph de 
Glanville. Bello' stunned and captured William de Mortimer, 
and many of the Scots, including Richard Comyn, surrendered 
when they saw the king taken. Roger de Mowbray and Adam de 
Port smcceeded in making their escape and returned to Scotland 
The losses on both sides were naturally small, as the whole 
affair was little more than a skirmish. The captive king was 
taken to Richmond castle in Yorkshire.3. 
Section 3. Conclusions. 
The main interest of the two campaigns, which have 
been briefly described above, lies, not in the actual shock 
of battle of which there was little, but in William's 
movements ind in the behaviour of his men. These are important 
/.What exactly happened at this point is uncertain. William of 
Newburgh, ch.33, asserts that the mist suddenly rose and the 
English found themselves close to William. Fantosme, on the 
other hand, states that the English took post in a wood, and 
that a spy, sent forward by de Glanville, returned and reporte 
William's exposed situation. The latter explanation seems to 
me the more probable. 
.It was, however, a regular piece of mediaeval bravado. The 
Conduct of Clifford and Argentine at Bannockburn was similar. 




because they form part of wriat was really the last attempt 
at conquest by the Scots, as distinct from invasions in 
defence of tneir own territory. 
There is in William's movements the same lack of a 
definite plan of conquest, which_ was noticeable in David's 
invasion of 1138; but, with the exception of the catastrophe 
at A1nwick which terminated the campaign and nullified all iti 
previous successes, there are traces of some skill in the 
operl.,.tions of the king and his advisers. In this respect it 
must be remembered that although with William, as commander - 
in- chief, lay the final resposibility, yet most of the action; 
of trie war were probably directed by Adam de Port and the 
other barons who were in immediate attendance on the kind. 
There is no trace of any say being allowed to what may be 
called trie irregular element in tue Scots army, and we may 
surmise that if a pitcned battle read been fought with the 
English, it would nave been managed on more regular lines 
tnan that of the Standard. 
When the army proved unable to take Wark castle, triE 
invasion, instead of being pushed south as David's riad been, 
was directed westwards, and an attempt was made to open a way 
to Scotland by trie capture of Carlisle and the neighbouring 
fortresses. 'Preis attempt was in the main successful and the 
Scots secured communication with trieir own country in the west 
It is difficult to rate as equally sound the move from Prudhoe 
to Alnwick. It is true that William had only heard that a 
force was gathering against him in the south and could not 
possibly know how weak that force was. Under these circum- 
stances it was perhaps justifiable on his part to seek to 
avoid a battle and secure his retreat; but he does not seem 
to have considered that by retreating he sacrificed his chance 
of obtaining possession of Carlisle. In addition it may be 
pointed out that, unless the Scots were capable of winning a 
battle against the English forces of the north, they could 
iY 
could/ 
never hope to hold the northern counties, and thus the whole 
,invasion. would be stultified. The fact seems to be that neithi 
i`illir;, nor David had the idea of a complete conquest, but 
that both thought that by making intolerable nuisances of thei 
selves they might induce the English rulers of their respecti, 
periods to hand over the north. In David's case this plan was 
partially successful, but its success could only endure so 
long as the English were too weak to take back the lands they 
nad surrendered. 
The actual occurrences round Ainwick itself 
are shrouded in mystery. William had presumably between ten 
and twenty thousand_ men occupying the country round about. 
Yet a body of heavy cavalry, too large to be easily concealed, 
was able to blunder through the ring of besiegers and capture 
the king, and also, which is much more surprising, was able tc 
withdraw again with its prisoners, without, so far as can be 
ascertained, any serious attempt being tirade at a resuae. 
It can safely be assumed that the Scots had no 
effective outpost, system in operation. Even the lightest scree 
of rickets could not have failed to notice the passage of 
four hundred horsemen, even if that passage took place in dim. 
light. The point that cannot be settled is whether the absence 
of outposts was due to carelessness in the high command or to 
lack of discipline on the part of the troops. William and his 
knights knew that a force had been embodied against them, but 
of its whereabouts they were unaware; from their point of view 
it was much more likely to be near Prudhoe than near Ainwick. 
The theory that the Scots despised the English force because 
of its smallness and therefore took no precautions against it 
is negatived by the fact that they had already retreated from 
Prudhoe because of its rumoured approach. Any information as 
to size gained during the retreat or during the siege.of 
Alnwick would have disclosed the position of the English and 
would have put the Scots on their guard. 
/á 
On the other hand it lay be said that William's 
array was livinE7 on the country and was therefore scattered 
over a wide area. A great deal of plundering was going on and 
it would be very difficult to find among the light troops a 
sufficient number of reliable Irian_, who could be trusted to 
undertake steady outpost duty while their fellows were busily 
engaged in looting the country for their own profit. This fact 
makes it probable that some sort of an outpost line was poste . 
and that the men either slipr,ed away to plunder or were so la; 
in their attention to duty that the English force was allowed 
to pass through. The absence of any attempt at a ressue may bE 
exìlained by the facts that the reliable part of the army was 
dispersed by the English cavalry and that the remainder, 
scattered and without leaders41 would naturally think the 
attack only a prelude to an offensive by a much larger force. 
In summing up the points of the campaign it may be 
said that in the conduct of the invasions and especially in 
the sieges of the castles there are signs of an advance in 
skill. but it is clear that there was still no regular force 
able to undertake a definite campaign as distinct from a raid, 
and that the advance in the science of warfare was due to the 
alien influences, Norman and Fleming, in the Scottish army. 
Section 4. Siege weapons./ 
From classical times down to the age of the 
invention and development of gunpowder, the main weapons in 
use in sieges varied very little. Demetrius Poliorcetes knew 
as much about the scientific meghodc of taking a fortress as 
the Scottish leaders of the Middle Ages, and it is not till 
the siege of Roxburgh castle by James II, that any marked 
LAs reference has been made in this chapter and will have to be 
made in others to certain implements of siege warfare, I have 
considered it advisable to insert here a short section, 
explaining briefly the nature of these weapons. The list has 
no pretensions to being exhaustive. 
/9. 
Larked/ 
development of these methods takes place in Scottish affairs. 
In dealing; with a castle the mediaeval general, 
if time was no object, resorteb to a blockade or made one of 
those, to us, curious arrangements with the besieged by which 
no hostilities tiok place and the fortress surrendered after 
a fixed period, if no relief arrived in the interval. If a 
regular attack in form was to be made, the first object was 
to reach the moat or ditch.t To do this it was usually 
necessary to storm the tete -de -pont of the drawbridge, which 
otherwise might be used by the garrison as a sally -port from 
which a sortie might be made to take the besiegers in the 
flank. The ditch was frequently defended by chevaulx- de- frise, 
or entanglements in modern terms, and these had to be pierced 
under the archery fire of the besieged. 
The ditch, being reached, was next filled up for 
some distance in order to give the attackers access to the 
foot of the walls. This was an expensive operation, as the 
besiegers were by this time exposed to the shpwer of heavy 
stones, boiling pitch and water, arrows, and other projectileE 
used by the defenders. To protect the men at the ditch trie 
archers of the besiegers were usually employed to give a 
covering fire and to clear the top of the wall as much as 
yossible. 
When a way had been opened to the wall, several 
expedients were open to the attacking general, which he might 
use simultaneously or separately. a.An attack by scaling- A 
ladders might be made at several points. This was an uncertair 
and most suitable in a surprise. b.The place might be bom- 
barded by tree large siege engines,2 all worked by the 
/.We are dealing here with a stone castle, but it must be 
remembered that till the 14th century there were few such in 
Scotland. Most of the strongholds were constructed largely 
of wood, and were correspondingly easy to take. 
..Variously known under a bewildering diversity of names such 
as the catapult, ballista, mangonel, sling, arbalast (not the 
small variety, or crossbow), etc. 
40. 
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principles of stretching or twisting ropes, or by counterpoise 
These machines were of more use in annoying the besieged than 
.in making a re. ular breach. c.'.L'he ram might be brought forward 
to batter down the wall. It was usually protected by a pent- 
house, or so*, which moved on wheels and was constructed of Z 
timber and raw hides, the latter being used to minimise the 
danger of fire from the combustibles dropped upon it by the 
garrison. d.The cat could be used; it was a bore intended to 
loosen the stones of the wall and so make a mole, and was, 
like the ram, protected by a penthouse. e.Miners might be set 
to work to dig under the wall. The roof of the mine was 
propped up by beams, which were set on fire after the men had 
withdrawn, When the timbers had been consumed, the mine fell 
in and the wall collapsed. f.A tower could be constructed of 
timber and mounted on wheels. It was made so that, when it was 
rolled up to the wall, its top would be level with the parapet 
and the attackers could thus jump on to the top of the wall 
and clear it of defenders. The towerfwas, however, useless if 
the ground was uneven or soft, and was very liable to be 
destroyed by fire. g.An attempt might be made to burn down the 
gate, but as this was usually protected by a portcullis and 
flanking towers, and was often set ina a tunnel, such an 
attempt was very costly and uncertain. 
Almost any one of the above methods could be 
successfully employed by a strong force against a second -rate 
fortress, as were most of the castles in Scotland, but it is 
evident that a first -class castle, ably governed, and 
equipped with two or three lines of defence and a keep, could 
defy its attackers for a prolonged period. 
In defence the main object was to destroy the 
engines of the besiegers. This could be done by sorties, fire, 
projectiles, cutting the ropes of the engines, jamming the 
head of the ram, and by counter -mining. The machines used for 
purposes of bombardment were similar to those of the attackers. 
attackers.f 
In addition the wall might be heightened at a threatened point 
or a half -moon wall built to cover any breach which had been 
Lade. In the best type of castle the battlements projected, 
andthere were slits in the floor, which enabled the 
defenders to drop stones or liquid to the foot of the wall 
without exposing themselves above the parapet. 
Blarney castle, though not a mediaeval fortress, has good 
examples of this means of defence. The most accurate and 
graphic account of the type of siege prevalent in ancient and 
mediaeval times is that in Flaubert's "Salambo" . 
Charter III. 
The Invasion of Hato. 
Section 1.Previous troubles. 
After the catastrophe at Alnwick the Scots gave up 
the attempt to secure the northerncounties and a state of 
peace prevailed between the two countries for more than a 
century. This period of harmony was invaluable to the Scottish 
kings, who were actively engaged in consolidating their 
kingdom and in subjugating the more unruly sections og the 
people in Galloway and Argyle, but, being a.period of peace, 
it was necessarily unaccomanied by any military development. 
The consolidation of the country naturally entailed attempts 
to secure the western isles, and these attempts brought about 
troubles with the Norsemen in whose possession they then were. 
The first serious disturbance -took place in 1228. 
Being at so great a distance from Norway, the Islesmen enjoyed 
a kind of semi- independence under the rule of king's lieuten- 
ant or viceroy, that post being held at the time by Olaf of 
Man. But the greatest power in the southern islands seems to 
6 
have been held by the house of S aerled. In 1228 Alan of 
Galloway, whether acting on his own initiative or by direction 
of superior authority, attacked the southern isles and Olaf 
was unable to resist him successfullyí Ospak, of the house.of 
Somerled, brought the news of the disaster to Haco, and was 
soon followed by the defeated Olaf. Two years later Haco named 
Ospak ruler of the Isles and sent him off from Bergen with 
Oiaf and eleven ships to reconquer the islanders, who seem to 
have made common cause with their Scottish invaders.4, 
By recruiting in the Orkneys and in the western 
isles the attacking force was raised to a total of eighty 
/.The Haco Saga, Rolls Series, p.163. 
' , p.164* 
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ships. /.The Norsemen sailed round Cantyre and landed on Bute to 
attack the Scottish strongholds there. An assault was made on 
one of trie castles, which was constructed, at least partially, 
of stone, but the attackers were driven back by the showers of 
boiling pitch and lead poured upon tnem by the defenders. They 
next constructed wooden shelters2 and, under cover of these, 
hewed their way through the foot of the wall, which was 
constructed of soft stone. A covering fire of archery was kept 
up, which caused the garrison some loss. After three days' 
siege the castle was taken and plundered, but it had cost the 
Norsemen, on their own confession, three hundred men, a ser- 
ious loss to their small force. This was aggravated shortly 
afterwards by the bursting of a storm, which caused the loss 
of three shipd with their crews. Threatened with an attack by 
Alan of Galloway with a superior force, the invaders lay in 
shelter off the Cantyre coast. Here Ospak died and Olaf, who 
succeeded to the leadership, sailed to Man, where the winter 
was spent. 
In the following spring the force, leaving Olaf in 
Lan, attacked. Cantyre. The Norsemen built a camp on the shore 
and marched inland, where a fight took place. After an indec- 
isive struggle in which both sides suffered heavily, the 
Norsemen retreated to their camp which had been plundered in 
their absence. After some other small raids had been made on 
various points of the Cantyre peninsula, the force returned to 
by Lewis and the Orkneys.3. 
It is clear that the attack had made no great 
impression, a fact due no doubt to tne smallness of the force 
the distance from its base, and the difficulty of securing 
¿About forty men to a ship may be a fair average; see Du 
Chaillu on the subject. 
41.I presume this to be the meaning of tne "flakes" mentioned in 
0the Saga, p.167. 
.riaco Saga, plp.167s. 
securing/ 
reinforcements. A Horse landing was trie sign for trie people of 
the neighbouring districts to take arms en masse, and this rudi 
form of levy was sufficiently strong to prevent any penetratiol 
inland on the part of the invaders. 'r;e are free to assume that 
after the withdrawal of the attackers Cantyre, Arran, the 
Cumbraes, and Bute, at least, remained in the power of the 
Scots. 
For over thirt;í years matters remained as they were, 
the only serious movement being the attempt of Alexander II 
in 1248 to secure the isles. Tais failed owing to the loyalty 
of John of Man to tige Norse cause and to the death of the 
king at Kerrera. /There followed the minority of Alexander III, 
during which little could be done by the Scots, but in 1262 
the earl of Ross, presumably acting with Alexander's 
encouragement, attacked and ravaged Skye. The news of this 
raid and the rumour tnat Alexander was planning a conquest of 
trie isles stirred haco to action and he ordered the preparatioá 
of an expeditionary force.c2. 
Section 2. Tne main attack. 
In trie spring of 1263 haco was ready to sail with 
. 
the greatest force that had ever left ivorway,3 iiis own ship, 
/Hato Saga, p.266. .?.Ibidem, p.314. 
3,The Raven Song; "Never gold mater 
Saw more on one spot 
Sturdy spear- throwers 
To stand by their lord. 
That fountain of honour 
Shut put the sea -shore 
With snield -fence of snips, 
And an army of men" 
Were some of tae vessels English ships? údyntoun, ch.x, mention 
that some of the vessels had top -castles, surely unusual in a 
Norse galley. Bain,I,2355, nas a protest of henry III at some 
English vessels, presumably merchant ships, being seized by 
the i'orsemen and used in the war against Scotland. 
.25" 
ship,/ 
the largest of tiie fleet, was splendidly equipped and naa xxir 
thirty benches, which allowing two men to a bench and certain 
supernumeraries, supposes a crew of at least ninety mend. 
The expedition sailed rapidly to Snetland, 
where a delay of a fortnight took place in Bressey Sound, and 
thence to Kirkwall, where a council was held. naco, apparently 
realising the hopelessness of a struggle in the west far from 
his base, proposed that he should keen his fleet at Kirkwall, 
while a portion of the force should bring pressure on the ScotE 
by ravaging the fertile district of Aoray. This plan failed 
through the reluctance of the Norsemen to being detached from 
the king and the main force, a reluctance which seems to imply, 
even at this early stage, a lack of confidence in their own 
strengtn. Invaluable time had been wasted and it was the 5th oí 
August before taco proceeded by honaldshay, the Pentland 
Firth, Lewis, and the Sounds of Skye and Mull, to Kerrera in 
the bay of Oban, where the whole force mustered, one hundred 
and twenty snips strong At a liberal estimate of fifty men to 
a ship, this gives a total of no more titian six thousand men. 
From Kerrera naco proceeded south to Gigha, almost 
half the force being detached to harry Tarbet in Cantyre. The 
ravaging went on till the local chiefs submitted, and the king, 
after a further delay due to waiting for a wind, rounded the 
.dull and anchored at Lanlasii, while a small force took 
possession of Bute with very little trouble.3Alexander, well 
knowing treat the islands and Cantyre were merely pawns bound 
to become the spoil of tine ultimate victor and -that the weather 
would prove his best ally, did not trouble unduly about the 
loss of the outlying districts, but contented himself with 
holding his main force at Ayr as a central point and relying x 
/.naco Saga, p.318. 
3. 
, p.319. 
p .320 -322. 
on the people of the coast to resist any landing long enough 
to enable him to come up.4 At the same time he kept up, a desul- 
tory negotiation with naco by which time was passed away. his 
confidence in the outcome of the struggle is shown by his 
absolute refusal to surrender to the Norsemen the islands of 
Arran, ¡Jute, and tne Cumbraes.02. 
At length haco, weary of this fruitless 
bargaining and conscious that September was well advanced and 
that his men were short of food, sailed to the Curabraes, where 
the temporary truce was- broken off. Sixty snips, being half 
the horse fleet, were detached under Uagnus of than to Loch 
Long.3 From the loch the Norsemen performed a portage of their 
small boats into Loch Lomond, whence raiding parties desolated 
the islands pfthe loch and the rich district of Lennox, one 
body pushing well into tne interior of the couütry.,ilne raid 
was distinctly successful, but this was largely discounted by 
is little direct evidence that Ayr itself was Alexander' 
base, but it was the most central point for the defence of the 
seaboard and nie presence there seems to be implied by the 
reference in John of Fordun's Annals, ch.55. 
á iiaco Saga, p.322. 
3John of Fordun, Annals, ch.55, puts the total force of the 
invaders at one hundred and twenty ships; the discrepancy from 
the number given in the Saga is not great, but all through I 
prefer the Norse account, which seems straightforward wad 
merits confidence by its refusal to disguise defeats. 
4 naco Saga, p.323; "Those soldiers so flight -shy 
Of dart- storms bold wielder, 
Drew boats over dry land 
For many a length; 
Those warriors undaunted 
They wasted with war -gales, 
the islands thick -peopled 
Of Lomond's broad loch." 
by/ 
tne fact that on their return the Norsemen lost ten ships and 
trieir crews by the same storm that brought about the wreck of 
taco's snips and the subsequent action near Largs. 
On trie night of Monday, 1st October, the storm 
struck riaco's fleet and caused several og the ships to drag 
their anchors. The flagship was, with great difficulty, saved, 
but three vessels were driven ashore. Wnen dawn came, a force 
of Scots appeared, wiio attacked trie shipwrecked crews with 
archery, but did not attempt a charge. i'ne storm moderated as 
the day went on and naco sent in a landing party to protect 
his men. On the appearance of those reinforcements the Scots 
witndrevi, but during tne following night they returned and 
plundered the wrecks./ 
In the morning of the next day, the 3rd October, 
i!aco, to prevent further plundering, himself landed with a z 
strong force and saw to trie stripping of the wrecked vessels. 
Later in tné day a strong body of Scots, comprising some 
cavalry and a large number of archers and men armed with pikes 
and bills came upon tne scene, and riaco, at the urgent request 
of his men, returned to his ship.2. 
The position of true Norsemen was now very precar- 
ious. They had seven hundred men on the rough shingle and 
/,.Haco Saga, pp.324 -325. Probably these archers were only the 
country people of the districts round about and could not 
engage in a regular struggle with the Norsemen. 
iaco Saga, p.326. This would be the vanguard of the main 
Scottish force coining up. The Saga puts the number of horsemen 
at five hundred, which is probably too great, and states tnat 
the horses were protected with mail; some of them may have 
been, but it could hardly be true of the majority. In any case 
owing to the nature of the ground, the cavalry could not oper- 
ate freely, and the chronicle of Mailros, ío.62, is doubtless 
cossect in attributing the success of tne Scots to the footmen 
and/ 
shelving rocks of the shore in the vicinity of the wrecks, 
and a furtner two hundred under the command of Ogmund, placed 
as an outpost on a hillock a little inland. As the Scots 
advanced, the Norsemen on the hillock withdrew and were so 
hotly pursued that they broke and fled. The panic spread to 
the main body on the shore and a rush for the boats took place 
As a consequence many hen were drowned through boats being 
overcrowded and capsizing. Some of the Norsemen, however, 
rallied in the shelter of the wrecks and held out bravely. 
Reinforcements gradually worked ashore from the snips and the 
defenders were able to hold their own till nightfall and even 
to recover some of the lost ground. In the darkness the 
Norsemen withdrew to tAeir fleet. They must nave lost several 
hundred men in the storm and the fight; amongst tne fallen 
were flaco of Stein and 'T'norgils, both members of the King's 
bodyguard. / 
On tne following day naco returned toll the Cumbraes 
where he was joined by the fleet from Loca Long wits: its news 
of further losses in the storm. Influenced by tnis naco with- 
drew further to Lamlash to settle what steps should next be 
taken. pie himself wisned to wi;iter in Ireland and to renew 
the attack in the following year, but his men, dispirited and 
short of food, insisted on a return to Norway. The fleet 
sailed back by Islay and ïiul.i to the Orkneys, losing one more 
vessel by a wreck in the Pentland Firth and having, some 
foragers cut off by the people of Caithness. At Kirkwall the y 
invasion was definitely terminated by trie death of iiaco. J, 
Taco Saga, y). 32G. The statement of the Saga that tne Norsemen 
held their ground is doubtless true, otherwise they would have 
been completely destroyed. At the same time I can hardly 
accept the assertion that they drove the Scots completely off 
the field; the confession tnat the Scots were able to remove 
their dead negat Ives tfie possibility of a rout. 
.2 '_aco Saga, pÿ.326 -327. 
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Section 3. Position of the battle and ogler consiuerations. 
Confusion arises from the fact that there are two 
Cumbraes and that there is no definite information as to which 
was naco's anchorage. If this point could be established, the 
neighbourhood of the battle could easily be fixed, though not 
` its exact point. As it was a southwesterly gale which wrecked 
naco's ships, /,the battle would be fought on a part of the 
mainland slightly to the north of the anchorage. 
If the Norsemen took shelter behind the smaller or 
southern Currbrae, the wreckd would be cast ashore nearer to 
Fairlie than to the modern town of Lards; if behind the 
lamer Cuxribrae, they would strike in the vicinity of the 
present battle tower. In either case the .battle must have 
taken place in the bay between Farland Head and -Largs itself. 
If it may be assumed that the anchorage was in the shelter of 
the greater Cumbrae, it should be added that it was probably 
on the side where Koppel Pier now stands; Millport bay is too 
confined and rocky for a large fleet and has, moreover, a 
southern exposure. 
The fight itself should have taught the Scots a 
valuable le -sson as to their best means of defence. Since the 
beginning of history every general, with the possible 
exception of Hannibal, who has cut hinself off from his base 
and attempted to subsist in a hostile country, has failed. 
`!here was nothing surprising in Haco's defeat; it was in fact 
inevitable from the start. The only hope of the Norsemen was 
to harass the Scottish coast to such an extent that the king 
would be glad to make peace at the expense of sacrificing the 
islands. That Haco realised this shown by his proposal that 
x 
/.A tale outside the south to west quarter of the compass is 
practically unknown on the Ayrshire coast. 
.Largs is specifically mentioned by VGyntoun, ch.x, but I have 
an idea that the "Lairgs" was originally a name applied to 
all the coastal plain in the vicinity of the town. 
3O 
that/ 
the expedition snoulQattack úoray from the security of the 
Orkneys. The Norse king did his best for his fleet; it is 
useless to blaiie him for dividing it before a battle, because 
there is little doubt that Hato did not contemplate a battle 
at all and would not have, fought one, but for the storm. The 
only inexcusable fault was the wasting of tike, which took 
place on the outward journey. 
The lesson, which, in the light of after events, 
the Scots conspicuously failed to digest, was that an invasion 
like a revolution, cannot stand still; it must destroy the 
hostile armies and occupy their territory or it will 
inevitabYy A powerful attack by the most formidable fighting 
people of the time had failed, not because the Scots had been 
able to win a great battle, but because through the wisdom of 
their king and the vagaries of the weather they had been able 
to avoid one. The obvious course of defence for every 
Scottish. leader from the day of Largs onwards should have 
been to harass the enemy, to wear hip: out by surprises and 
stratagems, but, above all else, to avoid decisive battle 
except in the most favourable 'situation, until the nature of 
the country itself, its natural defences and its 
inaccessibility, should have wearied out the invaders. 
It need occasion no surprise that the Scots did 
not make a more determined effort to crush the horse landing 
party entirely. There are three considerations which explain 
this apparent neglect of a golden opportunity. a.The great 
reputation of the Norsemen as determined fighters, who 
usually gave of their very best when in a tight corner. 
b.'The fact that only a portion or the Scottish wain body 
could yet have arrived. If the Norsemen had lingered on the 
beach for another day, the Scots would have been present in 
much greater strength and would have made a more determined 
attack. c.The point that the extermination of the few 
hundreds of invaders on the beach was of very little 
little/ 
importance. From the moment of the bursting of the storm over 
tîae. Cumbraes an ultimate Norse failure and retreat may be said 
to have been only a matter of time. Under these circu,.:stances 
it would have been folly- for the Scots to have risked a 
disastrous repulse. 
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Part II. The .'Tar of Independence. 
Chapter I. 
Berwick and Dunbar. 
Section 1. The fall of Berwick. 
In 1295, a rupture between Edward I and aohn Baliol 
seeming inevitable, an alliance was formed between the Scots 
and Philip of France. In pursuance of the policy declared in 
this treaty and with the purpose of forestalling and rendering 
ineffective the invasion already being prepared in England, 
the Scots crossed the border in the earl pring of 1296./ 
Thanks to the beneficent rule of Alexander IIl, 
Scotland was by this time a fairly well prganised country 
with a growing trade to which much importance was attached. 
Unfortunately military development had not proceeded at a rate 
commensurate with security, although some steps had been taken 
The country had been immune from serious invasion fvvm more 
than a century and, as a result, there do not seem to have 
been any regularly formulated schemes for a defensive campaign 
Since the cessation of the trouble concerning the possession o 
the northern counties, relations with the aouthern neighbour 
had been, on the whole, good, and the Scots, lacking the 
incentive to efficiency, supplied by the presence of a 
dangerous neighbour, had in military affairs fallen behind the 
English, who had profited by the conflicts with the Welsh and 
the French. 
/.It will be noticed that I have accepted the assertion of the 
Scalacronica and of the chronicles of Lanercost and Meaux 
that the Scots took the first steps in the struggle. This, 
however, does not throw on the Scots the onus of a war, which 
had been rendered inevitable by the behaviour of Edward I 
towards Scotland. 
33 
The only direction in which the Scots had made 
progress was in the composition of their armies. The Gaelic 
element had practically disappeared and in its place came the 
forces of the burghers of the towns and of the freeholders of 
the lowmand and eastern counties.!Along with these men went 
the barons, who held by feudal tenure, with their quotas of 
retainers, and the Celtic earls, much milder in spirit than 
in the days of the Standard, with their particular retinues; 
in addition there would always be a propoution uí the poorer 
peasants and men from the towns, partly as camp -followers and 
partly as light troops. Of the infantry portion of the army 
it is difficult to give exact particulars before the time 
when the Scottish parliament began to issue exaa.IxpaxIimaiaxx 
regular directions for the arming of the country. It must 
suffice to say that the probable equipment for the better part 
of the foot would consist of pike, sword, acton, or leather 
jacket reinforced with small steel plates, and possibly a 
strengthened bonnet. The poorer footmen would have little 
defensive armour and would carry either spear cr bow. 
The better armed cavalry, as always, did not differ 
greatly in equipment from their English contemporaries. The 
latter were at this time wearing the complete chain mail with 
breast, back, and leg plates in addition; the helmet was of a 
rounder shape and was frequently closed by a visor and 
surmounted by a crest. The offensive weapons carried were the 
lance and a selection from the mace, flail, swgrd, axe, and 
hammer or punch. In addition it should be mentioned that the 
English, inflaenced by their contact with the Welsh on the 
western marches, had developed their archery to a pitch never 
approached in Scotland, though still far short of the point to 
which it afterwards attained in the south. 
In March the Scottish raiders, led by the earls of 
Ross, Menteith, Athole, and others, devastated some districts 
/John of Fordun, Annals, ch.89. 
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districts/ 
of Cumberland and burned the suburbs of Carlisle which lay 
outside the wail of the town. The attack, however, did not 
succeed in its object of diverting the English invasion of 
Scotland, and on 28th March Edward arrived outside Berwick 
with a strong force, which partly depended for its supplies 
on a fleet provided by the Cinque Ports. /. 
Berwick and Perth were at this time the only two 
protected towns in Scotland, but the wall at Berwick was 
really only a strong embankment, seven or eight feet high, 
covered by a ditch. The caslt2 0was distinct from the town and 
lay further up, the north bank of the Tweed in the vicinity of 
the present railway bridge.lhe town was at this time the cent 
of trade between Scotland and England and was one of the 
largest and most prosperous in the north. The garrison 
consisted of a detachment sent from Fife by Balioyspecially 
for the purpose and of the burghers themselves, some of whom 
were Flen:ings.3. 
Edward made overtures to the town for a capitul- 
ation, but his offers were refused and certain of his ships, 
either in attempting an assault or in carrying out their 
regular work of giving supplies to the array, were destroyed. 
To carry out their work and avoid the cliffs it was necessary 
for the vessels to enter the Tweed, and here they were caught 
on the Calot Shad presumably by the falling of the tide. A 
sally from the town resulted in the burning of the vessels, a 
deed which, together with the rejection of his offers, 
%John of Fórdun, Annals, ch.89; Scalacronica. 
Owing to the multiplication of fortifications of different 
periods in'berwick, it is extremely difficult to trace the Tin 
of the old wall, but I have endeavoured to make the accompany - 
ing plane, which I prepared myself, give a rough idea of the line 
of tie wall as it existeu in Edward's time, a line which 
extended much further than the later Tudor fortifications. 
3.John of Fordun, Annals, ch.89; Chronicle of Meaux, II.p.261; 




On the 30th Edward made a feigned retreat and, after 
a hurried return, was able to cross the ditch and burst into 
the town without encountering any serious resistance..21'here 
followed a dreadful massacre in which thousands of the citizens 
fell and the men of Fife, apparently the most reliable portion 
of Baliol's forces, were destroyed. The only knight of note 
killed on the English side was Richard de Cornwall, who was 
shot by a Flemish archer. Shaken in spirit by the disaster to 
the town, the governor surrendered the castle on the same 
evening without waiting for an assault.). 
Section 2. The rout of Dunbar. 
After the capture of zerwick Edward was for some 
time engaged in strengthening and extending the defences of the 
place. The Scottish invaders at the same time continued their 
ravages on the border of Cumberland and Northumberland, 
especially in the neighbourhood of Hexham, and later recrossed 
the border into Scotland. Their objective was Dunbar, but, 
owing to Berwick and the lower reaches of the Tweed being in 
English hands, they were compelled to cross the river further 
west and thus make a de4our inland.f. 
At this time Patrick, earl of March, was serving with 
the Englis$ king and his castle of Dunbar was held for England 
by his wife. The Scots #J desirous of blocking the coast road, 
appeared before the castle on Aril 21st, and the earl of Pear 
/John of Fordun, Annals, ch.90; Chronicle of iieaux, II. p. 261; 
Scalacronica,fo.198b. 
,2,Fordun and Wyntoun,ch.XI, both assert that the English 
deceived the garrison by using Scottish standards, while the 
Scalacronica states that there was á flaw in the defences 
owing to the town people having made a path on the fosse. 
3,Chronicle of Meaux,II.p.261. 
. ,II. p.261. 
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mar/ 
was able to persuade the countess to reg,arc' her husband as a 
traitor to Scotland and to admit the Scots. The English 
Larricon was exÿelled 77ith loss and the Scots placed in the 
castle a strong force./. Edward immediately sent forward the 
earl of Warenne with a division of the English army to atteipt 
the recovery of the place,Z, Tnis force attacked the castle and 
the garrison asked for a three days's truce in order to get 
help from Baliol; tais request was granted by the besiegers. 
On the 27th the main Scottish body appeared, 
descending the slope of tne Lammermoors from the direction of 
Spott.3In number it was probably superior to the English force 
under Warenne, but it must have been composed for the most 
patt of men little experienced in war. The relieving body had 
been in communication with the garrison of the castle and an 
arrangement nad been made by which the garrison was to give 
the signal for the advance of the field army by lig,nting a 
beacon fire on the castle. l'ne garrison would then make a 
sortie at the same moment as the army attacked Warenne, and it 
was hoped that in this fashion the English body would be 
crushed between tne two parties of Scots.. 
Unfortunately for the success of the plan, Dunbar 
castle was situated on a rocky promontory, wnicn ..,as joined 
to the mainland by a narrow neck of land and was moreover 
commanded by a higher elevation on tne mainland. Thus the 
English were able to put the garrison out of action by leavinL 
a small holding force to repel any attempted sortie, and could 
turn to meet the advancing Scottish army with practically 
/,Chronicle of Lanercost,fo.20b. 
..h_emingford,II.p.103, puts it at one thousand horse, which is 
very probable, and ten thousand foot, which is certainly an 
exaggeration. 
3,Scalacronica,fo.i 99. 
'%.Chronicle of Lanercost,fo.205b. 
3 
practically/ 
their whole strength./ 
The Scots were now almost in the narrow plain which 
bounds Dunbar to the south and the English, probably anxious 
to keep the coast route open, advanced down the hill from 
Dunbar to meet them. As the English proceeded hurriedly, tneir 
ranks feil into some disorder and the Scots were buoyed up by 
the thought that this was a sign of unsteadiness on the enemy': 
part. They were soon undeceived. On reacning fair ground again 
the English coolly reformed their array and then delivered a 
charge which the Scots were quite unable to withstand. The 
mounted section of the Scottish host fled after offering every 
áeeb16 resistance, and the footmen, inexperienced in the shock 
of battle, opposed by veteran troops, and disheartened by the 
flight of the men on whom they most relied, broke up rapidly. 
Their nearest refuge was the great forest of Selkirk and 
thither they fled. As far as the outskirts of the wood the 
English kept up the purduit and thousands of Scots fell. 
!Alone anon the notables Sir Patrick Graham resisted to the 
last on the field of battle and feli where he fought. The 
English loss was trifling.á 
After the relieving; force had been disposed of in 
this summary fashion, the English returned to the siege of the 
castle. As they constituted an advance party which had been 
pushed forward rapidly, they were deficient in siege 
.equipment and were compelled to have reccurse to the simpler 
methods of attack. Mounds of earth were thrown up against the 
wall to give an inclined approach by which an assault could 
be made, and a mine was connrenced. On the day after the battle 
the garrison, realising their hopeless position, cut off as 
they were from help both by land and sea, surrendered without 
!.Chronicle of Meaux, II. p. 262. 
. heIriin ;ford, II. p. 1C4; John of Fordun, Annals, ch. 92; Meaux 
Chronicle,II.p.262; Chronicle of Lanercost,fo.205b. 
j Ó. 
without/ 
awaiting an attack. The prisoners, apparently the flower of the 
Scottish army, included the earls of Menteith, Athole, and 
Ross, between thirty twenty and thirty knights, and almost 
one hundred men -at -arms. / 
With the rout of the main army and the capture of 
Dunbar the resistance of the Scots collapsed. Edward made a 
rapid progress through the east of Scotland, which was only 
terminated by the surrender of Baliol at Stracathro. The 
organised forces of the country had proved quite unfit for the 
task of checking the English, and it was left for time and the 
needs of the case to produce the natural methods of resistance 
and the men who coula follow them. 
Section 3. Lessons of the campaign. 
The reason for the defeat of the Scots is evident. 
They were foolish enough to play the English at their own game 
and cause off seconOd best. The English may have been inferior 
in numbers, tuou,,,r: 1,he difference cannot have been great,but 
they were seasoned troops, experienced in war and enjoying a 
better equipment than that possessed by the Scots. The 
circumstances being such, the Scots should nave endeavoured to 
discover a new mode of fighting suitable to their means and 
natural resources and should have tried to engage their 
veteran enemies in a type of warfare for which their experience 
had not adapted them. vhenever the Scots adopted the wrong 
course and embarked on what was, for those days, a conventional 
campaign, they laid themselves open to a crushing defeat. It 
remains to examine the particulars of the struggle. 
The initial move of the Scots in striking first 
and in raiding their opponent's territory was a good one. It 
gave the troops a much needed opportunity to acquire 
experience and confidence: in themselves through early successe 
/Chronicle of 14ieaux, II. p. 262; riemingford, II. p. 10; Chronicle 
or Lanercost,fo.205b; Scalacronica,fo.199. 
successes./ 
Its object of diverting the hostile attack would have been 
successful in the case of most mediaeval generals. Edward I, 
nowezer, was too sensible to be drawn into a difficult and 
prolonged pursuit of a mobile raiding force, a pursuit which 
would consume time and the energies of nis men without lead- 
ing to any decisive result. Instead he pushed forward his 
invasion. of Scotland, re-yin¿ on the marauders being drawn 
back home by the danger to their country. Both parties, in a 
word, were employing the same strategy, Edward trying to draw 
home the Scots by invading their lands and the Scots 
endeavouring to divert Edward by ravaging the north of England 
Thus the matter became one of endurance, rather of the spirit 
than of the flesh, and in this trial of morale the Scots gave 
way. Many excuses can be made for them. Their country had 
long been immune from attack ana prospered in trade, so that 
a destructive invasion must have seemed to them a very 
terrible affair. Moreover they were conscious of their 
superior numbers and, through their inexperience of battle, 
quite unaware of the tremendous advantage which the English 
would enjoy in regular combat. It is safe to say that, if 
Scotland had been engaged in war and had been seriously 
attacked and ravaged two or three times in the previous 
decade, the invasion of Cumberland would have been pushed on 
and Edward's sack of Berwick and advance up the east coast 
ignored. Such a policy woula probably have been successful, 
because of the impossibility, proved many a time in later 
years, of maintaining a large army in Scotland for a 
prolonged period. 
When Edward had succeeded in imposing his strategy 
on the Scots, the end was in sight. The most deplorable 
feature and, in fact, the fatal one of the rest of the 
struggle was the flagrant misuse which was made by the 
Scots 
of their fortresses. The shutting up of the men of Fife in 
the town of Berwick was a step which seriously weakened the 
the/ 
field force. Not content with this initial blunder, the Scots 
proceeded to coop up the flower of their army in Dunbar casts 
and so placed themselves in the position of havi -g to force a 
rescue. Fortresses are meant as supports for armies, not 
armies for fortresses. Neglect of this cardinal principle 
compelled the Scots to fight an offensive battle in which 
they could have no advantage of position to counterbalance 
their lack of experience. 
There is little to be said about the battle. So far 
p as can be seen, it must have been a mere hurly -burly in which 
the cots made little resistance. No new tactics appeared on 
either side. It may be argued that the hignlanders of the 
days of David would have fought much more manfully, but it 
must be remembered that their wild courage led nowhere, while 
the thrashing that the Lowlanders here received taught them a 
salutary lesson. The Scottish soldier was learning, that his 
proper course was to fight cisxkkaxgllenxaxt on the defensive 
and on foot, not in the open where an efficient body of 
cavalry was a necessity. The flight itself was probably due 
more to nervousness than to panic; the Scots, in fact, in the 
words of the German general before Metz, needed to be 
"shooted a little." 
On the whole the campaign of 1296 shows signs of 
progress on the part of the Scots. The history or the months 
of March and April is indeed a catalogue of disaster, but them 
are redeeming features. The wild Celtic element was 
disappearing. More attention was being paid to the formation 
of e. steady and well armed body of foot. But it was for the 
Scots a period of transition and in such a period they 
-. naturally suffered. They were, in fact, in process of 
learning from mankind's two greatest masters, bitter necessity 
-- ana their own mistakes. In the subsequent epoch tue successes 
and defeats of the people were alike numerous, but two 
principles remained fixed. Never again, if we except the 
 /. 
the/ 
slight deviation of Bruce at Metnven 'wood, was undue reliance 
glut on fortresses or heavy cavalry. The Scottish footmen and 
their leaders, in triumph ana disaster, relied on themselves 
alone. Nor was this all. The rout had taught them the folly 
Zoae 
of disorganised lines and gnabe attack in the face of a 
disciplined enemy. In the pangs of Dunbar was born the 
schiltron of Bannockburn. 
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Wallace and Stirling Bridge. 
Section 1. A new strategy. 
It is unfortunate that we know so little of the 
earlier career of Wallace in his rebellion against the English 
invaders. Only the iiiain outlines of the story remain to us, 
such as the tact of the slaying of lazlerig and the surrender 
of the notables at Irvine. But enough is known to show that 
Wallace was not the only partisan leader of the period./ 
Prominent among the other leaders of risings was the young 
Andrew de Moray, who in May and June of 1297 sadly troubled 
the English garrisons in the neighbourhood of Inverness. 
In the operations of these leaders there evolved a 
new strategy, which, like most such phenomena, was the product 
of circumstances. Pitched battles were conspicuous by their 
absence. Any large English force could move across country wit: 
comparative freedom and would, indeed, find it very difficult 
to draw any Scots into action. On the other hand any small bod; 
such as a convoy or a detachment of reinforcements, was 
assiduously tracked and larked down as a prey by the Scots; 
similarly, small and weak castleswere sure, sooner or later, 
to be surprised or stormed at tile very moment when no help 
could reach them. 
The irony of the situation lay in the fact that while 
the English could easily muster a force strong enough to march 
from Berwick to Elgin, as Edward I had done in 1296, such a 
body was of very little use. By the nature of its composition 
and the amount of baggage which it required it could not 
penetrate into the remote fastnesses and forests where the 
Scots lay hidden, and so its march became a vain parade. 
Unless it stuck closely to the coast where it could draw 
lEntries in Bain, Rotuli Scotiae, Stevenson's Documents,etc. 
draw/ 
supplies from its attendant fleet, it could not be kept 
together for long, and, as soon as it was broken up, its 
detachments were excused to danger of defeat from a concen- 
tration of Scottish bands. Scotland was, in fact,rapialy 
becoming a country like Spain, "a country in which large 
armies starve and small armies get beaten ", and the English 
hela little beyond the wails of their castles and the 
outskirts of their camps. 
A large part of the success of Wallace in his raids 
in the springy of 127, e.g. his attacks on Perth and on tree 
castles in the district between that town and Dundee, was 
undoubtedly due to the nature of his forces. The men whom he 
commanded were necessarily the Most independent and daring in 
spirit of the people. any of them were outlaws and practicall; 
all were fighting with ropes round their necks. Those only 
could expect to be spared who could afford a large ransom or 
who were of value to the English king as lieutenatts. Under 
these circumstances no enterprise was too bold and no risk 
too great for the followers of Wallace. In addition it should 
be remembered that the church of Scotland was wholeheartedly 
on the side of the patriots and that this clerical support 
was a great stimulus to many of them. 
It was the very essence of the Scottish strategy that 
they should always know where to find the English and that the 
English should never know where to find them. Such being the 
case, fixed points of defence were necessarily abjured, and 
when a castle was taken it was dismantled so that it might no 
longer serve as a link in the English chain which bound the 
country. This determination to avoid a pitched battle except 
in the most favourable circumstances was the very feature of 
the operations which baffled trie English and which reduced 
them to a state of exasperation which largely explains their 
premature action at Stirling Bridge. It may be objected that 
such strategy as that of the Scots could not produce any 
any/ 
great or sudden success and was very trying to the country. I 
theory this is true, but in practice the fact remains that at 
tliis time it goaded the English into reckless action, and tna 
in the time of Edward Ealiol it tired them out by its persis- 
tent pinpricking. At the least it preclueed any chance of a 
crushing disaster which would prostrate the whole country 
before its enemy. 
Section 2. :life battle of Stirling Bridge. e
After the capture of Pertri and tne successful raid 
on the district between that town and Dundee, allace engaged 
in trie siege of Dundee castle, the most serious enterprise 
that he had yet undertaken. While he was thus occupied, he 
received intelligence that tree earl of Warenne and uugh de 
Cressinghau were advancing north with a large force. As the 
line of tine Forth was the natural position of defence and as 
that line was most vulnerable at Stirling, Wallace hastened t( 
defend that point with all ais available troops. The continuec 
blockade of Dundee castle was entrusted to tile burghers of thi 
town, who had taken the side of their countrymen. Wallace had 
been reinforced by Andrew de Moray, the younger, with the 
troops of the Moray and Inverness districts, so that ne had 
under his command the strongest Scottisn force which nad 
assembled since tne battle of Dunbar. /.his action was apparent- 
ly a bold one, but in reality it committed him to nothing, as 
nie line of retreat was always open. his position was in fact 
rather one of observation with the possibility of successful 
action if the English should act rashly. 
The news of the Scottish successes in the midlands 
and the north nad alarmed the Englisn and Warenne had hastily 
gathered a force in the northern counties. he had one thousanc 
heavy cavalry and a body of footmen; as usual it is impossiblE 
to ascertain the number of foot accurately, but, judging by 
/, Jorin of Fordun, Annals, ch. 99. 
M-2 
by/ 
the losses sustained, ten thousand may be a reasonable estimate 
The line of advance was, as usual, by Berwick, and Stirling 
was reached on the lOth of September. ùallace and Moray nad so 
far offered no opposition, but contented themselves witn 
holding taie wooded slopes of the Abbey Craig above the abbey 
of Cambuskenneth. In tlliß position they were able to command 
the northern end of the long narrow bridge and could conceal 
the number of their forces, which comprised close on two 
hundred horsemen and several thousand spearmen. Moreover it 
must be noted that the position of Dunbar was now to some 
extent reversed, in trie cerise that many of the English and 
Welsh were probably raw levies, wni.Le the Scots army was 
composed of veteran patriots nerved to fight to the last./ 
In tree early morning of September 11tH an advance 
party of English and Welsh crossed the bridge witnout 
encountering any opposition, but soon afterwards withdrew again 
the move having apparently been made without Varenne's 
authority. buhen the English host was fully awake and marshalled 
on the slain to the south of the bridge, a council was held to 
determine what means should be adopted in crossing the river. 
The only alternative to tue bridge was a ford which could be 
crossed by forty men abreast.3.Sir Richard Lundy advised that a 
frontal attack should be made on the bridge, while he with half 
the cavalry should distract the attention of the Scots by 
crossing the ford and executing a flank charge. This course 
of action, which was probably the best under the prevailing 
Circumstances, was rejected on the ground that the army could 
/LKenry Knighton, p. 3'79. 
2! ,p.378. 
3; But, so far as I can ascertain, the ford was tidal and could 
not be reckoned on as a means of retreat. 
could/ 
not be divided in the face of tne enemy. /At this stage in the 
discussion Cressingham advised an advance across the bridge 
and his counsel was adopted by Warenne.2. 
The extraordinary decision to which the English 
carne has usually been attributed to tne influence which 
Cressingham exerted over Warenne, the assumption being that 
Cressinnaiu was no soldier. But while the course which was 
advised was undoubtedly wrong, there are considerations which 
show that the English were acting with a ceraain amount of 
reason. The error into which almost ail writers have fallen is 
to suppose that tne Scots were determined to fignt a battle. 
To make tais assumption is to reject tae lesson of all the 
previous strategy of Wallace and Moray, wnicn consisted in 
avoiding :actions except when the circumstances were favourable. 
If the English had exercised every precaution and had crossed 
the ford in due order, the probability, which nobody seems to 
!Lave considered, is that the Scots would simply have slipped 
away and resumed their guerilla warfare. It is surely not too 
much to suppose tnat the Englisn leaders, wiio had clear enough 
heads to see the weakness of Lundy's plan, realised tnis risk. 
The main difficulty of the English up to this point in the war 
had not been to beat tiie Scots, but to find tnem. having at 
last found the Scottisn main body it was by no means 
unnatural for the English leaders, and especially for 
Cresáingnara who was concerned about tzle expense entailed by a 
long war, to desire to pin down the Scots at once and thus 
force them to a decisive action. Tne fear of a protracted 
campaign and triàir own overconfidence were, I venture to 
/An excellent principle initseif; but its application nere is a 
trifle amazing in the lignt of the fact tnat the English 
immediately afterwards proceeded to divide their army by the 
width of the river. 
Jnenry Knignton,pp.3i9 -380. 
to/ 
suggest, the main motives which impelled Varenne to rush into 
the trap. 
The English vanguard, under the command of Sir 
Marmaduke de rwen;e, proceeded to cross tne bridge, and was 
rapidly followed by the main body including Cressingnam and 
the standards of the king and of trie earl. At tnis point in 
tale proceedings the mass of the Scottish spearmen left tne 
shelter of the woods and advanced quickly across tne open in 
a compact body. /.Straight for tne bridgenead they drove and in 
a few moments tney had pierced the thin column of tne.Englffith 
and had cut the hostile army into two sections. De Twenge had 
ventured ahead too rasrily in a successful charge against the 
small body of Scottish cavalry and had tnus left tne infantry 
unsupported. The archers could not come into action owing to 
tne limited extent of the ground and the suddenness of the 
Scottish charge.Tne scene on tne bridge was now one of will/ 
confusion. Those behind strove to push through to the front, 
while those in front recoiled from the hedge of Scottish 
spears. In the struggle many of the English were precipitated 
over the parapet and drowned. The section wnieh had crossed 
and was now cut off made a desperate attempt to secure a 
retreat, but the Scottish schiltron held firm and defied all 
efforts to force a passage. Despairing of safety by any other 
means, hundreds plunged into the river in a wild effort to 
cross, but were all drowned with the exception of a single 
knight. Of the vanguard de Twenge alone, with his nephew and a 
mere handful of followers, refused the desperate expedient of 
swimming back and succeeded in cutting a way to safety through 
/The English had quite possibly underestimated the Scottish 
force. The woods of the Abbey Craig would conceal its strength, 
and it is very doubtful if varenne could know that Moray and 
his followers were with Wallace. 
through/ 
the Scottish spearmen./ 
Meanwhile the English on the south bank of the Forth 
had been horrified spectators of the debacle. A panic arose 
at the possibility of the Scots crossing the bridge and 
Warenne, apparently forgetful of the fact that he held as 
strong a defensive position as the Scots, broke down and 
burned his end of the bridge and hastily retreated south. The 
English, on their own admission, had lost one hundred knights 
and men -at -arms, including Cressingnain, and five thousand 
foot; in a word, the whole body which had crossed trie river. 
The Scots, thanks to their close and steady array and the 
comparative absence of archery fire, escaped lightly. 
Section 3. True Scottish tactics. 
The action at Stirling Bridge gives us our first 
example of a Scottish victory, and as a consequence many 
fresh conclusions can be dream from it. The tactics employed 
by the Scots in the battle form the complement of the guerilla 
strategy indicated in the first section of this chapter. The 
new strategy of the Scots consisted in harassing the English 
out of certain sections of the country, and their new battle 
tactics provided a means of preventing a reoccupation of the 
liberated districts. 
In any battle against the English the Scots had 
two main disadvantages to overcome, the superiority of their 
opponents in well equipped cavalry and the deadly efficiency 
of the hostile Of these two arms the archery was 
infinitely tne more danierous, and throughout Scottish 
military affairs it was the chief obstacle to a supremacy 
over the southern enemy. Although repeated attempts were made 
in later times by tne Scottish king and parliament to foster 
the practice of archery in Scotland, the art never really 
/henry Knighton, p. 381. 
02 ,p.382. 
really/ 
flourished in the north. The Scottish leaders at Stirling 
Bridge were faced with the problem of overcoming the hostile 
archers, without any possibility of doing so by a superiority 
of fire. Their solution bf the difficulty was a masterly one. 
The only fashion in which the problem could be 
solved was to put the English archers out of action at once, 
and tnis was done by tne choice of the position covered by the 
river and by offensive action before the English could deploy. 
The advantages of tne position cannot be fully realised until 
an analysis is made of the difficulties of the English. To 
get the archers into action it was necessary to send them 
across the river and this provided the insoluble ,roblem. To 
send them over first was to expose them to certain destruction 
at the hands of an energetic enemy, because archers unsupport- 
ed would be of no more use than an army entirely composed of 
artillery. On the other nand, to send over the cavalry and 
billmen and retain tne archers to tne last meant that the 
battle would probably be commenced and decided before they 
could take any effective part. T9iingle tne different sections 
was to abolish control and engender confusion. Dupplin Moor, 
Crecy, and other battles prove that the archers were most 
effective when they were given room to deploy. So long as the 
Scots could force tne enemy to concentrate his troops in 
order to surmount a natgtral obstacle, such as a river, they 
neid the advantage. The other two conditions necessary for 
success were that tile Scots should take rapid offensive actiox 
before trie English could extend, and that they should have a 
body of foot sufficiently strong to prevent the English 
cavalry clearing an area in which tne archers could act. 
Whether Wallace and Moray came to these conclusions 
deliberately and cnose their ground accordingly or whether 
they simply chose wnat seemed to them the strongest defensive 
position and acted as opportunists, it is impossible to say; 
but the fact remains that Stirling Bridge with its defensive- 
o. 
defensive-/ 
offensive tactics should have been a model for every 
subsequeht Scottish leader. 
The first condition, namely taut offensive action 
should be combined with a suitable defensive position, 
demanded sound ratrier tnan brilliant generalsnip.jTne second 
condition, that tne Scots should nave a body of foot able to 
witnstand the English cavalry, was satisfied by the creation 
of the schiltron. 
There has been a certain amount of discussion 
about the origin of this body. Briefly it may be said to have 
been a compact body of men, several ranks deep; the members of 
tine body were armed with shears, which were of different 
lengths for tne various ranks. 'the spears were made with 
wooden shafts and iron or steel heads, which were continued 
for some distance down the shaft in order to prevent the head 
being cut off by a sweeping blow of sword or axe. When the 
spears were directed to the front and flank the effect was to 
produce a hedge of points calculated to give pause to the 
fiercest cavalry charge. If necessary the rear of the 
schiltron could be closed also and a defensive "square" 
established. Offensive action was by no means impossible with 
such a body, but it required a fairly high efficiency among 
trie men and an unbroken piece of ground for the advance. 
Attempts have been made to ascribe the formation of 
this body to the influence of the Flemings, who used it 
successfully at Courtrai against the French cavalry. But as 
the battle of the Spurs was not fought till 1302, the 
formation cannot be said to have proved itself on the 
continent till a date subsequent to both Stirling Bridge and 
Falkirk. In any case there is no need to search for causes 
which are doubtful, when tue explanation seems clear. X 
.Vellington's conduct at Busaco is an admirable exarpie of 
good coordination on the lines indicated. 
The schiltron was not an original formation, 
trough it may nave seemed so to tne cavalry leaders of tale 
time. In outline it was a revival of the old phalanx 
instituted by the Tnebans in the time of Eparuinondas and 
developed by tree Macedonians in tnat of Pnilip and Alexander. 
The object in both cases was the same, nameljr* to resist the 
attack or break through the defence of a longer tnin er line 
by superior weigrlt and absence of flanks. In otner words, the 
demand of circumstances produced botri the concentration 
employed in ancient Greece and that in mediaeval Scotland, 
and it is rather misleading, triougn very convenient, to 
ascribe the origin of tne formation to individual men. It was 
merely the fact that footmen were discredited for almost a 
thousand years after the battle ofnadriople in 366, that 
gave trie schiltron an appearance of novelty. 
Note. The question of extension or concentration of the line 
has always been one of the greatest importance. The Greeks 
employed the extended line till it proved too weak to face 
the phalanx. The Romans employed the concentrated formation, 
till the necessity of rapia manoeuvring in hilly ground in 
the Samnite. wars made them extend their infantry. During the 
period of their supremacy they were rarely faced by a foe 
expert in the use of missiles, and the result was trrat they 
themselves neglected this branch. As a result the Gothic and 
Persian wars savî the failure of the Roman infantry, and 
infantry stood condemned thenceforth. But this was an erron- 
eous conclusion, as the blame did not rest witn the infantry 
but with the organisers who thought that an army could be 
made up of one arm only. Therefore an infantry revival was 
inevitable at some time or another., The English, being fairly 
strong in cavalry and very strong in archery, naturally 
fought in extended order, and the Scots, almost totally 
lacking these arms, had tO entrate. it is noticeable that 
the English, since the Norman Conquest, have 
have/ 
always relied mainly on missiles or musketry, and nave ciunE 
to their extended formation e.g. in tne Peninsular war at a 
period when tne concentrated column was neld by European: 
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Section 1. The intermediate period. 
The catastrophe at Stirling marked the end for the 
time being, of the English supremacy in Scotland. Matters had 
come to such a pass that the presence of Edward himself was 
imperative before further operations could be carried. out. !is 
the king; was overseas at the moment and was fully occupied 
with French affairs, the Scots could safely count on having 
the autumn and winter months in which to prepare their 
resistance against the coming of the inevitable invasion. 
Wallace, besides opening relations with certain 
continental powers and providing a temporary government for 
Scotland, elected to raid the northern counties of England. 
As numerous Scottish strongholds, including Stirling itself, 
the key to the Forth, were still in the hands of the English, 
it is open to question wnether Wallace would not have been 
better employed in getting a thorough grip of the country. But 
it is necessary to notice that sieges, even if they had been 
undertaken, could hardly have been successful. The Scots, 
being deficient in siege machinery, were of necessity reduced 
to the practice of blockade, e.g.at Stirling where de Twenge 
held the castle. In numerous eases even blockade was out of 
the question owing to the fact that the coastal fortresses 
could be revictualled by the English fleet. In addition there 
dust have existed among the Scots a strong feeling that the 
sufferings of Scotland in the previous two years should be 
visited on the English. Wallace may quite reasonably nave 
thought that a successful raid might bring pressure on Edward 
which would induce him to grant at least a truce to the Scots. 
Such a purpose, if it existed, was defeated by the resolution 
of Edward and by the agreement by Philip of France to a truce 
truce/ 
with the English, /thereby leaving them, contrary to anything 
that Wallace could nave expected, entirely free to deal with. 
the Scots. 
'!'he raid itself had no great results except, perhaps, 
to increase Edward's anger and hasten his coming. Following on 
Pdarenne's retreat the Scots advanced to the borders where they 
dividedtheir forces. Wallace, with the main body, proceeded 
into the northern counties of England to ravage, while henry 
de Haliburton marched or Berwick with a detachment. As the 
fortifications of the town had not been strengthened greatly 
since its capture by Edward ,.he was able to occupy the town.,. 
The position was, however, indefensible, and the first serious 
English advance compelled hind lx) evacuate it. Meanwhile 
another party was engaged in attacking Roxburgh castle, which 
was held for the English by Robert de Hastings. Some engines 
seem to have been used in the siege, but the attack was 
ineffective, as the barons of Cumberland and part of the 
garrison Carlisle were able to surprise the Scots and drive 
them off with the loss of their engineers.%c. 
While the Scots did not suffer any serious check 
apart from tnat at noxburgh and were no doubt able to do a 
good deal of damage to the ±nglish marches, it is impossible 
to acquit Wallace of a certain amount of blame. Tn.e splitting 
up of the army prevented the winning of any important success, 
and the neglect to cover the siege of Roxburgh was a serious 
fault. In the light or trie developments of later years, and 
especially of the Douglas period, it is noticeable tnat the 
Scots do not seem to nave enjoyed any advantage over the 
1. Chronicle of Meaux, p. 2'70. 
';.lhis neglect was apparently due to Cressingham's parsimony; 
a stone wall was soon afterwards built. 
3But not the castle. 
/Tne Scalacro :ica, rp. 200. 
i 
the/ 
English in the matter of mobility; ratner the reverse, in fact, 
as the inglisn marchers were able to make tneir concentration 
and strike their blow without any serious counter- stroke being; 
launcned. 
Section 2. Tne battle. 
The continued successes of the Scottish patriots 
roused Edward to action and a parliament was held at York near 
the end of May. At this assembly arrangements ents were made for tree 
attack on Scotland and the rendezvous was fixed at Roxburgh on 
June 25th. There the English army met; it was composed of three 
thousand cavalry, nearly a half being heavily armed, several 
thousand infantry, almost all from Wales and Ireland, and a 
contingent of Gascons./ 
To meet such a force in tne open, wnere his foot- 
men could be outflanked and surrounded, was no part of Wallace's 
plan. instead he stripped Lothian of supplies and retired to 
tne fringe of the great Tor Wood between Stirling and Falkirk, 
ready to seize any opportunity tnat mint arise for a 
successful sally on the invaders. nis army was somewnat 
different to the victorious force of Stiriin. Bridge, but its 
strength still lay in tne infantry, of whom he had probably as 
great a number as Edward. The cavalry arm had been strengthened 
since the previous summer by the accession of certain barons 
and knights of the Comyn faction and now reached a total of a 
¡thousand. In addition the Scots had made, for the first time, 
a serious attempt to strengthen the missile section of tne army 
and asK a result tnere was present in Wallace's force a party a 
of archers from .ttrick and Selkirk under the command of Sir ,t 
;John Stewart of Bonkill. .1 
1tiemingford, II, pp. 1'73 -174. 
-.But these archers for the most part would be armed only 
with 
the short bow, which was not nearly so effective as 
the long 
one; this fact accounts for their inability to check 
tie 
English cavalry charge. 
Edward met with no opposition in the first stages 
of his advance, but does not seem to nave hurried forward. 
Possibly the delays which took place were due to the 
difficulty of obtaining supplies, which rlau to be provided for 
the most part by a fleet. When the English reached Kirkliston 
a halt became imperative, as the co mmunications were being 
seriously interfered with by the garrisons of Dirleton castle 
and two other neighbouring towers. Antony Beck, bishop of 
Durham, was sent to destroy triese points of resistance, but 
was at first repulsed with loss owing to nis lack of siege 
engines. Edward urged a renewal of the attack and, after a 
further two days' siege, the Scots in Dirletor_ surrendered. 
the other two keeps were found abandoned and were destroyed 
by fire./ 
At this point in the operations a serious of mis- 
fortunes befell the English troops. The disadvantage of having 
to rely on a fleet for supplies was demonstrated by the 
prevalence of a contrary wind widen kept back tne transport 
vessels and left tne English aeriously short of food. At the 
same tine, and possibly as a result of the shortage, the 
always existing bad feeling between Englisg and Welsh blazed 
out in open quarrel and a fray took place in Edward's camp in 
which several of the Welsh were slain. iiioved by these occurr- 
ences and by the remonstrances of his barons, who feared tzea 
treachery on the part of trie Welsh, Edward was on the point of 
moving to Edinburgh to secure direct communication with nis 
fleet, when there came to him the earls of Angus and March, to 
report tnat trie Scottish army was close by Falkirk and was 
preparing to attack tne English by night if they retreated. 
This act of betrayal took place on July 21st., 
Edward now cast all hesitation to the winds and 
ordered an immediate advance. On the evening of the same day 
S. 
J. Hen,ingford, Iipp. 17- 1'T'p. 
n 
day/ 
Linlithgow was reached and there a bivouac was formed for the 
night, Edward sleeping amongst his troops. Turing the night 
the king was trampled by his horse wnicn was picketed close by, 
but in the morning of the 22nd he pushed on the advance. As 
the English pressed on xne from the south -east between 
Lauriston and Slamannan Muir, evidence of the presence of the 
Scots began to appear in tree retreat of advance parties. 
Finally tne main body was sighted a mile or two south of 
Falkirk itself. 
Wallace nad taken up position on the hill flank 
with his right almost resting on the fringes of the 2ak Tor 
Wood, which extended far to the west. The front was covered by 
a morass, /. of wriose existence the English seem to nave been 
ignorant, but the left wing was bare. The position seemed at 
first to be a strong one, but it lacked many of tne advantages 
of that of Stirling Bridge. The marsh could be passed at the 
sides by large bodies of cavalry, who would then find ample 
ground to manoeuvre between it and the Scottish infantry. This 
meant that the English horsemen could not be dealt with .L n 
detail, but would be able to keep enough ground clear for the 
operations of their archers. The fatal weaknesses were the 
presence of the clear space in front of the Scots and the fact 
that diagonally across their rear ran the river Carron, which 
rendered almost impossible the retreat of their left wing. 
Wallace had arranged his infantry in four schiltrons with the 
'archers occupying the gaps and the flanks, while in the rear 
,was stationed the cavalry ready to iieir.421u any body which might 
pass the schiltrons.a. 
¿Darnr ig Moss. 
Zieruingford, II, pp. 1'i S -179; "Statuerunt enim Scoti omnem plebem 
suam per turmas quatuor, in modum circulorum rotundorum, in 
campo duro, et in latere uno iuxta Fawkyrk. In quibus quidem 
circulis sedebant viri lancearii, cum lanceis suis obliqualiter 
erectis; coniuncti quidem unusquisque ad alterum, et vernis 
vultibus in circ»mferentiam circulorum; inter circulos irlos 
erant s1atia quaedam intermedia, in quibus statuebantur viri 
sagetarii. Et in extrema farte retrorsum erant equestres eoruni 
hegular Waterloo formation in fact, but lacking the artillery. 
5e 
The English van, com )oeed of cavalry and col_zaanded 
by the earls of rlereford and Norfolk, was cnecked by the 
presence of the marshy pond which tney passed by making a 
detour to the west. Antony Beck with the second division 
passed it to the east and taus a double attack was made on the 
Scots. The headstrong barons got out of hand and made a reck- 
less charge. The Scottisri horsemen, though not immediately 
threatened, fled at once,t.and the exposed and defenceless 
archers were cut down wholesale, Sir John Stewart being killed; 
only those escaped who were able to reach the edge of the wood 
or to take shelter in true ranks of tne scniltrons. The English 
charge was continued, but when it met the solid resistance of 
the spearmen, it recoiled in defeat and disorder. 
By this time Edward had arrived on the scene with the 
English main body, containing most of the foot, and himself 
took charge of the battle. Realising that further cavalry 
charges were for the moment useless, ne ordered the archers to 
the front and commenced a systematic bombardment of the defence 
less Scots. Pinned to their ground by tne presence of tne 
Englisn cavalry, the Scots could only endure as best they might 
the shower of arrows and large stones with which they were 
pelted. As more and more men feil,it became impossible to fill 
up the gaps in trie scniltrons and the hedge of spears became 
broken. Tnen Edward loosed his cavalry in a second charge and 
the syiearmen, unable to close up and make a resolute stand, 
were scattered. Once tne ranks were broken the isolated groups 
a 
and individuals were Isily ridden down by the heavily armed 
horsemen and several thousands of the Scots were slain. The 
survivors of the left wing found their retreat cut off by the 
;Carron and were mostly killed or drowned. In fact the only part 
l.But hardly, I think, through treachery. It is not too much to 
suppose that the horsemen, shaken by the sight of the huge mass 
of English cavalry and unaware of the strength of the shield 
of Scottish infantry in front of tnem, fled in sheer panic. 
/. 
part' 
of the Scottish infantry which escaped was that on the right 
wing, which was able to reach the shelter of the forest. The 
English losses were practically confined to trie horsemen who 
íe11 in the unsuccessful attack on the scniltrons, though a 
few, including Brian le Say, master of trie order of trie 
Temple, were killed in tr?e pursuit./. 
Section 3. The weakness or the scniltron. 
The result of the battle of Falkirk ana trre nature 
of trie operations wnicn preceded it are so different from that 
of Stirling Bridge, tnat some attempt must be made to account 
for the failure of the Scots to repeat wnat they nad performed 
with an inferior army in the preceding year. Tnroügnout the 
piece, however, in addition to the factors influencing the 
cottish actions, it should be borne in mind that trie English 
leadership was infinitely superior to that of the previous 
campaign and that the Scots could not afford to make any 
mistakes at ail. 
Tile first clear point is that up to the disastrous 
fight itself the campaign was going well for the Scots. The 
strip irg of Lothian and the absence of any definite 
resistance made tree £,ngiisn invasion a mere blow at t_ie air, 
while trie presence of t:,e harassing force at L.irieton, trifl8 
as the diversion may have been, shows a realisation of the 
true means of defeating the attack. In the absence of a 
battle there can be little doubt that Edward could not nave 
pushed on much further, in fact could not have lingered much 
longer in Lothian. An ultimate Engiisn retreat through 
shortage and uncertainty of suj.p.y was inevitable. up to the 
point of the English halt at Kirkliston Wallace's 
strategy 
was admirable. A position of observation nad been taken up, 
which rendered it impossible for the English to 
scatter their 
forces without risging a disaster, and tue country 
read been 
L inemingford, II, pp. 179-181. 
GD. 
been/ 
so treated. that to keep the English armor concentrated was 
rapidly becoming out of the question. áv'hy, th.:n, stake on the 
result of a decisive battle trie fruits of a campaign which was 
already practically won. 
Wallace's presence on the eastern outskirts of the 
,or Wood is accounted for by his debire to strike a blow at 
the Englisrl in the case of a retreat. ._e seems to nave been 
fairly well unformed of the state of affairs in trie hostile 
army and his conception of a night attack, in which the Englis. 
archery would be useless, was a good one. But although it is 
easy to explain his presence in the neignbournood of Falkirk, 
it is difficult to understand why ne elected to stand nis 
ground when he was threatened by an English attack in full 
array and in broad daylight. Retreat into the shelter of the 
forest would have been easy, for the Scots must have had 
several hours warning of the English advance. 
The obvious, in fact too obvious, solution is that 
Wallace was a mere partisan leader and not a great general and 
that consequently he, by misreading the lessons of Stirling 
Bridge, underestimated the strengtn of nis opponents and 
overrated his own. In this there may be a certain amount of 
truth. Certain it is that ne had never yet encountered a 
general of the calibre of Edward I, and that the English army 
was organised and handled in a fashion of which the Scots had 
had no experience. In addition he lacked the influence and 
advice of the young Andrew de Moray, who had done so much for 
the Scottisn cause in the previous year. ',here are, however, 
other factors which show that Wallace was not entirely his 
own master at Falkirk. 
The Scottish army in trie battle consisted of three 
arms. Of these two, the cavalry and the archers, proved to be 
little better than useless. But the very presence of 
these 
two sections was bound to influence the conduct of the 
Scots 
and may have nelped to bring about the determination to fight 
6/. 
fight/ 
a pitched cattle. The cavalry was largely composed of the 
/. 
supdorters of the Corayns wno were adherents of the Baliol cause 
As Wallace was himself a Legitimist, or supporter of Baliol, 
and was governing in the name of tne exiled king, the Comyns 
were able to exert a certain influence over nia. mnie influence 
was increased by the fact that, though Wallace was commander 
of the host, yet he was inferior in rank to many of the 
notables on the Scottish side. In addition there may have been 
some feeling among the Scottish soldiers in favour of a battle; 
it is always difficult for men to stand quietly by and watch 
their country being maltreated by an enemy, especially wneri 
they feel it in their power to defeat that enemy. In the end 
we are left to choose whether Wallace blundered in his own 
person or whether he was, more or less reluctantly, brought by 
external influences to fight the battle. 
With regard to the combat itself there is little to 
be said. The presence of the cavalry and the archers on tne 
Scottish side made it.necessary to take up a position outside 
the woods, but, as has been already pointed out, the position 
cnosen had serious weak points. Mt could have been improved by 
resting the ri ;nt wing on the wood, the left on tne marsh, 
and covering with tree eentre the gap of open ground between 
the two natural obstacles; such an arrangement would, however, 
have necessitated a retreat if tne English had met it with a 
flank march round the east of the morass. It is an interesting 
question whether it would not have been an improvement to put 
the archers actually inside the schiltrons and thus cover then: 
by the spearmen. Such an arrangement would have prevented 
pointblank fire, but in the case of the short bow this was 
rarely used except at short range. 
¿In Scotland at tais time there still existed the 
dispute 
between the Baliois and the Brutes as to tne possession 
of taie 
crown. 
me faults of tne schi.itron appear clearly as a 
result of tree battle. Unsupported and caught on ground where 
the enemy could extend, it nad to submit to gradual destruc- 
tion. Once tie English archers nad come into action, such a 
result could not be avoided, but soi.et.iing snouid nave been 
done to prevent, tne situation arising. Tne critical point of 
tree battle was at tne repulse of the English cavalry charge. 
At that moment tLie Scots had two alternatives, eitner to 
follow up their advantage by a vigorous offensive which migrt 
nurl tne discomfited horsemen into the marsh, or, in tìie 
absence of cavalry and archers on their own side, to break off 
tue fight and retreat into tae wood. Botn courses were 
difficult to pursue in the turmoil of tue contest, but one or 
otner shoula have been adopted and prepared for beforenand. 
Reliance on the nelp other arms than that of thee foot and 
on immobile defence and lack of manoeuvre brought about the 
ruin of the Scottish nost. 
Chapter IV. 
Minor operations. 
Section 1. The siege of Caerlaverock castle. 
The period immediately subsequent to the battle of 
.Falkirk is devoid of outstanding incidents. After the failure 
of their attempt at resistance in tne field the Scots reverted 
to the policy of harassing the English invaders. Tne fortunes 
of Wallace paving declined, the leadership passed into the 
nands of tne Cotnyns, who were at least able to prevent Edward 
gainiggasecure grip on the country. The more accessible 
districts were, as usual, under the control of the English, 
but there continued to exist nests of resistance from which 
the Scots made frequent sallies. In the absence of a field 
force with which they might contend, the efforts of tne Englisr 
were directed towards the pacification of the rebellious areas. 
It was in these circumstances that Edward attacked Caerlaverocl 
castle in the su nrner of 1300. 
At Midsummer Edward held his court at Carlisle and 
ordered an assembly for an advance against tne castle. In due 
course tne force met to the number of tnree thousand barons, 
knights, and men -at -arms, with a body of foot. /.The cavalry was 
of overwhelming strength and included in its ranks the most 
'prominent English warriors of the time. In addition a fleet waE 
provided, which would sail into the Solway Firth and provide 
the besiegers with food and with engines for the attack on the 
castle. 
Edward took tne road over the border with his army 
divided into four squadrons under the command of Henry, earl 
of Lincoln, the earl of Warenne, tne king nimself, and the 
prince of Wales respectively. Tne horsemen were kept inclose 
/Walter of Coventry, translated by Nicolas, p.63. 
(4. 
close/ 
array and wore their full armour as a precaution against any 
surprise that the Scots might attempt. No resistance, however, 
was made to the advance of the English and thex reached the 
castle after a slow and easy march without encountering any 
opposition. /. 
the caste was triangular in shape and provided wit. 
a tower at each corner. One of the towers was especially stron, 
and was situated immediately above and in defence of the 
drawbridge gate. The wails were strongly built and were 
adequately protec$ed by wet ditches. Approach to the fortress 
from tne west and soutn was prevented by the waters of the 
l:ith and of the Solway Firth, while access from tne north was 
rendered difficult by the bogs and marshes whicn existed. &.Tne 
feasible line of approach was by tree high ground to the east 
past the modern farms of Locharwoods4 
/.Walter of Coventry, pp.5 -59. 
.2.It was situated less than a quarter of a mile from tue present 
building. 
3rhe modern Lochars Moss. 
t. 
//Walter of Coventry,pp.61 -63; "Its shape was like that of a 
shield, for it nad only three sides ail round, with a tower on 
each angle; but one of them was a double one, so high, so long, 
and so large, that under it was the gate with a draw -bridge, 
well made and strong, and a sufficiency of other defences. It 
had good walls, and good ditches filled to the edge with water; 
and I believe there never was seen a castle more beautifully 
situated, for at once could be seen the Irisn Sea towards tne 
west, and to tne north á fine country, surrounded by an arm of 
the sea, so that no creature born could approach it on two 
sides, witnout putting himself in danger of the sea. 
Towards 
the south it was not easy, because tnere were 
numerous danger- 
ous defiles of wood, and marshes, and ditches, 
where the sea it 
(note continued at foot of next 
page). 
45- 
On arriving at the east side of tile castle the 
English, under the direction of tne Marshal, proceeded to 
construct a camp of tents and wooden huts in which the army 
took up its quarters in three divisions. Soon afterwards the 
snips of the fleet arrived witn supplies and necessary engines 
for tne siege and Edward decided on an immediate assault./ 
i:he first move against the castle was made by the 
footmen, but they were met by such a storm of stones, arrowp, 
and crossbow bolts, from the engines and bows of the garrison 
that they were rapidly repulsed with heavy loss. The knights 
and men -at -arms tnen advanced to tne attack on foot and in 
armour and pushed up to the edge of tae moat and tne end of the 
bridge. Imis reckless rust met witn no greater success than 
had tne attack of the footmen, and the heavily armed force, 
though protected by defensive armour, lost several killed and 
many disabled, the contingents of Bretons and Lorrainers 
.suffering severely. More scientific metnods were ultimaIely 
adopted and Adam de la Forde set to work to mine the wall, 
while an attack was made upon the gate itself. In spite of the 
pressure of the assault and the fact that the English, being 
so numerous, were able to fignt in relays, trie Scots held out 
all through the first day and night and well into the second 
day. a. 
/.Walter of Coventry, p. 65. 
" , pp. 6'7 -83; we are not told triat the English 
passed the ditch, but as minig xis specifically mentioned, the 
assumption is that they did or that one part of the wail was 
not protected by the moat. 
on each side of it, and where the river reaches it; and 
there -fore it was necessary for trie /lost tp approach it towards 
,the east, wnere the hill slopes." It will be noticed that there 
is no mention of a keep. The weakness of the castle seems to 
nave been triat it was possible for battering engines to come 
within effective range of it without great trouble. 
6 
day./ 
Every English advance and retreat had been naras:3ed 
by the missiles of the garrison, while _lo adequate cove.rin 
r.? :.d b ee,n 1;rß :, i 1 d for the attackers, only a few en ines 
beia employed. But on the second day of the assault this was 
reiaedied ttiJ the English erected three new engines capable of 
throwing very heavy stones, which began to beat down the 
defences. The garrison, which only comprised sixty men and was 
worn out by the continuous assault, could not face this new 
fire and hung out a pennon as a sign of surrender, The soldier, 
who showed it, was immediately shot in the face by an English 
archer, but, on his crying out that the garrison surrendered, 
the constable and the marshal, who were on tne spot, 
suspended the attack./ 
When the Scots left the castle the English were 
astonished to find that they had been kept out so long by so 
small a body. Edward.spared the lives of the prisoners and 
treated them well. The English banners were mounted on the 
castle, which was garrisoned and put under the charge of 
Clifford.) 
Section 2. The English reverses of 1303. 
The events of this year provide two minor examples 
of the successful emloyment of guerilla tactics by the Scots. 
By this time John Comyn was Guardian of tne country and, 
perhaps as a consequence, more use was made of mounted men -at- 
arms. While the operations of such troops were hindered by the 
difficulty of traversing rough country, a superior measure of 
mobility, always a factor of primary importance in guerilla 
warfare, was gained. 
Early in 1333 Jonn de Segrave advanced into 
Lothian with the English wardens of the marches, Ralph de 
/Walter of Coventry, pp. 85*-87. 
á , pp. 87-89. 
b 
de/ 
Manton the Cofferer, and Patrick, earl of March. On the 23rd 
w 
of Febzary the English encamped in tne vicinity of Roslin, 
the advance guard being at a leaEue's distance from tne main 
body owing to lack of camping room./ r.ris was, of course, a 
careless step, and seems to have been accompanied by a lack 
of outpost precautions. Tile English were probably thrown off 
their guard by the fact that there was no Scottish force in 
the immediate vicinity, Comyn and Simon Fraser being at 
Siggar in Lanarksnire. 
Tnrough the nignt the Scots, apparently mostly 
mounted men ,.made a forced march over the nulls, and attacked 
trie main body under Segrave early in the morning. Although 
the Scots were, on the whole, heavily outnumbered, they had 
the advantages of surprise and of tree division of the hostile 
force. After a desperate struggle Segrave and his troops were 
routed and driven off the field, several prisoners being 
taken by tne Scots. A little later the English van, apparently 
ignorant of the fate wnicrr nad befallen tneir main bodycame 
upon trie scene. Tne Scots were dismayed by tne approach of 
t,rese fresn troops, but Fraser and Comyn succeeded in 
heartening their men, and they advanced to the combat, after 
slaugntering their prisoners for want of men to guard tnem. 
Tne struggle was renewed and again the Scots prevailed, the 
English being driven off and Ralph the Cofferer captured. The 
Scots, asa a result of tneir successful action, made larg 
captures of equipment and horses, the possession of which 
was to them of great value tnrougn the prevailing scarcity 
/.John of Fordun, Annals, ch. 103; tyre Scalacronica, fo. 200b; tne 
ground at Roslin is still broken and wooded. 
.2,Jonn of Fordun, Annals, ch. 108, in his account of the combat 
describes the charges of the Scots cavalry. Still it is 
probable that a certain number of them fought on foot. 
3. The Scalacronica, fo. 200b. 
6? 
scarcity/ 
consequent upon years of warfare. J 
In the same year Edward entered Scotland by 
Roxburgh with a force of over nine thousand men. ..A camp was 
made at Dryburgh for the main body, but Sir :iugn de Audley, 
who was at this time warden of Selkirk Forest, pushed on with 
Sir Thomas Urey and sixty men -at -arras to Melrose, possibly 
with: the object of clearing the King's advance, and took up 
quarters in the abbey. The opportunity was too good a one for 
the Scots to miss, and Comyn made a night attack on the abbey. 
Tne Scots rapidly burst open the gates leading into the court- 
yard and, rushing in, overpowered trie small English force.3The 
remainder of Edward's march of that year was devoid of reversal 
but it is a notable fact that so little dismayed were the 
Scots that they were capable of causing serious alarm to the 
/'There is a marked discrepancy as to dates and details in the 
accounts of the action at Roslin contained in the Scalacronica 
and in Fordun. Fordun gives the date as 27th July,1302, trie 
Scalacronica as 24th February,1303. The matter is settled by 
an entry in Bain,II,1347, wnere Ralph de Manton is said to 
nave lost a horse (whicn is valued at twenty pounds, a large 
sum at tnat time) on trie date as given in the Scalacronica. By 
the old calendar the year would of course have been 1302. 
Again the Scalacronica states that the English were 
in two sections, Fordun that tney were in three. I have 
preferred the former version as being more probable in a 
military sense. The Scalacronica makes out that Ralph de 
Manton was killed, but Segrave reported to Edward that he was 
taken prisoner---- Bain,II,1976. 
.Bain, II, 1356. 
3,'The Scalacronica, fo. 201; Sir Thomas Grey, the father of the 
author, was taken prisoner on this occasion, but he must have 
been released very soon after as ne was again in the English 
ranks at tuie Siege of Stirling castle. 
tne/ 
English by raids on trie marches from Annandale and Liddesdale/ 
Section 3. Conclusions. 
The fall of Caerlaverock demonstrates several 
points of interest in connection with trie strength of the 
mediaeval castle, but its chief attraction lies in trie 
opportunity which it affords for a criticism of the methods 
of attack emvloyed by Edward. 
It cannot be said that trie episode snows Edward in 
a very favourable lignt as a commander. It is evident tnat, 
with the overwhelming force at his command, he was foolish 
enough to think tnat ne could rush the position. In coming to 
this conclusion he was doubtless encouraged by the hot- headed 
barons and knights by wnom he was surrounded, and wno on tnis 
occasion, as at Falkirk, got out of nand to some extent. As 
Edward was by no means a person of weak character, it is easy 
to realise the difficulties experienced by a mediocre leader 
in attempting to control the feudal chivalry. 
As a matter of fact tile attempt at a coup -de -main 
might as well not have been made. Tne first attack by trie 
footmen was a complete failure and the subsequent efforts of 
trie men -at -arms only served to swell the losses of the 
besieging force. The only advantage that was gained was the 
tiring out of the 4arrison, which rendered the Scots more 
inclined to surrender when the bombardment commenced. 'Tile 
headlong attack would nave been intelligible if the English 
had had no alternative means of reducing the fortress, but, as 
siege engines were at hand and could be brought into operation 
after a short interval, all that was regmired was a little 
patience. It was the bómbardment that reduced the castle, and 
there is little doubt that if reliance had been placed in it- 
alone, the English success would have been almost as speedy 
(Bain,II,1374; tnis is an order of Edward to the deputy wardens 
to call out the levies to resist the raiders. 
Yo 
speedy/ 
and much less expensive. 
The success witu which a very small garrison in a 
castle of the mmaiiazt second class resisted attack by "a force 
infinitely superior shows that an assault could only succeed 
if it nad the element of surprise or a weakness in morale on 
the part of the defence to aid it. On the otner nand the speedy 
success which attended the operations of the engines 
demonstrates treat with proper materials at the disposal of the 
besiegers, only the strongest of fortresses could make a 
prolonged resistance unless protected by the nature of the 
ground. 
The behaviour of the Scots in defending a fixed 
point against trie English attack was unusual, and, to some 
extent, ineffective. Caerlaverock was, however, of great 
importance to them as a raiding base ana this fact may have 
influenced them in attempting a defence. 
The Scottish success at Roslin and the surprise of 
the .inglisn detachment at Melrose are examples of successful 
night attacks. The movement of troops at night, especially in 
an offensive direction, has always been attended by the 
gravest risks of disorder and loss of touch and direction, and 
such movement has often been attended by disastrous results./ 
As a consequence night attacks have usually been deprecated by 
military critics. 
Ine Scots had, however, at Roslin and Melrose no 
alternative method of attack available. If tney had waited 
till daylight at Roslin, the English would nave had time to 
/Only from actual experience can any person realise the diffi- 
culty of keeping direction and sense of locality in real 
darkness, even in a neighbourhood which is well known. 
One of 
the great mysteries of the ages is that although 
the head of a 
column may be moving at no more than two or 
three miles an 
hour, the rear ranks are always running in order to keep up. 
to/ 
concentrate and would nave been too strong to be attacked, 
while to attempt to carry off the English detachment at Mel- 
rose under Edward's nose in broad daylight woula have been far 
too hazardous an undertaking. But the -Scottisn march from 
Biggar and the burst into the English bivouac at the very 
hour when the power of resistance is at the lowest ebb were 
both well planned and executed./. The fact that the Scots were 
operating in frieddly country gave them security from fear of 
having their advance reported and an ambush laid for them, 
while familiarity with the country would also facilitate the 
operation. When skilfully carried out such an operation had, 
from tne point of view of the Scots, one great advantage, 
immunity from the English archery..?, 
An additional point of interest, as has been 
already pointed out, was the employment of horses by the ScotE 
as a means of rendering rapid movement possible. At Roslin 
the action was probably a mixed one, but at Melrose the Scots 
fount on foot in tne assault on the abbey ana trius commenced 
the development of their mounted infantry. It is interesting 
to notice that tnis employment of infantry for battles and of 
horsemen for raiding was a reversal of the usual practice of 
the time. 
The raid at ielrose serves to show that even in the 
face of the neiÜhbourhood of the English and of the overwhel: 
wing strength of Edward, the Scots still maintained the spirit 
of resistance unbroken and were to seize their opportunities. 
Even at this time, after six years of war, mostly made up of 
reverses, the Scots were able to control the area immediately 
outside the English zone of occupation. 
X 
/,Possibly Fraser deserves most of the credit. 
.Z,A better example of the value of such immunity will be found 
in the battle of Otterburn. 
Chapter V. 
Methven Wood and Loudon hill. 
Section 1. The defeat of Bruce. 
In the spring of 1306 Bruce initiated the movement 
which was to reach its height of success eight years later on 
the field of Bannockburn. his force at the beginning was small. 
So many promising movements had collapsed in previous Sears 
and so heavy had the hand of Edward been on tne patriots that 
there existed, not unnaturally, an inclination on tine part of 
trie Scots to hang back and await a preliminary success before 
declaring themselves openly. An additional factor that militate 
against Bruce's popularity was his somewhat inconsistent 
.behaviour in tne past. Bruce was a noble, and tie Scottish 
people read no great reason to put trust in any member of that 
class, especially in tiffe face of the apparently well founded 
belief tilut trie rebellion was merely another stage in the long 
quarrel between the Bruces and the Comyns. Trais belief was 
:encouraged by tne facts that John Comyn was murdered at Dum- 
fries and tnat most of his party immediately declared for the 
English side. 
It must, then, be premised that the action at 
Jlethven was one between the immeaiate supporters of the Bruce 
¡family and an Englisn detacnment, greatly strengthened by the 
'members of the Comyn faction. Only when he proved his sincerity 
by perseverance in trie face of misfortune did Bruce succeed in 
aining the hearts and support of the people. 
When Edward neard of tue new movement in trie country 
which he had fo)dly hoped was finally subdued, he lost na time 
in preparing an army to crush the rising in its early stages. 
But as an interval must elapse before the full force of 
England could take the field, he sent on Aymer de Valence, 
earl of Pembroke, to make head until tree king himself 
should 
arrive. Pembroke, marching rapidly, passed Selkirk Forest, 
4(3 
Forest,/ 
wnere he laid waste the lands of Simon Fraser, /and halted at 
Pertn, where his small force was i,,rotected from attack by the 
stone wall and towers whicn that town still possessed. 
On June 13th or 26t4Bruce advanced against Perth. 
He had a force of fifteen hundred men, mostly drawn from his 
own earldom of Carrick and the lands of Lennox, Perthshire, 
and tne eastern counties. Among his supporters were the earls 
of Athole and Lennox, the erasers, Hugh de la riaye, Edward 
'Bruce, Thomas Randolph, and the bishops of Bias ow and St. 
kndrews.3 
In true feudal and chivalrous fashion Bruce 
advanced to trie walls of Berth and issued a challenge to 
Pembroke to come out and fight on fair ground. Pembroke, who, 
if his later conduct at Loudon Hill may be taken as an 
indication of nis character, was rather of the impetuous order, 
was quite willing to accept the challenge, but he was restrain- 
ed by Ingram de Umfraville, who advised him rather to act with 
guile. Accordingly the challenge was declined and, as evening 
was approaching, the Scots withdrew to make their camp.4 
Bruce was now guilty of an extraordinary piece of 
i carelessness. On reaching the wood of iuietriven he sent off a 
third of his force to forage and allowed trie others to disarm 
/.Bain, II, 1782. 
ZThe date is in dispute. Dunbar gives the arguments for both 
sides. 
3,Barbour,Book II, Mackenzie's edition; I have not thought it 
necessary to give the exact lines except in particular 
cases. 
The number given by Barbour on this occasion seems 
reasonable. 
4.'The Scalacronica,fo.203; Barbour declares that the challenge 
was accepted for the next day in order to throw the Scots off 
their guard; this may be true, but it looks suspiciously like 
a partisan attempt to explain tne defeat of trie Scots 
as due 




and construct a camp. i'o force of observation was left to keep 
a watch on Pembroke's .movements, with the result that he was 
able to assemble his force, leave Perth, and reach the 
immediate vicinity of Bruce's camp before the alarm was giver..!. 
The Scottish cavalry hastily armed and mounted, but the surpris 
was complete and the resistance that could be offered to the 
English advance was of a desultory nature. The Scottish 
footmen, few in numbers, soon left the field and Pembroke was 
able to concentrate his attack on the mounted men. Bruce 
himself and his immediate followers performed prodigies of 
valour, but the initial handicap was too great and in the end 
the Scots were routed.Bruce himself, almost taken by Mowbray 
and rescued by Seton, with difficulty effected his retreat with 
a few followers. Randolph, Somerville, Simon Fraser, 
Christopher Seton, the earl of Athole, and other notables were 
captured and were, for the most part, treated with merciless 
;severity by Edward. The Scottish force had, in fact, been 
completely scattered and Bruce retained. what was little more 
Ithan a bodyguard. 
Eéction 2. Bruce thanes his tactics. 
The winter of 1306 -7 was a period of depression 
for the adherents of the Bruce party, but in the spring came a 
revival marked by some notable efforts on the part of James 
Douglas. After a, prolonged series of escapes and skirmishes in 
Galloway in the spring of the year, Bruce was able to emerge 
from his refuge in Glen Trool and march into the hither parts 
of Ayrshire. His force consisted of six hundred men and was 
very different in composition from the body which had been 
routed at Methver_ Wood, being made up almost entirely of 
In face of the explicit sxatemefts in Barbour and the Scala- 
cronica, I cannot see the reason for the assertion of anum 
Professor Oman that the attack took place in the morning. 
Chronicle of Meaux,p.276; Barbour,Bk.II; Scalacronica,fo.203.. 
r 
of/ 
apearmen. This was partly trie result of tige slaughter or falling 
off of so many of Bruce's supporters among the nobles, and partly 
of the fact that Bruce, through the difficulty of the ground in 
which he had been operating and through a change in his tactics, 
did not attempt to maintain any 1ar"e body of horsemen./ 
As Bruce was operating in the vicinity ofalston and was 
thus threatening to cut off all copmlunication between the Ayrshire 
lowlands and the east, Pembroke moved out from Ayr to attack him. 
The unopposed presence of a body of rebels and the isolation, even 
if only partial and temporary, of the western district could not, 
from the English point of view, be permitted..ZBruce had, however, 
on this occasion ample notice of the English advance and was able 
to make full preparations to meet the attack. 
On the western side of Loudon Hill, which is a rdcky 
excrescence somewhat resembling an Ailsa Craig on dry land, the 
1 road rises for two miles in a long steady slope from the Irvine 
valley to the point where it crosses the neck of.high land 
connecting the hill to the main plateau.3.On either side of the 
road at a distance of one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards4 
began the series of mosses and bogs, which still occupy a great 
part of this district. Thus the flanks of a Scottish position 
astride the road were adequately protected from any movement of 
cavalry. To restrict further the line of the English advance 
Bruce dug three parallel lines of trenches with breastworks from 
the bog towards the road on both sides. The area immediately 
11It is worth noting that a supply of horses would, under the 
circumstances have been impossible to obtain. 
>  
.Z.Edward, like Cromwell at a later date, seems to have considered 
that Ayr was one of the keys of Scotland. 
).From the statement in Barbour,Bk. VIII, that Bruce placed his 
noncombatants on the hill itself, it is evident that the Scottish 
position was to the westward. 
',I.Earbour's "bowshot ". 
immediately/ 
beside the road was left clear to invite a charge, and this open 
space was manned by the Scottish spearmen in close array./.In the 
rear of the position. stretched the great moor of Drumclog in which 
the Scots could easily elude any pursuit by heavily- armed men and 
which was, as Claverhouse found to his cost centuries afterwards, 
a mere trap for a mounted force. 
In due course Pembroke arrived on the ground with a 
strong force of men.- at- arms111e was at once faced with the fact 
that any attack which might be made would have to be a frontal one 
and that the simplest flank movement would entail a detour of miles 
with the additional risk of moving in column to a flank across 
broken ground and the front of an enemy, whose mobility was, on 
the moors, supericr to his own. To retire from an inferior enemy 
without an action was not to be thought of, as it would have been 
a most damaging blow to the reputation of the English, and to 
maintain a position in front of the Scots would have been difficult 
ton account of the question of supplies. Accordingly Pembroke, whose 
force was split into two divisions, immediately ordered the leading 
squadron to charge along the road against the Scottish force. 
The English men -at -arms galloped headlong on the 
Scottish spearmen, but the latter, as at Stirling and Falkirk, 
held together and easily shook off the attack. The stabbing of the 
horses and the fall of the foremost riders caused confusion and 
raised a barrier to any further English assault. The attackers had 
lost over a hundred men and their first division was badly shaken, A 
It was no part of Bruce's plan to prohibit an English attack; if it 
had been, there were in the immediate vicinity a dozen positions 
in which he could have defied assault. The matter was rather one of 
'laying a trab for Pembroke, as a victory in the field was a 
necessity for Bruce at this time that he might gain prestige and 
increased support from the people. 
;.But I agree with Mr. Barron that Barbour's three thousand 
is 
,Probably an exaggeration. 
C 
shaken,/ 
while the Scots were completely unharmed and were even showing 
signs of charging the broken ranks of the English. Accordingly 
Pembroke cut short the action, possibly in fear of a. worse 
disaster, and retreated rapidly towards Ayr. In this he ,robably 
acted wisely, as a charge by his second squadron could only have 
served to swell the English losses and might, when repulsed, have 
led to a complete rout./". 
Section 3. A comparison. 
Bruce at LIethven Wood appears as ah inexperienced and 
somewhat careless leader, who risked the success of his effort at 
the very start by an adherence to a mode of action not at all 
ti 
suited to Scottish requiements. For this failure to appreciate the 
true needs of the case he may be excused because of the facts that 
practically all his experience of warfare had been gained in the 
/.Pembroke has been rather severely criticised for this action. 
'Doubtless he was, as I have stated in the previous section, hot- 
headed and overconfident, but what l.e could he do? From his point 
of view to crush the Scots was an urgent necessity and an easy 
task. There is no indication that he had an adequate force of 
archers and, even if he had had them and had brought them into 
action, the Scots could easilt have retreated out of range to an 
,impregnable position. In fact the Scots were never more than a 
.quarter of a mile from complete security. Pembroke only acted as 
;nine out of ten commandees at the time would have done. As, 
according to his lights, he had to attack at once, the only 
improvement would have been to dismount his men. 
4arbour,Bk.vIII; additional explanations of Pembroke's rash 
behaviour exist in the facts that he was naturally exasperated at 
his repeated failures to get to grips with Bruce in Galloway, and 
that he was still smarting under a rebuke launches at him by the 
impatient Edward on the ground that he was too cautious - -- -see 
Bain, II, 1896. 
the/ 
cavalry sphere and that he had lived for years among men who held 
that the horse soldier was superior to trie foot. Nad ne been 
present at trie battle of Stirling Bridge or at one of trie minor 
successes of the Scots, his action would probably have been 
different. 
Similar reasons exist for Bruce's reliance on the 
mounted retainers of his supporters among the nobles. As has been 
already indicated, it was impossible for him to obtain the support 
of the people at that early stage. As a result the battle was 
merely one of those cavalry hurly-burlies, so conmon at this 
period, without method or plan, in which some slight factor might 
easily turn the scale. In this particular ease the element of 
surprise was on the English side and gave Pembroke the advantage. 
It is not so easy to excuse Bruce for the laxity of 
behaviour which led to the fighting of the action. The preliminary 
advance on Perth, though accompanied by some risks, could be 
justified. Pembroke's force was small and was far from any support, 
so that it might be snapped up before help could arrive from the 
south. In addition it was very important that Bruce should win 
some initial victory in order to incline the waverers to his side 
by a prospect of ultimate success. But when the challenge to open 
combat was refused, Bruce should either have taken up a post of 
observation near Perth in which to intercept any sally, or else 
have withdrawn out of striking distance of the English. 
Bruce learned his lesson. The leader, who committed so 
many errors in 1306, reappeared in 1307 as a general both skilful 
and wary. Never again did he engage in an action in which the 
advanjtage of position was not on nis side, and it is doubtful if 
a single occasion can be found on which he gave the English an 
opportunity of crushing im. his general strategy developed in a 
fashion similar to that of Wallace; the maintenance of a strong 
body of experienced footmen with a small party of light horse as 
outriders and scouts, and the gradual reduction with this force of 
the districts least accessible to the English. Combined with this 
sr9, 
this/ 
action was a readiness to seize the slightest oportunity for the 
destruction of an English detachment and a refusal to defend to 
extremity any fixed point which could be isolated by the invaders. 
The cambat at Loudon Hill was in itself a small thing, 
but it was the presage of greater successes to come. In a way it 
was a minor edition of the wort of Stirling Bridge, for the positi 
of observation, the trap, the narrow approach, and the ability to 
to retreat if the English acted warily were all there. It was in 
fact an example of the "heads, I win; tails, you lose" game, as 
played by the Scots. If Pembroke fought with every conceivable 
precaution, he could not hope to crush the Scots; nor could he 
hold the position for long, if they had been forced to evacuate it 
in face of the difficulty of supplying a force in so inaccessible 
a region. Not only could the Scots find a dozen alternative 
positions, but they could keep the field indefinitely. On the othe 
hand, if Pembroke acted rashly or refused to fight at all, the 
advantage was bound to lie with the defenders. 
The action itself was marked by the reappearance of the 
scniltron in a modified form. Flanks and rear were, owing to the 
nature of the position, practically dispensed with, and the Scots 
were able to use all their spearmen to stiffen the defence to the 
front. A century later, in the light of the successes of the 
Flemings and the Swiss, the result would hardly have been doubted, 
: but for Bruce, who was trying out these tactics for the first time 
'ir_ his career, it must have been an anxious moment when the 
leading files of the English men -at -arms thundered down with 
,apparently irresistible force on the ranks of the spearinen. The 
result went to prove, as has often been demonstrated since, that, 
in the absence of missile or artillery support for the cavalry, a 
resolute body of footmen, suitably armed and keeping in close 
array, could rely on turning the charge of the best horsemen in 
existence. From the testing ground at Loudon dill the Scottish 
spearmen marched with full confidence in themselves and in their 
leader. 
iO 
Note. The inability of cavalry to break up a strong body of 
footmen is well known. This state of affairs is no reflection on 
trie courage of the horsemen, but is rather due to the reluctance 
of a horse to charge home, unless wounded, and to the ease with' 
;which ranks of cavalry are thrown into disorder by the fall of the 
leaders. Exceptions to the rule exist, of course, but, when they 
are examined, it is usually found that there has been some 
(unsteadiness on the part of the infantry leading to a bap in the 
ranks by which the charge has been able to penetrate. 
a( 
chc.Jter VI. 
Scottish Sie ¿es. 
Section 1. The failure at Berwick. 
wring the period from 1308 till 1314 Bruce was engaged 
in regaining the districts und, especiaaly, the fortresses of 
Scotland from the invaders. In this he was greatly aided by the 
weak rule of Edward II and by the internal troubles which distract 
ed England at this time. English invasions were foiled by an 
avoidance of pitched battles and by a cutting up of small parties, 
e.g. the slaughter of a detachment of three hundred Welsh and 
English in 1310./But offensive action was not neglected and Bruce, 
by his raids in 1311 and 1312, gained spoils which provided him 
with the sinews of war. At the same time tine Scots were very 
,heavily handicapped in their operations against the castles by the 
,almost total lack of siege engines and by the English predominance 
at sea. It was the latter factor which enabled coastal fortresses, 
such as Dundee, to hold out so long against the Scottisr. blockade) 
In the absence of proper appliances for the reduction of 
the strongholds in English nands, the Scots were reduced to the 
employment of surprise attacks aided by such contrivances as their 
own ingenuity might suggest. An incident of this sort took place 
t Berwick in 1312, which, although it enddd in failure on the 
part of the attackers, provides information concerning the manner 
in which they set about t} :eir task. 
The attempted surprise was, as w4.s usual, carried out at 
i 
,night by a picked body of stormers under the charge of Douglas and 
Randolph, but there was probably a strong supporting force in the 
xmediato neighbourhood, perhaps under the command of Bruce himsel: 
In the darkness the Scots stole up to the foot of the wall and 
Proceeded with the task of setting up their scaling ladders. This 




delicate task was successfully accomplished, but at tne criti- 
cal_ moment, when the stormers were about to mount to the 
.'attack, the alarm was given and the Scots, their initial 
advantage being lost, beat a rapid retreat. /So quickly did 
they decamp that trie ladders, which, from their nature, were 
firmly attached and would save taken some trouble to recover, 
were left Hanging on the walls, and were captured by tr.ce 
English and exhibited next day on the public pillory. 
These contrivances were probably the most original 
and useful which the Scots had yet contributed to the science 
of war. Each ladder was made of rope, but with the steps, 
measuring thirty inches by six, constructed of wood, and kept, 
by knots in tne side ropes, at intervals of a foot and a half. 
At t ne top of tie ladder was a right angle grapnel, to rings 
in wnich the ropes were attached. Each arm of tree grapnel was 
a foot long and it was so planned that one arm would lie along 
the face of the wall and the other ..cross its top. This gave 
a farm grip and provided that the greater the weight on the 
ladder, the securer the hold would be. 
As the first principie was that of securing silence 
atx ail costs, and as the throwing of a grapnel would create 
noise and give the alarm, a hole was left in the grapnel. Into 
this nole was inserted the point of a lance, specially chosen 
as being equal in length to the altitude of the wall, and by 
the use of this the ladder was quietly placed in position. To 
prevent the ladder handing too closely to tile wall, a fault 
which might cause noise by scraping the surface or might 
seriously incommode th- clinbers, fenders of sift material were 
fitted on every third step. By the use of such an appliance as 
this ladder noise was absolutely avoided, and the alarm could 
only be given by an accident or through the special care of a 
/According to the chronicle of Lanercost and the V.E.S. the 




Section 2. Bruce's capture of Perth. 
Towards the end of 1312 Bruce with the main body of 
the Scots advanced to the siege of Perth. The town, like 
Berwick, was defended by a stone wall with numerous towers, 
and by a wet ditch., It was held for the English by the Scots- 
man, William Oliphant, and had been provided with a sufficient 
garrison. 
The Scots maintained a blockade of the place for 
several weeks and engaged in numerous skirmishes with the 
garrison, but an open assault was out of the question, because 
of the strength of the defences.3.The time thus consimed was not 
however, wasted, for tine king was busily engaged in reconnoitr- 
ing the defences or the place with a view to the discovery of 
any weak points which might exist. Eventually he ascertained 
that at a particular point the ditch was fordable by men on 
foot. Having thus obtained the information whicn he desired, 
he ordered the siege, which had by tais time endured for six 
weeks, to be raised. Tile Scots accordingly broke up carp and 
retreated openly, to the delight of the garrison. 
'L'ne following week was spent by the Scots in the 
construction of scaling ladders for the impending assault. At 
the end of that period Bruce led his forces.back to Perth by 
night, observing every possible precaution to preserve 
absolute silence. The retreat of the Scots and the interval, 
which had elapsed, had served their intended purpose; the watch 
on the wails had been relaxed and the garrison had been lulled 
into a false sense of security. 
Ì'l'he chronicle of Lanercost, fo. 214b; comment would be super - 
fluous; a more fool -proof device could hardly be imagined. 
.t ain,III,68. 
3Bruce may have hoped to obtain help from the citizens of the 
town, but, if he did, he was disappointed. 
security./ 
On reaching the edge of tne moat Bruce led the way 
into the water, closely followed by his best troops. Tile ditch 
was deer and the w.ding difficult, but the bottom of the 
wall was gained without misadventure or giving of the alarm. 
The laddersl.were placed in position and up swarmed the 
stormers. A considerable section of the top of ti-!e wail was 
occupied and then the Scots ventured quietly into trie streets. 
Not all of tnem, however, for Bruce himself: kept a strong 
reserve at tile top of the ladders in case of a repulse being 
sustained.A.'iiae surprise was so complete that the garrison was 
unable to make any effectual resistance and the town was 
speedily captured. In accordance with Bruce's project of 
conciliating the burghers, the stormers shed as little blood 
as possible, with the result that tiie capture was attended 
with very small loss to either side.3g4 
Section 3. Douglas storms Roxburgh. 
Commanding as it did the junction of tine Tweed and 
Teviot valleys, Roxburgh was one of the most important 
strongholds in the border district. Its position rendered 
approach difficult and it was strongly fortified, having, what 
was unusual in the Scottish fortresses of that date, a keep, 
in addition to tne surrounding wall. The garrison was at the 
1.Presumably similar in construction to those captured by the 
English at Berwick. 
o2 :i.iis very necessary precaution has been frequently neglected 
by commanders in the heat of an attack. Such negligence 
nearly caused the failure ofmore than one Britisn assault in 
the Peninsular war. 
3.3arbour, Bk. EX. 
4i'he last document in Bain regarding Perth is dated October, 
1312. Some idea of the strength of the garrison may be gained 
'by reference to the list of well over a hundred mounted men in 
Bain, III, pp. X25 -427. 
 
vie/ 
time of the attack commanded by Sir -Iilliam de Fiennes./ Ine 
Earrison was extremely unpopular in trie surrounding districts, 
because of its raids, which had called forth complaints to 
Edward II from the neighbourinE farmers..? 
On Eastern eve of 13143.óa es Douglas advanced to 
attack tne castle. me nad chosen his time well as the garrison 
was engaged in the feast, which was usually held at tnis tike, 
preparatory to tne rigours of Lent. Tne advance was not carried 
out in absolute darkness, but in the twilight. The Scottish 
stormers had, by the order of their leader, carefully 
darkened their armour, and, by advancing slowly and in a 
crouching position, t2ey were able to reach trie foot of the 
wall without arousing the alarm of the sentries. S7 
The Scots were equipped wit!i ladders of tne same 
pattern as trlose used at Berwick, wnicn had been specially 
constructed for tne assault by John Lednouse. These were now 
placed against the wall, but not, as at Perth, witnout noise. 
The clatter attracted the attention of a sentry, wno at once 
/'This is his name as given by tne Scalacronica and trie chronicle 
of Lanercost. Darbour,Bk.X, calls him Filinge, and there is a 
reference to him in Bain,III,337, in whicu he is named as 
k'elyng. According to the Lanercost chronicle he was a Gascon, 
while tne Scalacronica calls him a Burgundian. Such are the 
joys of research. 
?.Bain, III, 33/. 
3.The Scalacronica says definitely 6tn }larch, and Berbour and the 
VE.S.,p.200, both refer to the carelessness of the garrison 
common at such a time. Any date, such as twat of Dunbar, seems 
to be ruled out by tile document in 13ain,III,352, showing that 
the castle was in English hands in rebruary, 1314. 
This afterwards became a common practice of tne border raiders. 
S.Barbour declares that the object was to deceive the English 
into thinking the Scots a herd of black cattle. 
once/ 
ran to the spot, but ne was quickly stabbed by Ledhouse, who 
had darted up the ladder as soon as it was attached to the 
wall. A second sentry met with a similar fate, and the Scots 
poured over the wall and into the yard of the castle and 
burst into trie hall where the feast was being held. The 
surprised and unarmed English were mostly cut down out of hand, 
but the warden and a handful of his men succeeded in seizing 
and barricading the principli tower, or keep. 
Douglas was reluctant to attack in the darkness, 
whicri had by this time fallen, but throujhout the night 
skirmishing went on. Apart from the tower the Scots held 
the whole interior of the castle, and the English survivors 
were in a hopeless position. Nevertheless they defended their 
tower bravely until the governor was killed by an arrow shot. 
In the morning the Scots prepared for a regular attack on the 
keep, but this proved unnecessary, us the English were ready 
to capitulate on condition of receiving safe conduct to 
England. Douglas, who was probably eager to finish his work 
and get away from such a dangerous locality, readily granted 
this condition. As soon as the English nad gone, the Scots 
fell to work to demolish the castle, a task which was speedily 
and theriughly accomplished./ 
Section 4. The fall of Edinburgh. 
Tue castle situated on the rock of Edinburgh was 
probably at this period only constructed of wood, but the 
natural strength of the position gave the garrison a tremen- 
dous advantage in defending it. Here, if anywhere, it might be 
said that the surprise tactics of the Scots would be of 
no 
avail, as it seemed impossible for them to approach 
the wall or 
palisade, except on the east side, where it was 
strongly 
defended. It was held in the spring of 1314 
by a dascon, 
/Barbour,Bk.X; V.E.S.,p.200; the chronicle 
of Lanercost,fo.215; 
trie Scalacronica, fo. 207b. 
 
Gascon, 
Peter Lebaud,fwith a garrison of nearly twui hundred men... 
The fortress nad been blockaded for some time by a 
force under tne command of Randolph, but little progress had 
been made towards effecting a capture. Tne success of the Scoti 
at Roxburgh, however, stirred tne besiegers to greater efforts 
and it was decided to risk an attack. Randolph was fortunate 
enough to secure the services of a volunteer, William Francis 
by name, who professed to be acquainted with a practicable path 
to the foot of the stockade. Thirty men were specially selected 
for the perilous task, and a ladder, carefully muffled, was 
provided for the actual escalade. Randolph himself took part.3. 
The ascent took place on the west side and was succ- 
essfully accomplished despite the natural difficulties and the 
added risk of discovery of the enterprise by the English. At 
the same time the remainder or the besiegers made a noisy 
assault upon the gate of the castle and tnus attracted the 
attention of the garrison away from the pàjnt of attack. 
Favoured by the success of this feint, the Scots were able to 
plant their ladder on the palisade and then, led by Francis, 
Randolph, and Sir Andrew Grey, to swarm over into the fortress. 
They were soon attacked by the English, but, despite the odds 
against them, were able to hold their own. The fall of Lebaud 
and the fact that the pressure on the gate had now become 
a 
serious finally induced the distsicted garrison to surrender 
after a brave resistance. The place was destroyed by the Scots 
(,Or Loubaud; Bain, III, 254, 33 >0; the Scalacronica, fo. 207b. 
.This was the 
see Bain, III 
3,Barbour, Bk. X 
chronicl 
fault in his 
to the south 
of the rock. 
the esivlanad 
been made on 
could hardly 
,Loch was in 
customary garrison in the time of Edward i3aliol; 
11323. 
e of Lanercost,fo.215; the writer is, however, 
at 
oints of direction. He states that the 
gate was 
and that thew ascent took place on the 
north side 
The gate, hciever, could only be at the 
east, where 
e now stands. Correspondingly the ascent 
raust have 
the west side. Indeed the north side 
of the rock 
be approached if, as seems probable, 
the North 
existence at t=iat time. 
O 
Section 5. An appreciation. 
So well planned and executed were the operations of 
the Scots in the surprises briefly described above, that 
adverse criticism becomes almost impossible. It is still, 
however, necessary to point out the details which are worthy 
of the fullest appreciation by the modern reader, and which 
were, unfortunately, seldom studied and applied by the Scottisi 
leaders of the later middle aces. 
The attack on Berwick was a failure, but it was a 
failure only türougii bad fortune. Even this repulse brings 
into prominence a feature, co,aaon also to the capture of 
Roxburgh. This is the determination of the Scots not to be 
drawn into an en agement at a disadvantage. The natural 
impulse on the part of the attackers at Berwick must have been 
to rush to the assault despite the giving of the alarm. But 
cooler counsels prevailed and, if a possible success was lost, 
a probable check was avoided. Even greater at Roxburgh must 
have been the temptation for the Scots to make an immediate 
assault on the keep, when they had already gained possession 
of the greater part of the fortress do easily. Again, however, 
the rules of discipline and order prevailed and the confusion 
of a night attack upon an organised defence was avoided. Still 
more worthy of praise is the moderation which Douglas 
displayed in granting a safe retreat to the durvivors of the 
garrison at a moment when they were practically at his mercy. 
1,ot only would it have been difficult for him to conduct and 
guard prisoners, but it would have been foolish to linger a 
moment longer than was necessary in a locality where an Englis 
force, from Berwick or elsewhere, night appear at any tine. 
The castle and not the English troops was the objective and of 
that fact Douglas was fully aware. 
It will thus be seen that the object of the Scottish 
commanders vans to avoid ribk to their forces by every 
conceivable ;leans. The only action of the four, which could 
by any stretch be described as rash, is Randolph's assault 
r:. 
assault] 
on Edinburgh, but it ikust be allowed that the situation: was in 
this case desperate, and that the remedy had to be correspond- 
ingly drastic. The lives of thirty men were staked against the 
gain of a position of immense natural strength; not, surely, 
an extravagant risk. 
Bruce's capture of Perth was marked by the most 
judicious use of a reserve and by an ingenious stratagem for 
lulling the suspicions of the defenders. The trick was not 
original, having indeed been employed by various leaders, but 
it draws attention to the fertility in expedients shown by the 
Scots at this time. Except in the assault on Lithlithgow, 
every attack had the common feature of the escalade by ladders, 
but in the preliminary movements there appeared a diversity of 
plan, which well illustrates the ingenuity of the brilliant 
leaders who supported Bruce. 
On the whole it may be said that the Scots, almost 
altogether lacking proper implements and faced by apparently 
insurmountable difficulties, won a triumph which will always 
remain a testimony to the powers of coolness, craft,and 
discipline. The more honour is due to them, as this was the 
only period at which they can be said to have distinguished 
themselves in the difficult role of besiegers. 
It is not so easy to excuse Randolph for taking part in the 
climb himself. His motives are, of course, obvious and do him 
credit, but it is not the duty of a general to run risks, even 
when the object is the animating of his men. 
Notably by Khalid, the Moslem leader, in the conquest of 





Section 1. Preliminary operations; the armies. 
Hard pressed by the blockade carried on by a section of 
the Scottish forces under the coirn and. of Edward Bruce, Philip de 
Mowbrayw the warden of Stirling castle, made a compact with the 
besiegers, whereby he undertook to Surrender the fortress at 
Midsummer, 1314, if, before that date, a relieving English force 
had not penetrated within three leagues of the position. kfter 
making this arrangement he'proceeded to England to seek help from 
Edward II before the appointed day. The threat to Stirling, which 
was the key to the Forth and the most important stronghold in 
Scotland, together with the recent successes of the Scots at 
Roxburgh and Edinburgh moved the king from his usual lethargy and 
led to the assembly of a large force for the invasion of the northi 
While the majority of the English notables were in 
favour of this action, certain of them, being at loggerheads with 
the king over Gaveston and other matters, would not take part 
personally in the campaign. Chief among the dissentients were the 
early of Lancaster, Warenne, Arundel, and Warwick. They did, 
however, send their feudal quotas, so that the army, though not so 
strong as it might have been, was fully representative.3 Amongst 
/I need hardly say that it is with great trepidation that I attempt 
the solution of a problem, which has been closely discussed by 
many writers of repute. Lest my treatment of the question should 
appear inadequate in regard to refutation of opposing theories, I 
must urge that I have to treat the battle in its position as an 
episode in the development of Scottish warfare, and cannot devote 
unlimited space to the carrying on of a controversy. 
The Scalacronica, fp. 207b; V.E,S.,p.200; Barbour,Bk.X,820,and Bk.XI. 
ties, S. 
, p. 201; the chronicle of Lanercost, fo. 215. 
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Amongst/ 
the men of high rank who accompanied. the king were the earls of 
Gloucester, Hereford, Pembroke, and Angus, Robert de Clifford, 
Henry de Beaumont, John de Segrave, Ingramme de Umfraville, and 
Giles de Argentine. The entire host probably numbered between 
twenty and twenty -five thousand men. /, 
Of this mighty array the choicest parts were the men- 
at-arms and the archers. The period of chain mail, pure and simple, 
was now rapidly passing, and the heavy cavalry were equipped with 
crested and visored helmets, and chain mail body armour with the 
addition of plates at the knees, ailettes at the neck and shoulders 
and, in some cases, back and breast plates.q,The shield was small 
and triangular in shape. The lance and long sword continued the 
favourite offensive weapons, but there was the usual assortment of 
crushing implements; a recent addition was the faichion, a modified 
form of the scimitar, used for cutting only. The footmen were 
comparatively lightly armed, their bodies being as a rule protected 
/eyed 
by coats of banded mail.3.The Welsh and Irish were usually, as light 
troops. 
The numbers of the Scottish army cannot be exactly 
ascertained and estimates of the total vary widely. Allowing for 
the thin population of the country, the wastage caused by years of 
'The Foedera writs providing for the summoning of over twenty -one 
thousand men are well known. To that number is to be added about 
five thousand for the Welsh and Irish contingents- -see Bain,III, 
Intro.,pp.xx -xxi- -and three thousand heavy cavalry-- Barbour,Bk. XI, 
and the V. E.. , p. 201, are nearly in agreement on this point. This 
gives a total of nearly thirty thousand; but a liberal allowance 
must be made for absenteeism, desertion, and straggling. A larger 
force could not be fed. 
1411e objection to chain mail was that it was possible for the 
wearer to suffer a wound without the armour being broken. 
3The true nature of this means of defence has not yet been 
ascertained. See the late Mr. Ashdown's Arms and Weapons --IV. 
ofd 
warfare, and the determination. of Bruce to confine his force to 
reliable men, an estimate of about ten thousand may be fairly 
accurate. /!'ne archery element was almost entirely non- existent, 
and the mounted force was confined to a body of five hundred light 
cavalry under the command of the marshal, Sir Robert Keith. The 
great bulk of the force consisted of the spearmen, who were 
equipped with steel or iron caps, reinforced leather jackets, 
plate gloves, and spear and sword or dirk. Alternative to the 
plated leather jacket were chain neck coverings and back and 
breast plates.c2. 
The comparison of the two forces would not be 
coxlete or fair, if mention were not made of the fact that the 
English were in part raw troops and were, perhaps, more hindered 
than helped by their unwilling Welsh and Irish auxiliaries, while 
the Scots were veteran soldiers nerved to fight by the highest of 
motives. Both forces were accompanied by considerable numbers of 
lightly armed followers, useless in defeat but helpful in victory, 
and the English, unlike their opponents, were encumbered by a 
mass of baggage and transport.3 
Section 2. The evening of the 23rd. 
Bruce had ample warning of the approaching; attack and 
J,This is an arbitrary calculation; any number between five and 
fifteen thousand could be advanced, but these are certainly the 
limits. 
Acts of the Scottish Parl.,i,113; "Every landed man having ten pouncii 
In goods shall have for his body and defence of the realm, one 
sufficient acton, one basnet, and gloves of plate with a spear and 
a ewprd. Who has not an acton and basnet, he shall have one good 
habirgeon and one good iron jack for his body; and a hat of iron 
and gloves of plate" This act is, of course, later than the date of 
the battle, but, as Mr. Barron remarks, it represents the prevalent 
Scottish opinion of the foot soldier's equipment for that period. 
3'v' E' Ú 1 . 202. 
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was able to choose and strengthen a suitable defensive position. 
The chosen. ground was the elevated mass of land round St. Ninians 
to the south of Stirling, pretected to the east and south by tige 
Bannock with its bogs and pools and to the west by tue edges of the 
Tor Wood. A direct attack on this ground by the English would 
entail the passing of the Bannock, an operation which could only 
be carried kyc out by large numbers at two points. The easier 
approach was by the old Roman road which passed the stream in the 
vicinity of 1 ilton bog and continued throu,h St. Ninians towards 
Stirling. This, the weakest point of the position, was strengthened 
by the digging of a number of small pits, about a foot square and 
deep, to make the ground as unsuitable as possible for the operat- 
ions of cavalry.I.The other route of approach to the position 
available to the English was to cross the Bannock some distance 
above its entry into the Forth and thus to debouch into the Caree 
between St. Ninians and the river. The space available for crossing 
was, however, very narrow,.tas the ground at the actual junction of 
Bannock and Forth was hopelessly boggy; nor could the crossing be 
extended higher up, as the stream ran through u gully which, though 
it might with difficulty be crossed by footmen, was quite 
unnegotiable by heavy cavalry. 
The strength of the position is at once realised. If the 
English advanced by the Roman road, the narrowness of the entry, 
with the presence of the pits and the rising ground, would make a 
charge difficult, while the passing of the Bannock lower down could 
only be done in detail and was attended by all the risks of narrow 
and wet ground. In either case Bruce could concentrate his forces 
to attack the enemy before they could debouch on open ground. To 
(,Barbour, Bk. , 360; 38'7. The "way" must be the old road. Everything 
seems to indicate that Bruce did not wish the English to attack by 
that route. 
Not, I am convinced by survey of the ground, more than five 
hundred. yards at the most. 
To/ 
facilitate such a concentration, his forces were arranged in four 
divisions so placed that they could take front rapidly either 
towards the Carne or towards the Roman road. The divisions were 
commanded by Randolph, Edward Bruce, Walter the Steward, and the 
king himself. Randolph was posted on the high ground at St. Ttinianc 
overlooking the Cerise, Walter and Edward Bruce close together to 
the east of the road facing the Bannock, while the king occupied 
the interior of the angle and could at the same time cover the 
road or easily move to the support of either party. A weak point ix 
the position was that it could be turned by a wide sweeping move- 
ment to the south and west, but such a movement would have taken 
,time and would have enableu the Scots to retreat safely. /. 
In the afternoon of the 23rd the English, coming from 
the direction of Edinburgh, approached the skirts of the Tor Wood. 
The advance was watched and reported to Bruce by Douglas and Keit, 
and the Scottish scouts in their turn were discerned by the English 
;van.3 It was now too late in the day to fight a decisive battle, as 
the Scottish position was still unknown in its details to the 
English. Accordingly the earl of Gloucester with a portion of the 
vanguard and some Welsh light troops, commanded by Sir Henry de 
Bohun of Hereford, pushed on along the Roman road to reconnoitre.4 
This advance developed into a skirmish in which some of the Welsh 
were slain, and their leader, de Bohun, was brained by Bruce.Ç 
At the same time a detachment of cavalry, led by 
f.Barbour,Bk.XI,265- 347,348 -453. Bruce's position was in fact the 
now familiar one of observation. He did not intend at any time to 
stand strictly on the defensive, but was ready to strike a blow at 
the English, if they afforded him a suitable opportunity. But, like 
Wallace and Moray at Stirling Bridge, he would have retreated if 
the English had taken all due precautions to outflank him. 
.2.Barbour, Bk. XI, 454 -463. 
+.The Scalacronica fo. 238 "lauant garde, dour.t le count de Gloucestre 
eftdit gouernour, entreront la voi dedenz le Park." 
SBarbour, Bk. XII, 1 -59; V. 3. , p. 202. 
/j 
by/ 
Robert de Clifford and Henry de Beaumont, passed the Bannock at thy: 
lower crossing and attempted to ride round the Scottish position 
by the plain.jThis body had already proceeded far across the plain, 
when Randolph with five hundred of his spearmen descended from St. 
Ninians into the open. The English cavalry immediately pulled up 
and prepared to charge the Scots. Sir Thomas Grey, well aware that 
the party of horse was unsupported and better acquainted than his 
companions with the prowess of the Scottish spearmen, pleaded for 
caution, but was held up to scorn by Beaumont. The English made a 
headlong charge which was steadily received and repulsed by the 
veteran Scots, who directed their spears against the horses with 
Barbour,Bk...I,52i -o4 , gives eight hundred as the number; the Scala 
cronica,fo-238, states the sum as three hundred, which seems more 
probable. I must join issue here on the assertion that Clifford's 
sole object was to enter the castle. Barbour says so, but such a 
statement could only be on his part an expression of opinion. On 
the other hand the chronicle of Lanercost,fo.215, asserts that 
Clifford's desire was to ride round the flank and prevent a Scott- 
ish retreat. This seems a perfectly good reason; in considering its 
elausibility three points must be borne in mind. a. The castle was 
already technically relieved. b.What could be the object in weaken- 
ing the field army, above all in cavalry, to reinforce a castle 
which was in no immediate danger? c.The main object of the English, 
was to destroy the Scottish army. The relief og the castle was an 
incident - -a point which has been forgotten by most, if not all, 
writers on the subject. The fortress was bound to become the prize 
of the victors. That would it profit Edward, who could not remain 
in the vicinity for a prolonged period, to achieve a barren relief? 
As soot, as he retired the castle would have been once more blockadi 
and the previous state of affairs restored. Permanent success 
could only be gained by a decisive victory over the Scottish field 
force; it is this fact which explains the determination of the 
English to fight, even on unfavourable ground. 
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with/ 
fatal results. William Deyncourt was killed and 1ax Grey was 
dismounted and captured. The survivors of the English fled, some 
to the castle and some back across the Bannock to the king's 
bivouac. /.With this check to the advance hostilities ceasee for the 
day. 
Section 3. The battle. 
Throughout the night the English were busily engaged in 
passing some of their force over the Bannock and the adjacent ,pools 
and by the dawn they had mustered a strong force on the higher 
portion of the Carse facing the divisions of Edward Bruce and 
Walter the Steward. The narrow space available had, however, reduce 
the army to a closely packed mass, and had, with the difficulties 
of the ground, prevented the whole force from crossing. From the 
details of the subsequent action it is evident that the English 
body ready to commence the action was mainly composed of the 
cavalry, and that the infantry were jammed in behind. In this way 
the English had partially lost the valuable help of their archers 
before the battle started. 
It was no part of the Scottish plan to allow the English 
to deploy on the plain unchecked, and to prevent this and restrict 
the English ground an4 A.rnmediate advance was made, the division of 
Edward Bruce leading the way. As the mass of the spearmen pushed 
steadily into the plain, the English division of cavalry, with the 
earl of Gloucester in the van, hurled itself on the hedge of point, 
The shock was terrific and large numbers of the English were hurled 
The Scala. , fo. 208; see Section 4 for arguments on tais point. 
Barbour, Bk. XII, 39J -438. 
There can be little doubt that both sides advanced -- Barbour,Bk.XII, 
409 -421, the Scots "tuk the playne full apertly"; V.E.S.,p.203; the 
Scalacronica,fo.238b; the chronicle of Lanercost,fo.2lbb, the Scots 
"audacter contra Anglicos processerunt" and the English horsemen 
rushed " in lanceas Scottorum." 
! 
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and large numbers of the English were hurled to the ground by the 
stabbing of their horses. The Scots were, however, hard pressed 
and the divisions of Randolph and Walter successively entered the 
fight, Randolph coming up on the left of Edward Bruce. A desperate 
melee ensued, in which the earl of dloucester was brought down and 
killed by the spearmen. 4 
At this point the English archers came into action from 
behind their cavalry. Their fire, though largely indirect,.?was 
harassing the Scots greatly, when Keith with his division of light 
horse issued suddenly from the skirts of the Tor Wood and swept 
down the side of the stream.3,This unexpected charge was fatal to 
the defenceless archers, who were cut down wholesale and the 
archery diversion ceased. The great mass of the English were now 
penned in the narrow space between the Bannock and the Scots and 
the critical moment was at hand. Bruce, realising the crisis, 
flung in his division on the Scottish right flank s and the 
spearmen, now welded into one huge schiitron, swung irresistibly 
forward. The English army was now being pushed into the angle of 
the Forth and Bannock as Bruce pressed on their left, and further 
resistance would only have resulted in the mass being precipitated 
into the deep tidal waters. The threat to the rear and the ever - 
preotu increasing pressure on the front had their effect. Aymer 
de Valence extricated the king from the mass and the great array 
rapidly broke up. 
Flight was possible by the castle and some few, including_ 
the king, escaped by taking this route and riding round the Tor 
Wood to Linlithgow and Dunbar, hotly pursued by Douglas.ridany fled 
to the Forth and were drowned there, while the majority strove to 
.V.E 
S. , p. 294. 
Baker of Swinbrook,p.10, alludes to some of the English being shot 
in the back by their own archers. 
Barbour, Bk. XIII, 47 -112. 
" ,Bk.XIII,131- 224; "and on a syde assemblit thai." 
T 
" ,Bk.XIII,359 -394. 
to/ 
return across the Bannock, which was choked by the slain and 
drowned. Nor was this all. An angry peasantry and a persistent 
pursuit rendered escape difficult, even for those who had succeeded 
in getting clear of the field. The stragglers perished in hundreds 
and many of the notables were taken, Despenser, Beaumont, Hereford, 
Umfraville, and others being captured at Bothwell, while atterptinL 
to reach Carlisle. /.Argentine, like Gloucester, Clifford, and many 
of the knights was left on the field. The English army was in fact 
destroyed as a military force. 
Section 4. Locus of the battle. 
There are three main theories as the place and manner of 
the fight. Mr. Mackenzie holds that the English crossed the Bannock 
at the lower passage on the evening on the 23rd and formed their 
camp, or bivouac, in the angle of the Forth on the Carse itself. 
Sir h.Maxwell supports the theory that the battle was fought higher 
up in the vicinity of the Roman road, while Mr. Miller holds the 
view that the English crossed the Bannock low down and then moved 
obliquely to meet the Scots, the fight taking place opposite the 
Skeoch mill. 
The first theory rests maihly upon the following points 
1.The references to the crossing of the wet and boggy ground. 
2.The raid of Athole on Cambuskenneth during the night of the 23rd. 
3.The desire of the English to get the Scottish army away from the 
prepared ground near the Homan road. 4.The fact that both sides 
took the offensive,i.e.that Bruce did not act purely on the 
defensive. 5.Tne facility with which the English could on the 
following day, the 24tí1, move into Stirling from their camp an the 
Caree. 6. The reference in the Scalacroniea to the English being 
encamped beyond the Bannock. a. 
'The chronicle of Lanercost,fo.21bb. 
)12he Scalacronica,fo.236; the exact quotation is "Les uns des queux 
Tuerent au CYiaftel, autres al oft le roy, qy is auuint guerpy la 
voy du boys, eftuint venuz en un ,lain deuera leau de Forth outre 
Bannokburn un mauueis parfound rufcelle, ou le dit oft dez Engles 
detruff erent demurrerent tout r_uyt, cìurexnent áuoint pardu courten -- 
aurCe, et eftcint de trop mal couyne pur la icur :ee paffe. " 
P? 
It will be seen that points 1,3, and 4 are quite 
compatible with Mr. Miller's theory. The raid. of Athole was probab- 
ly an isolated action of private vengeance, and did not necessitate 
the presence of the English army oß the Stirling side of the 
Bannock. The fifth point, as has been shown in a previous section, 
,rests on a common misconception of the English objective. The 
meaning, of the Scalacronica quotation is ambiguous, as it may mean 
'beyond Bannockburn as regarded from the point of view of the fight 
or from that of the English in general. But Clifford crossed the 
1Btream, advanced quickly over the Carse, and was routed after a 
short, sharp encounter. How then could the main English host have 
had time to cross the stream during the short interval? 
The theory is,moreover, open to attack on two grounds. 
It neglects the incident of Keith's charge, which could not take 
,place from ambush on the open ground of the Carse, and it stulti- 
lies the military intelligence of the English leaders. If it was 
desired to pass the Scots and reach the castle,ithe English could 
have done so perfectly easily much more safely by keeping to 
the south and west. If the objective was to attack the Scots on an 
exposed part of the front, there was no reason for the camp on bad 
ground,QMr. Mackenzie, in fact, makes the English commit the 
following cardinal faults. a.Prefer a barren relief to a decisive 
blow, i. e. throw away the opportunity for which they had sighed for 
years. b. Move to a flank across the left front of a dangerous 
enemy. c.Make camp in a bog with a broad tidal river to the rear, 
in one of the worst positions imaginable. Edward II was no general, 
but it is impossible to suppose that veterans like Pembroke, 
Umfraville, and Argentine would have permitted such folly. 
Sir h.Maxwell succeeds in drawing attention to certain 
Weaknesses of the first theory, but he fails to prove his own. The 
41 do not for one moment admit that such was the case. 
QIn addition it may be asked why the English did not complete their 
iuovement on the same evening, when a further advance of a little 
:ore than a mile would have put them in a place of security. 
14-D 
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reference to bad ¿round and the crossing; of the pools cannot be 
overturned by a belief that it was impossible in the 14th century 
to cross the Bannock below the Roman road. No wa' is shown in which 
the English were brought up from the lower ground to the higher 
area on the skirts of the wood. Nor is it shown how some of the 
English managed to flee by the castle after the rout. 
ILr. Miller's theory alone remains. It is at once the most 
credible in a military and in a topographical sense. It must be 
insisted that the object of the English was to strike at the 
Scottish. .arm$, and, as they had found by reconnaisance that the 
road route was difficult, it was necessary to cross the stream lowe 
down and then, turning half left, to move against the Scottish 
force. That the initial part of this movement took place at night 
!is not disputed, nor is it doubtful that it might easily have been 
1 
successful if the Scots had stood strictly on the defensive and 
hallowed their enemy to deploy at leisure. By this theory the double 
;offensive, the charge of Keith, the of to get 
a clear field of fire, and the flight in three directions are 
explained. Kor is this explanation so much opposed to that of kr. 
Mackenzie. The two points debatable are as to the time of crossing 
and the exact locus of the first collision. As to the course of the 
fight, the manner in which the English were forced back into the 
obtuse angle of Forth and Bannock, and the flight itself, there is 
little to dispute. 
Section 5. Development of the defensive tactics of the Scots. 
The tactics of Bruce are those of Stirling Bridge 
elaborated and carried to their logical conclusion. From the first 
stage of the campaignd ictated his enemy's movements. Two courses 
of action were left to the English. a.To make a wide flanking 
movement. b.To fight on ground chosen by the Scottish leader. If 
the invaders had adopted the first course no battle would have been 
fought. The Scots would have made their retreat and the English 
blow would have been spent on the air and would have resulted in 
the temporary relief of the beleaguered fortress and nothing more. 
-- 
The adoption of the second alternative entails a brief 
examination of the preparations of Bruce for meeting the attack. 
However inferior a general may be over the whole battle area, it 
must be his primary care to secure a superiority of force at the 
decisive point.LBruce brought the achievement of this purpose as 
near certainty as was humanly possible. Two routess of attack 
existed. If the English had fallen into the error of dividing their 
forces and using both,.the Scots would held one attack with a small 
force and hurled their main body at the other. If one line of 
advance was adhered to by the English, the tactics of Stirling 
Bridge were to be repeated. A space of ground wa;2 left sufficient 
to tempt an advance, but insufficient for a deployment of cavalry 
and archers. The Bannock played the part of the Forth and the 
lower crossing that of the bridge. The obstacles were not, of eaux 
course, so prohibitive nor the space so small as in 1297, but in 
the case of Bannockburn the numbers were much larger. As at 
Stirling Bridge, when the English horse and part of the foot had 
crossed and were ready to hold the ground for their archers, they 
were attacked and forced to fight in a restricted space where the 
cavalry could not find room to charge with great momentum. It was 
impossible to cut the retre.:A as had been done by Wallace, but thiE 
office was largely performed for the Scots by the angle of waters 
in which the English were confined. 
Special. feature: of the Scottish action are the cavalry 
charge, the splendid offensive of the schiltron, and the use of 
a reserve by Bruce. Cavalry action by the Scots is a novelty 
worthy of note. The horsemen were lightly equipped and nere not 
intended to be exposed to a shock with their heavier opponents, 
but to cut up light troops. In this they were successful, but the 
example of their action was not followed in later battles. With 
/ "The critical force at the critical point at the critical 
moment "; Clausewitz and Jomini both stress this point. 
The fact that the English leaders avoided this error is 
a proof 
that they were not so incapable as has been generally 
supposed. 
With/ 
regard to the charge of the spearmen, it should be remembered that 
Bruce's troops were veterans who could be trusted to keep their 
ranks even in a rapid advance. When the actual shock came, there 
would naturally be two or three spear points in the Scottish 
front for every single horseman who could come into action in the 
front line of the English, so that the success of the schiltron is 
not surprising. With regard to the action of the reserve, it is 
sufficient to say that Bruce's handling of it may serve as a 
model. It was carefully withheld until the crisis of the battle 
was at hand and was then thrown into the fight at the moment when 
very little would turn the scale on either side./ 
¡It is worthy of note that, owing to the diagonal course of the 
Bannock, it was possible for Bruce to bring in his reserve on the 
Scottish right flank, while it was impossible for the English to 





Section 1. An unsuccessful siege. 
During the period of fifteen years which elapsed between 
the battle of Bannockburn and the peace of Northampton the Scots 
made repeated raids on the northern counties of England. These 
inroads, which commenced immediately after the victory, constitute 
the only period during which the Scots acted systematically and 
successfully on the offensive. There was, however, no attempt made 
at a permanent conquest, the object of the attack being to win 
plunder and to bring such pressure to bear on the English as would 
induce them to aéknowledge the independence of the northern country, 
In July, 1315, Bruce advanced to the siege of Carlisle. 
Such an attack had been expected by the English for some time and 
the garrison had been strengthened to meet the emergency. The 
defending force, which was commanded by Sir Andrew de Harcla, 
comprised in all five knights, fifteen squires, seventy men -at- arras, 
thirty hobelers, /and over three hundred archers..2This force would, 
of course, be reinforced by the burghers. The garrison was well v 
equipped with siege engines and towers,3.many of which had been 
constructed of material obtained from the demolition of sundry 
houses in the place.4The vulnerable point° of the defence were the 
three gates, the Caldew, Bokard, and Rivard, and for the protection 
these entrances special detachments of archers were assigned. 
When the blockade had been established the Scots made 
daily and repeated assaults on the city gates. These proved i 
unavailing and it became evident that the defences could not be 
rushed. The next step was to set up opposite the Caldew, or western,, 
/.For an explanation of this term see section 5. 
Bain, III, 403. 
3Berfrays. 
4 Bain, III, 464. 
/DA 
western,/ 
gate a large machine by means of which huge stones were hurled 
'against the entrance. This device failed because the battery of 
the attackers was completely overmatched by that of the defenders. 
Accordingly the Scots proceeded to bring forward a wooden tower, 
mounted on wheels, which was considerably higher than the wall. 
The garrison prepared towers to counter the hostile one, but this 
proved unnecessary as the attacking machine stuck in the wet 
ground by its own weight and could not be brought up to the walls. 
The besiegers next proceeded to prepare a sow under 
cover of which they might mine the foot of the wall, but the 
obstacle of the moat proved too great to overcome and the fascines 
a 
for filling and wheeled bridges for *rossing this barrier proved 
equally useless. On the ninth day of the siege the Scots prepared 
a general assault with scaling ladders and resolved to repeat the 
practice which had wined them Edinburgh castle. while the greater 
part of their army made a noisy assault upon the city at the place 
of the Minorite friars, Douglas, with a body of picked men 
equipped with ladders, endeavoured to scale the wall on the west' 
side. The ladders were planted under cover of a brisk archery fire 
but the watch was too well kept and the resistance too strong to 
permit of success. The ladders were cast down and the attackers 
withdrew after suffering heavily. 
This was the last effort made by the Scots to secure 
the place. On August ist, the eleventh dl of the siege, they 
abandoned their engines and retreated to their own country with 
the garrison skirmishing in their rear. In this action to cover 
the retreat twb Scottish knights were taken prisoners. /The lesson 
of the failure i3 that on hostile territory and swampy ground the 
surprise tactics of the Scots were in this case ineffective, while 
their attempt to divert the attention of the garrison by a feint 
was rendered useless by the employment of fixed detachments of 
/.The chronicle of Lanercost, fo. 216b, makes the siege last ten days; 
1 
Bain, 171, 464, indicates a duration of twelve. 
/d5^ 
of/ 
defence at the danger points. 
Section 2. Berwick and Myton -on- Swale. 
The English garrison at Berwick had long been a thorn irll 
the side of the Scots, though the activities of the English on the 
eastern border had been restrained by the victories of Douglas at 
Lintalee and Scaithmoor. On March 28th, 1318, the nuisance was 
removed by the betrayal of the town to Douglas by the earl of 
;larch and Peter Spalding. The garrison, however, held out bravely 
in the castle under the command of Sir Roger Horsley for a period 
of sixteen weeks before being compelled to capitulate for lack of 
food.' 
Even Edward II could not acquiesce quietly in the loss 
of the important border fortress and in the following year he 
ordered the muster of a force at Newcastle -on -Tyne for the purpose 
of retaking the dtronghold. The army which assembled amounted to 
seven thousand foot, mostly English archers and Welshmen, and a 
thousand hobeters,Z Tine was lost in preparation and in the march 
north and it was the beginning of September before the English 
approached the town. At the same time a fleet, provided by the 
Cinque Ports, sailed up the east coast with the double purpose of 
supplying the attackers with food and of blockading the town on 
the side of the North sea.3. The position was defended by the 
burghers and a small garrison, the whole being commanded by Walter 
the Steward, who had the invaluable assistance of John Crabbe, a 
Flemish engineer, outlaw, and soldier of fortune. 
The siege lasted from the 7th till the 24th of 
September and comprised a blockade, a series of skirmishes, and 
two great assaults. On the morning of the 7th the English advanced 
to the attack well equipped with ladders, scaffolding, pikes, and 
/The Scalacronica, fo. 211; Bain, III, 607, demonstrates the length of 
the defence. 





large shields to afford shelter. A covering body of archers was 
!detached to keep up a harassing fire on the embrasures of the 
1 
¡ramparts, and the attackers then rushed to the assault. Ladders 
were planted at various points and the besiegers swarmed up them, 
but were steadily mat and repulsed, the ladders being successfully 
!upset. The defenders were greatly troubled by the fire of the 
archers and by the fact that the wall was so low that the top of 
it was within spearthrust from the ground, but they held on gamely, 
ably directed and encouraged by Walter who rode round the line of 
defence with a small reserve giving help where it was required. 
By noon it was evident that the attack would fail and, as the tide 
was now full, the English tried a change of plan. A vessel was 
packed with men and towed by barges towards the wall on the side 
of the sea. The obstacle was to repeat the practice of the 
Crusaders in the assault upon Constantinople by "boarding" the 
wall by means of a gangway thrown out from the vessel, but it was 
defeated bythe heavy fire of arrows and stones from the besieged, 
which prevented the ship approaching to close quarters. When the 
tide ebbed the vessel was left high and dry, and the Scots, making 
a sally by the water gate, seized and burned it before the English 
land force could come to the rescue. As evening approached the 
attackers withdrew baffled. 
A quiet period of five days ensued, which was utilis- 
ed by the English to construct several towers and a huge wooden 
sow securely covered against fire. To counter this action Crabbe 
saw to the making of a specially large mangonel, which was 
mounted on wheels so that it could be rapidly moved to the 
required spot. Late on the 13thlthe Englisn made a combined 
attack by land and sea, the ships on this occasion being 
equipped with fighting tops full of men. As the sow advanced, 
Ì 
(The hour of the assault would be regulated by the time of full 
tide. 
advanced,/ 
Crabbe skilfully bracketed) and finally smashed it with a few stonee 
from his mangonel. Meanwhile the ship attack was repulsed by the 
Scottish engines on the sea wall. The land assault was pressed 
home and in places the defence began to wear thin. The Steward rode. 
about with a hundred men -at -arms, dropping reinforcements here and 
Hthere till he wag left witn a single attendant. As dusk approached, 
the English made a desperate rush on St. Mary's gate. The supports, 
of the drawbridge were bmrned through so that the bridge fell, and 
the English then dashed across and tried to burn the gate itself. 
The crisis of the assault had arrived and the Steward, drawing 
from the castle his last reserve, himself took post at the gate 
and held the entrance successfully till darkness compelled the 
:attackers to withdraw. Even the women and children had taken part 
in the defence by gathering the spent arrows and taking them to 
the men on the walls. .2. 
Meanwhile Bruce had not been idle in arranging for the 
relief of the besieged town. He rejected the course of fighting a 
pitched battle and preferred to put into operation his usual 
strategy of drawing off the English by making a diversion elsewhere. 
With this object he dispatched Douglas and Randolph with several 
thousand men to raid the north of England.3.The foray was pushed 
home and the defenceless districts of the northern counties and of 
Yorkshire were harried as far as Ripon. At this point William de 
Melton, the archbishop of York, with several other clerics and a 
large mass of the townsmen and peasantry sallied out to meet the 
/.Bracketing consists in a gunner throwing a shell beyond the target 
and then one short of it. The maximum and minimum ranges being thuE' 
ascertained, a gradual reduction of the one and increase of the 
other finally secures the hitting of the object. The simplicity of V 
the method and its certainty can only be appreciated from the 
subjective point of view. 
Z Barbour, Bk. XVII. 
and the chronicle of Meaux,p.336, give fifteen 
thousand, the V.E.S.,p.242,ten. Both estimates are probably 
exaggerations. 
the/ 
invaders. The force was of little military value and it was probab- 
ly only the example of the Standard which induced such an action. 
But the Scottish raiders of the twelfth and of the fourteenth 
;centuries were two very different pro .,ositions. At Mytoni -on -Swale 
on September 20th the hostile forces came into collision. The 
English advanced to attack the Scot: /but when the opposing forces 
,got within a few yards of each other the undisciplined northern 
levies collapsed and fled in confusion. Without suffering any loss 
to speak of the Scots destroyed over a thousand of the enemy, 
'including a large number of clerics, while many more were drowned 
in attempting to cross the Swale. Louglas and Randolph then 
resumed their ravaging, which they carried as far as the neighbour -i 
hood of Pontefract./ 
In a few days the news of the disaster in Yorkshire 
;reached the English camp outside Berwick. The knowledge that a 
¡;strong hostile force was successfully established in the heart of 
¡their territory cased consternation in the English camp, and the 
lords of the threatened lands were naturally anxious to retreat. 
Counsels on the subject were divided, but on the advice of the 
earl of Lancaster it was finally decided to raise the siege and to 
attempt to intercept the retreat of the raiders. In this the 
English probably wade a mistake, but their action was exactly that 
anticil;ated by Bruce, who had once more accurately summed up his 
enemy's weaknesses. The attempt at interception was unsuccessful 
as the Scottish raiders retreated by the western districts and 
The Scots, according to the Lanercost chronicle,fo.218, had 
;dismounted and formed a schiltron, while the English were in very 
1 
,bad order. When the English fled the Scots mounted for the 
pursuit. 
, Barbour, Bk. XVII; V.E.S. , pp. 242 -244; the chronicle of i eaux, pp. 336 - 
337; the Bridlington chronicle,pp.57 -58. It is noticeable that the 




reentered Scotland near Gretna. /. 
Section 3. The surprise at Byland. 
In the early summer of 1322 the Scots made a raid on a 
large scale into the north and west of England, and penetrated into 
the heart of Lancashire, destroying the towns of Lancaster and 
Preston. Stung into activity by this inroad Edward II snmt«oned a 
large fore and invaded Scotland at the beginning; of August. Bruce 
had the peasants drive off their stock and leave Lothian destitute 
cf food, so that the English had to depend upon their fleet for 
supplies. Meanwhile Bruce kept the main body of the Scots at 
Culross north of the Forth to observe the English advance. The 
invaders penetrated as far as Edinburgh and lay there for some time, 
but as contrary winds held up their supply ships they suffered. 
severely from hunger. Eventually a retreat was ordered by Melrose, 
but this march through difficult ground was stopped by the destruc -- 
Htion of a large detachment by Douglas. After this reverse the 
English confined their retreat to the coastal plain and reentered 
England at the beginning of September, having lost many men through 
famine and dysentry.g. 
bruce followed lip--the retreat, which was continued into 
Yorkshire. The Scots were fresh and well suplied, while the Englisk 
troops were by this time worn out and disoranised by privation. 
Bruce detached a small party to observe Norham castle, while the 
bulk of the Scottish force penetrated England by the west and 
pushed on rapidly towards the English. On October 14thgthe main 
body of the English army was in position on a rocky hill near 
Byland abbey, while the king himself with his treasure and plate 
The Bridlington chronicle,p.58; I take "Gratrehals" to signify 
Gretna; the chronicle of Lanercost,fo.218, distinctly re states 
that the Scots retreated by the west. 
The infantry numbered eight thousand-- Bain,III,765. 
3Barbour,Bk.XVIII; the chronicle of Meaux,p.345; the chronicle of 
Lanercoet, fo. 219b. 
4Bain,III,791; the chronicle of Meaux. 
//O 
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lay at the abbey of Rievaulx. The only approach to the English 
position was through a rocky and wooded glen which was closely 
guarded by a force under Sir Thomas Ughtred and Sir Ralph Cobham. 
Bruce detailed Douglas and Randolph to make an attack on this pasL. 
The Scots pushed fiercely forward and weee iet by a stubborn 
raisi resistance, the English hurling large stones at them. While 
this assault was going on, a force of lightly-equipped Highlander:; 
made a detour and clambered up the hill at an unprotected point. 
The ascent, difficult though it was, was successfully accomplished 
and the climbers found themselves above the English. Pressed by 
the attack in front and by the light troops in rear the defenders 
brokea and fled. The Scots .pursued briskly and a headlong flight 
followed, in which Edward took part. The earl of Richmond and sir 
Henry de Sully, a Frenchman, were captured, and a. large plunder, 
including the royal treasure, was secured by the Scots. The pursuit 
was pushed by the Steward as far as the gates of York, while the 
remainder of the Scots ravaged eastern Yorkshire as far as Beverlcy 
and retired at their leisure.!. 
The almost conte ptucu.o ease Witt, Lich he English 
invasion was repulsed marke the very 'rri r_es : :àvelol ae: t of the 
Scottish defensive strategy. Lgainst such a course of action the 
English attack had no hope of success, and retreat, after a short 
sojourn in the hostile country, became imperative. If a longer 
stay had been cede the invaders would have found their graves in 
the region they had occupied. Bruce carefully abstained fro= 
a decisive blow until the English were dis ;iríted and 
thrown off their guard. His action at Bylard rese t:vles In outline 
Rand 1ph's capture of Edir ..' ; caetie. Except -,L be taken to 
it on the ground that the cc t were their 
forces in face of the enew, ., 41I,lete1y nad trae English 
lost the initiative at th.is e r lc. r;. '.n*". the risk of any disaster to°, 
::I; the chronicle of Muai.$, p* 346; the chronicle of 
hamer._ 
, .2121; Er cbr®rdele,7.7;. 
1// 
to/ 
the Scots was small. 
Section 4. The Weardale campaign_. 
Early in June, 1322, /.the Scots broke the existing truce 
with the English and crossed the border several thousand strong 
under the command of Douglas, Randolph, and Donald, earl of Mar. 
Bruce was in Ireland and could not take part in tfle campaign.'She 
raiders, essentially a mobile force, easily eluded the English 
(border garrisons, and pushed their ravages as fax as Weardale, 
where they formed a variety of base from which they could make 
forays on the surrounding country. 
Edward III, unlike his father, was by no means inclined 
to look on at this devastation. of his territory. On hearing news 
of the Scottish attack he ordered an assembly at York, where there 
'met a force much larger than that of the Scots, but, by reason of 
¡its heavy equipment and train of baggage, not nearly so well 
adapted for operations in rough country, There was present an alien' 
force under Sir John of Haiault, and more than one broil arose 
between this element and the English archers. From the assembly 
t 
¡point this powerful force marched north to defeat the raiders, but, 
as soon appeared, the difficulty was to find them. Although the 
movements which followed were carried out on English ground, it is 
evident that throughout the campaign the Scots were fully aware of 
the position of their opponents and manoeuvred accordingly, while 
the English were more or less in the dark as to the whereabouts of 
(the raiders. 1 
1 
For two days the English toiled on,3their sole guiding 
marks being the fires left by the ravagers. On the third day, 
under the delusion that the Scots were attempting to retreat, 
Edward ordered the abandonment of most of the baggage and made a 
Bain, III, 918. 
" 922. 
4roissart,Ch.18, states that the English were in three divisions 
f foot, eacg having two wings of cavalry. 
a/ 
forced march to Haydon Bridge, on the Tyne near Hexhaml. leere he 
remained with his troops for several days, ?.suffering great hardship 
from wet weather and lack of sul.plies. As the Scots showed no signd 
of appearing, Edward finally dispatched scouts with the promise of 
liberal reward to anyone who would bring him ire reliable informa- 
tion of the position of the enemy. The English recrossed the Tyne 
at haltwhistle on July 28th3,and soon afterwards were met by Thomas 
1 
de Rokeby, who brought news that the Scots were camped in Stanhope 
Park, on the banks of.the Wear near Durham. 
The English had now succeeded in locating their enemy, 
but any prospect of a decisive fight appeared as far off as ever. 
The Scottish front was covered by the river, at this point rapid 
and stony, a fact which precluded any serious attempt at an attack. 
A challenge was sent to them to descend ana fight on fair ground, 
but it fell on deaf ears. Similarly an atteLjt to draw them into 
(battle by teasing them with archery only resulted in some loss to 
the English skirmishers. Douglas was not, however, quite satisfied 
with his position, and shortly after the arrival of the English he 
carried out a night movement of his troops to another area some 
two miles distant, where the front was still covered by the river, 
while to the rear stretched a broad moss. The English promptly 
conformed to this manoeuvre, and for thv best part of oath the 
two forces faced each other. The circumstances were by no means 
similar in both camps. The Scots were living in the midst of rude 
l 
l.lenty on the spoils of the devastated country, while t " +re Englsh 
suffered greatly from want of food. 
On one of the first ni ghts4of trie stalemate Douglas 
1Proissart, Ch. 1is; n1111,925. 
4ny tni.XuG from four to eight. 
3. 
EaiL, 1 11, y21 , 9`[8. 
411 the authorities except Barbour indicate that it was early in 
!the period. Probably the raid occurred between t 
of August. 
:11 e 3rd - nd the 5th 
ii 
Douglas/ 
carried out a daring attack. With some hundreds /of picked men he 
:broke into the English camp at ni,_;ht and created immense confusion. 
Certain of his men had been detailed to cut the guyropes of the 
tents, while the others stabbed the struggling figures beneath the 
canvas. Douglas himself penetrated as far as the king's tent and 
narrowly failed in seizing Edward. As soon as the English began to 
recover from their alarm the Scots fell back, while Douglas coolly 
covered the retreat. 
Some of the Scots, including Randolph, were encouraged 
by this success to the point of desiring a battle, but Douglas 
,restrained them and set about preparations for a retreat. This was 
carried out some time later in masterly fashion. The Scottish camp - 
'was lighted by fires, as was usual at night, and a certain stir 
caused the English to think that another attack was being prepared. 
Part of their army stood to their arms all night awaiting the 
assault, only to find in the morning that the Scots had quietly 
decamped, leaving nothing of value behind them. They had crossed 
the moss by leading their horses and were several miles off by 
dawn. The English army was in no state to make a forced march in 
pursuit, ana operations were accordingly broken off.3. 
The Weardale campaign speaks for itself. without 
risking an action the Scots wrecked Edward's army as effectively 
as if they had won a battle, and had probably lost less than a 
hundred men in doing so. Their force, in fact, was not intended 
for fighting. Its chief asset was mobility, a quality which it 
possessed to an extent never equalled by a Scottish army before or 
since. Properly handled in suitable country such a force was safe 
/ Froìssart says two, Barbour five. 
aThe whole business bears a startling resemblance to some of the noc -' 
turnal raids of the hill tribes of northern India on British camps. 
1 
,Froissart,Ch.15 -18; the chronicle of Lanercóst,fo.222; the 




from a heavily equipped enemy, and in this case the handling was 
above reproach. Douglas, in a word, gives the impression of having 
played with the English, while doing them all the damage he could. 
Unfortunately for Scotland, leaders of his calibre are infrequent 
phenomena. 
Section 5. A new arm. 
In the btric$ failitary sense a nobeler was a ligntïy 
equipped man -at -arms mounted, for the sake of mobility, on a horse 
of moderate size and weight. /..As applied to the Scots, however, it 
rather signifies the men who have attained immottality in the 
pages of Froissart. He describes them as spearmen, mounted on 
light ponies, and carrying only a bag of oatmeal and a girdle on 
which to bake cakes. For meat they used the flesh of captured 
cattle seathed in their own skins; the same cattle provided them 
with rough shoes. Spits for roasting flesh could, of course, be 
easily manufactured out of branches of trees. The raiders thus 
"made war support war." 
The appearance of such a force with its tremendous 
mobility and raiding power would hardly cause surprise in the case 
of the Cossacks of Russia, but it is a trifle unexpected in the 
case of the Scots. It is the particular contribution of the 
borderers to the science of warfare in Scotland, a product of the 
circumstances which demanded an efficient raiding organisation. It 
was rapidly adopted by the English, and the hobelers of the ltth 
century developed into the mosstroopers of later days. With the 
possible exception of Bannockburn it never was, however, worked 
into the organisation of the army as a profitable division in 
battle and, as will be seen in the case of Flodden, the presence 
of such a body could be at times a nuisance to its own side. 
Bruce had solved the problem of extorting a favourable 
peace from the English witn the minimum of risk. Once the 
English were expelled from Scotland itself pitched battles 
"hobby" in the old English phrase. 
//S 
battles/ 
became needless adventures and were accordingly avoided. The 
necessary pressure was brought to bear on the English by a 
strategy which, for the most part, kept the war away from Scottish 
territory and made it profitable to the Scots themselves. Attack 
was once more proved to be the best means of defence. It must be 
admitted that the war could not proceed indefinitely, but BO great 
was the predominance of the Scots at this time that it is 
difficult to see what advantage the peace of Northampton gave to 
the northern country except the theoretical recognition of her 
independence. In return for this England gained a respite during 
which her military forces could be reorganised and a better system 
of warfare adopted. 
Ghalter IX. 
Dupplin iuioor. 
Section 1. Opening of the campaign. 
The expulsion of the English from Scotland had resulted. 
in the presence in the southern kingdom of numerous exiles, mainly 
of noble rank, who had adhered to the defeated side in the war if 
Independence. These nobles had forfeited their lands north of the 
Tweed, but by the treaty of Northampton some provision was made for 
restitution in the cace of certain of them. The death of Bruce 
delayed the fulfilment of the pledges given in 132g and during the 
regency of Randolph complications arose which led to further 
disputes. The Disinherited, thoroughly dissatisfied with the 
treatment which they were receiving, appealed for help to Edward II 
aE one of the parties to the treaty, and declared their intention 
of trying to recover their lost lands by force of arms if other 
means should fail. Edward declined to afford them assistance and 
they accordingly took matters into their own hands. Randolph was 
aware of the approaching attack and had made some preparations to 
meet it, but, unfortunately for his country, ne died before the 
campaign commenced. The Scots were thus bereft of the last of their 
outstanding generale and were reduced to appoint as regent Donald, 
earl of Mar, a man of little experience in Scottish warfare. 
Divisions, caused by fear of treachery, were rife in the northern 
ranks, and the regent himself was not immune from being-; suspected 
of sympathy with the Disinherited. 
On July 31st the Disinherited sailed from Ravenspur 
and Kingston-upon-hull to commence their attack./,This course was 
taken to evade the prohibition which Edward had laid upon their 
crossing; the borders, which were under the jurisdiction of his 
wardens. The force which embarked was necessarily small, being 
composed of four or five ;.undred men -at -arms and between a thousand 




and fifteenAarc hers./. As was inevitable under the circumstances, the 
troops were either voiukteers, personal followers of the barons 
concerned, or mercenaries; no regular levy could be held for the 
purpose of carrying out so unofficial an expedition.. Chief among; 
the lecdero were Gilbert Umfraville, David of Strathbogie, Henry 
de Beaumont, claimants respectively to the earldoms of Angus, 
Athole, and Buchan, Edward Baliol, and the Netherlander soldier of 
fortune, Walter Danny. 
After a stormy voyage of six days' duration the fleet 
arrived at Kinghorn in Fife, where the expeditionary force 
disembarked on August Gth.(2.The unusual mode of the English attack 
had rendered the Scots unable to concentrate at the point of 
invasion, as such point could not be ascertained, but various 
;bodies were disposed on the threatened coasts. As the English force 
was disembarking it was attacked by one oft these bodies under the 
earl of Fife. Only the archers and the foot had reached the shore, 
and the men -at -arms, still on board, could take no part in the 
action, but a brisk discharge of arrows was enough to defeat this 
local attack.31n this action the Scots suffered some considerable 
loss, including Alexander Seton. 
After completing the disembarkation and resting their 
forces, the Disinherited proceeded to Dunfermline, where they 
captured a store of iron pike heads,apparently part of the 
preparation made by Randolph towards meeting the invasion, and a 
, /.he authorities are remarkably unanimous on the point of numbers, 
as their estimates all fall between fifteen and twenty -one hundred. 
y.E.S.,p.291; Meaux chronicle,p.362; the Lanercost chronicle,fo. 
22Ób. 
!,The Bridlington chronicle,p.104. 
3,This fact in itself shows the absurdity of the estimates of Fife's 
force. The Bridlington chronicle,p.104, gives twenty -three 
thousand, that of Meaux,p.363, fourteen, while the Lanercost 
chronicle is comparatively reasonable with four. 
4The Scalacronica, fo . 21Gb. 
// 
6./ 
supply of food.¡ A further interval for rest and reorganisation 
followed and then, on August 11th, the invaders marched north 
through Fife to the south bank of the river Earn. There they halted 
temporarily on the Lalylill near the outskirts of Forteviot. In 
front of them was the reach of the Earn between tit river and 
Forgandenny with the ground rising sharply on the opposite bank in 
a rough ana bare spur, on the crest of which stands the present 
Dupplin castle. 
The river could be crossed by either bridge or ford, 
and the Scottish knights and men -at -arms had been guaaria posted by 
Mar to guard the bridge, which seemed the more probable avenue of 
approach. On the north of the stream near the ford lay the camp of 
the light troops and followers of the army with the baggage. The 
English, who were perfectly cognisant of the alternative means of 
crossing, determined to fall upon the rear of the Scots in the 
darkness after fording the Earn. This operation was successfully 
carried out and the invaders cut a swathe through the 
Scottish. footmen. The raiders, who caused tremendous damage, 
carried straight on till they had occupied the high ground of the 
spur. Thus, when day came, the Scots heavy force found their camp 
nearly destroyed and the enemy in position on the slope above the 
scene of the night attack./ 
Section 2. The battle. 
The English position was not a strong one in which to 
resist the attack of an army whichis ersal of its light troops, 
must still have mustered over ten thousand men. The slope in front 
was fairly steep, but comparatively bare of natural obstacles, and 
/The Meaux chronicle,k.36 ti. 
The Bridlington chronicle, p.106, states that the Scots kept to the 
bridge thinking that the English would be ignorant of the 
existence of a ford. 
3,The hdn_ercost chronicle, fo. 223b; the Bridlington chronicle, p. 1035; 
the Meaux chron_icle,p.363; the Scalacronica,fo.217. 
// 
and/ 
except for a small stream on the left wing the flanks of the 
defending force were entirely in the air. This circumstance and the 
neces ity of covering as much ground with their front as possible 
induced the English to adopt a formation_ which presented a novel 
problem to the Scots. The barons and men --at -arms dismounted and 
formed a mass in the centre, while the archers were extended to 
either flank in long lines slightly advanced at the extreme wings./ 
The regent arranged the Scots in three eolimris. The 
central one contained the great bulk of the force, while the two 
exterior units were little more than flankere. In_ this formation. 
the Scots charged up the slope, the main column making straight 
for the clump of heavily armed men in the English centre. The rush 
was deprived of a great deal of its initial impetus by the 
steepness of the slope which had to be surmounted and by the heavy 
fire of the English archers. Thus the energy of the assault was 
somewhat lessened by the time that the attackers reached their 
objective, but it was still great enough to bear back the English 
men -at -arms for several yards, some of them being trampled under 
foot in the crush. But the absence of horses which could be 
stabbed and the presence of men in heavy armour rendered the thrust 
of the spears less effective than usual in clearing a space. As a 
result the footmen in both bodies became weagea in a mass so tight 
that to strike a blow became impossible. At this stage the 
stratagem of Stafford in ordering his men to turn their shoulders 
to the Scots and push was effective in checking any further 
ark 
` :.'ace, 
ïeanwhile the English archers had poured such a shower of 
arrows on the fiailkinL; columns tnat these detachments had recoiled 
into the main body. As the flankers fell back the archers pressed 
forward and were soon firing at close range into the sides of the 
mass, which was by this time hopelessly jammed and quite incapable 
of resistance. For some short interval the Scots still held their 
/.The theaux chronicle, p. 364. 
/.20. 
their/ 
ground in a constantly contracting area, but at length the rear of 
the column dissolved into flight. The head and centre had perished 
almost to a man, those on the outskirts slain by the arrows and 
those in the centre suffocated by the press and lying in a heap 
several feet in depth. ilenry de Beaumont and several of nie 
followers mounted immediately and carried out a pursuit which 
proves fatal to many more of the fugitives. The Scots had lost 
thousands of men, including the regent and many of the barons, 
while the number of the English fallen did not reach forty, most 
of whom had been killed in the first rush. The archers escaped 
unscathed.i. 
Section 3. New problems. 
The errors committed by the earl of Mar are so obvious 
that criticism is almost superfluous. It is, however, worth while 
considering what steps he might have taken to deal with the 
situation. 
The English formation was a novel one, though it bears 
some slight resemblance to that of the barons and the fyrd at the 
battle of the Standard, but it possessed, of course, a missile 
power much greater than that of the mortherrlevy of the twelfth 
century. Dupplin Moor provides the first example of the effective 
combination of archers and dismounted men -at --arms employed on the 
defensive, a practice which became the rule in the Hundred Years' 
War. The point of difference between the battle of Dupplin Moor 
and certain of those of the French wars is that in the former 
combat the Scots fought on foot. 
The unusual nature of the English invasion made it 
impossible for the Scots to employ their usual tactics of harassing 
the enemy by stripping the country of all food supplies, as the 
Point of entry could not be ascertained beforehand. In this respec-4. 
!.The Bridlington chronicle,pp.106 -10?; the Lanercost chronicle, 
£0.224; the Meaux chronicle,pp.364 -365; the Scalacronica,fo.21?; 
Knighton, pp. 106 -107. 
respect/ 
the smallness of the English force was a distinct advantage to the 
attackers as it enabled them to make a purely maritime invasion and 
thus rendered void the customary perils of the Berwick route. An 
additional advantage reaped by the Disinherited from their paucity of 
numbers was that their force could be fed from the resources of the 
country and thus could dispense with a base and a line of communi- 
cations. But it may well be asked what Mar was doing while the 
invaders were proceeding across Fife in such leisurely fashion. His 
concentration may not have been complete on the date ofx the landing, 
but he must even then have had a considerable number of troops in 
hand. If he had disposed these in a strong position across the line 
of advance or flung them in a cloud round the outskirts of the 
English force, he could have compelled the invaders to turn back or 
to fight an offensive action in which the Scots would have had the 
advantage of the ground and could have employed their favourite 
battle tactics. His actual position on the Earn was quite a good one, 
as it offered only two points of approach, but nothing can be said in 
defence of the generalship which concentrated the strength of the 
army at the bridge and left the other section, weak and leaderless, 
to guard the easier route. The Scottish army was exposed to and 
eventually suffered a defeat in detail. Certainly the mass of foot 
which was so severely handled in the eve of the battle seems to have 
Possessed no rallying or manoeuvring; power at all. 
The same lack of ability to manoeuvre is very apparent in 
the main combat. It is clear that the Scottish attack was not 
carried out by a schiltron, but by a column whose depth greatly 
exceeded its front. In this fashion the $cote threw away the great 
advantage which is usually possessed by the force superior in 
rambers, the ability to threaten the flanks of the enemy. By the use 
of the column the great mass of the Scottish troops was so disposed 
that it could not come into action at all. As a result it was the 
Jatnat the head of the column and not the actual blows and shafts of 
the English that destroyed the attacking force. 
Almost any other course of action would have been more 
successful. A refusal to fight at all would have been temporarily 
temporarily/ 
discouraging, but in the long run it woulc have compelled the English 
to take some decisive action, as they could not have wandered about 
the country indefinitely. If this is set aside on the grounds of Mar' 
fear of treachery in his own host and because of hi9(determination to 
strike at once, tnere still remain two alternatives to the method 
actually employed. An attack in open order might, and probably would, 
have resulted in serious loss to the Scots, but it would have allowed 
their whole force to participate in the fighting and would have led 
to a t:.ireat to the English flanks. Again, a slow and steady advance 
in schiltron formation, preferably attended by small bodies of cavalry 
in the rear, would presumably have enabled the Scots to reach the 
English front at several points, and there is no indication that the 
t?iin line of archers coula have withstood the shock as did the 
dismounted knights and men-at-arms. In either case the Scottish army, 
even if repulsed, would have remained an army and would have escaped 
total destruction. 
The battle is a distinct disappointment. Mar stood 
assively on the defensive when he should have acted bristly, and 
attacked witri blind fury when he should have behaved warily. Up to 
this stage it may be said that Scottish strategy and tactics had 
shown a steady advance, which had resulted in their obtaining a 
definite superiority over their southern enemies. Bit Dupplin Moor 
shows a return to the rash action of the days of Dunbar. Doubtless 
the defeat was partly due to the unusual tactics of the English, and, 
very largely, to overconfidence on then part of the Scots. The bare 
idea tnat such a body as Mar's army could possibly be defeated by the 
handful of men opposed to it would be scoffed at as absurd, had it 
not been proved true by the event. To that extent the rashness of the 
attackers may be excused, but it is evident that there was another 
rector at work on tile side of the Scots. 
Any reader of Scottisn history will have noticed that 
throughout the history of the northern country the part played by the 
barons and knights has been frequently a sinister one and that their 
policy has been more often dictated by selfish than by patriotic 
10tives. This was especially the case in the earlier days of the war 
i-? 3 
war/ 
of Independence. Wallace never had the opportunity of relying on 
the support of the higher ranks; he was essentially a man of the 
people and b -the people he stood and fell. Bruce, on the other 
hand,could, and occasionally did, have had the help of a large 
section of the aristocracy, but it is noticeable that he did not 
depend on it. dis successes were won by the masses of the commons 
ably directed by himself or by one of nis small band of clever 
lieutenatts. The Scottish army at Dupplin was essentially, 
however, an army of the barons and knights who had, apparently in 
the majority of cases, learned little or nothing of the Scottish 
system of fighting. In a land quarrel, such as this was, they 
were ready to bear even more than their fair share of the danger, 
as is shown by the tremendous loss they sustained in the battle, 
but their interference and, in this case evidently, their 
dictation in the management of the Scottish host was disastrous 
to the welfare of the country. It is a safe surmise that 
xandilph or Douglas with a half of the Scottish army of 
Bannockburn would nave accomplished what was beyond the power of 
Donald of Mar with all his bannered host. Unfortunately the 
reactionary military influence of the aristocracy was not limited 
.in its operation to this particular campaign. 




































Section 1. The expulsion of Baliol. 
After the victory at Dupplin the Disinherited, well 
aware that with their small force their position in the midst of 
a hostile people was very insecure, cast about them for a base of 
operations. Withix this end in view they occupied Perth and 
partially restored the ruined defences /with wooden palisades. 
Within a short time they were blockaded in their new position by 
a large force. The siege, however, only lasted for a few days 
and was then raised.. 
Baliol, now crowned king at Scone, did some marauding 
in the surrounding districts, but he and his followers were soon 
drawn south by the news that the hereditary lands of the Comyn 
family in Galloway were being attacked by the Scottish leaders. 
The inñerent weakness of the Disinherited now showed itself. 
having won a certain amount of success in their land struggle, 
certain of Baliol's chief lieutenants began to further their own 
interests and so greatly weakened the central force. This was no 
more than Baliol could expect when he allowed his own movements 
to be dictated by territorial motives. The earl of Fife, who had 
joined the Disinherited, was left to hold Perth, but the place 
was soon recaptured by the Scots.3. 
Baliol proceeded with his immediate followers to the 
/,The walls had been thrown down by Bruce after his surprise. 
,`'he reasons given are various. The Lanercost chronicler asserts 
that it was due to a rising of naiiol's partisans in Galloway; 
the Scalacronica that there was a shortage of food in the camp 
of the besiegers; the chronicles of Meaux and Bridlington that 
the Scots were disappointed by the defeat at Kinghorn of a fleet 
with reinforcements that John Crabbe was bringing from Berwick. 
Probably all these arguments are sound. 
3The chronicle of Lanercost,fo.2Z4b. 
GU: 
the/ 
border districts and, after an amount of skirmishing with the 
Scots under Archibald Douglas, took up position at Roxburgh. The 
main body of the troops was separated by the river Teviot from 
their leader, who had taken up his quarters at Kelso Abbey, and 
Sir Andrew Moray and Douglas took advantage of this disposition 
of affairs to attempt to seize the bridge in order to cut the 
invading; force into two portions. The attack was at first 
successful and the bridge was partly broken down, but it was 
ultimately repulsed by the obstinate resistance of Thomas 
Ughtred and the bridge guard which gave Baliol and his followers 
time to arm, and the Scots suffered some loss including Moray and 
Crabbe, who were taken prisoners. - 
The Disinherited next proceeded to Annan where they 
stayed for some time. On December 16th Douglas led a night attack 
on the town. Baliol and his followers were taken by surprise and 
could'offer little effective resistance. With a handful of 
followers the leader succeeded in escaping over the border, but 
over a hundred of his adherents, including Walter Comyn and 
Henry Baliol, were slain. /, 
It is evident that the invaders, despite their 
victories in the field, held little outside their own camp. The 
effect of the battle of Dupplin Moor was in fact almost paradoxi- 
cal. It resulted in a popular, as opposed to a baronial, rising, 
which, as was usual in Scotland, provided a much more effective 
resistance, and it initiated the weakening process in Baliol's 
army, which proceeded progressively until the final rout at 
Annan. The defeats of the Scots were unfortunate incidents which 
might well have been avoided, but it is clear that Baliol's 
unsupported force carried in it the seeds of its own decay and 
that such a filibustering expedition could have little hope of 
success unless it managed to attach to its side a large section 
/,The Scalacronica, fo. 21'7b; the Lanercost chroñicle, fo. 224b; the 




of the people. In the face of harassing guerilla attacks it Imam( 
became helpless, possibly largely through exhaustion. 
Section 2. The attack on Berwick. 
In the month following their expulsion from Scotland 
the Disinherited again appealed to Edward III for help. On this 
occasion, whether through anger at the passing of the border by 
Scottish marauders or through desire to secure Berwick and the 
border counties, the English king acceeded to their request and 
provided Edward Baliol with a strong force with which to under- 
take the siege of Berwiçk. The blockade of the ;lace was soon 
established and the besiegers proceeded to construct engines for 
the attack, but for some time no real progress was made towards 
bringing the garrison to terms. On March 23rd the Scots raided 
the western border in an attempt to divert the attention of the 
English from Berwick, but the feint failed and the raiders were 
roughly handled by Anthony de Lucy, governor of Carlisle./, 
After Easter Edward III himself joined in the attack 
with a large reinforcement. The siege was now actively pushed 
and the town was assaulted with engines on all sides. The English 
ships cooperated in the attack and an attempt by the Scots to. 
burn them only resulted in a conflagration in the town itsell..2 
So severe became the pressure and the shortage of supplies3that 
the warden, Alexander Seton, was compelled to make a truce by 
which he agreed to surrender the place if it were not relieved 
before the expitation of a period of fifteen days., 
On July 11th, just before the truce was due to terminate 
a large Scottish force forded the Tweed above the town and 
marched downstream on the south bank as far as Tweedmouth. The 
/,The Bridlington chronicle,pp.110 -111. 
á "With bitmen ". Was it some variety of the Greek fire? 
3.And especially, according to the Meaux chronicle,p.368, of water, 
as the supply pipes had been cut by the English. 




English expected an attack on their works, out as evening approa- 
ched it was found that the object of the Scots ryas to throw a 
body of horse into the town. These troopers, to tha number of two 
hundred, got across the shallow flats at the mouth of the Tweed 
and made their way to the sea gate of the town. Certain of them 
were intercepted and captured or killed by William de Montacute, 
but the others succeeded in effecting; an entry. leax_wrile the 
main body of the Scots turned south and proceeded into Northum- 
berland to ravage the country. 
On the day following these incidents the truce expired 
and Edward demanded the surrender of the town. Ine garrison, how- 
ever, claimed that a technical relief had been achieved by the 
entry of the horsemen and refused to admit the English. So 
infuriated was Edward that he had Seton's son, one of the twelve 
hostages given by the townsmen as a pledge that the truce would 
be observed, hung. A new arrangement was made by which the 
immunity cf the town was to be extended for a few more days and 
six more hostages were given by the garrison ,Edward did not 
reì ea.t his previous mistakes, but defined a relief as the entry, 
during daylight, of two hundred horsemen without the loss of ten 
or more of their number. Three Scottish knights, chief of whom 
was William Keith, were allowed to pass the English lines in order 
to carry news of the arrangement to the field army of the Scots. 
This body they found at Witton.3.Keith explained to the leader: the 
condition_ of Berwick and pointed nut that further defence nad 
become impossible unless the town were relieved before the 
termination of the truce. u s representations had the effect he 
desired, and the Scottish main body moved north to attempt the 
1The Bridiington chronicle, pp.1.12 -113; the Meaux chronicle, p. 36yí. 
a,It is onit fair to say that Edward was in the wrong. . be dispute 
arose over the fact that an accurate definition of what 
constitu;,ed a relief read not been made when the truce was 
arranged. This was Edward's own fault. 
3k few wiles north -west of Morpeth. 
the/ 
rescue of the town., 
Section 3. The battle. 
The Scottish army, which numbered approximately fifteen 
thousand with the footmen as usual predominant in number4.erossed 
the Tweed some distance inland and then turned eastward to attack 
the English. Edward's force was probably slightly smaller than 
that of the Scots3 and was further weakened by the necessity of 
leaving a detachment of five hundred men -at -arms and archers to 
prevent the garrison of Berwick from making a sally in the 
English rear while the battle was proceeding. A further body of 
two hundred picked men was sent to combat the expected attempt 
of an equal number of the Scots to relieve( Berwick on the side 
of the sea in accordance with the conditions of the truce..4 
There were available to the Scots two lines of approach 
to Berwick, by the coast and by the north bank of the Tweed. 
Situated in the angle between these converging lines and, by its 
unbroken ground and open slopes, commanding both, was Halidon 
Hill. Here Edward took up a position which had obvious advantages. 
As any attempt to pass the hill and proceed to Berwick would lay 
open their flank to an English attack, the Scots were reduced to 
a direct assault upon the position by climbing the steep slopes 
of the hill.ÇSuch an assault could be made from the south, where 
the slope is gentlest, the west, or the north -west, but the 
flanking movement was negatived by the fact that a long detour 
by the Scots could be countered by a comparatively slight 
movement of the English round the brow of the hill. Attack from 
'the south was risky as the advancing force would have the Tweed 
in its rear, while an assault from the west would be hindered by 
¡The Scalacronica,fo.218b; the Bridlington chronicle,p.113. 
2See Lord Hailes, Annals,1333, App.P+o.xii. 
No exact numbers are available. 
Ohe Bridlington chronicle,p.114. 




the necessity of crossing the Wniteadder at the foot of the slope 
Accordingly it was from the north -west, or Foulden, that the 
Scots delivered their attack./. 
The English army was disposed by the king in three 
divisions under the command, from right to left, of the Marshal 
Norfolk, the king himself, and Edward Baliol. The formation of 
the right division is typical of the other two also. It consisted 
of a block of knights and men -at -arms under the command of John 
of Eltham, Henry de Beaumont, and Edward de Bohun, with two 
wings of archers, the right led by David of Athole4and the left 
by Gilbert de Umfraville. The whole ddfending force was 
dismounted,3,but the horses were kept within easy reach. The Scots 
like their opponents,were arranged in three divisions, with their 
best troops in the left section, as success seemed most probable 
in that direction. Some of them, at least, wore shirts over 
their armgur as distinguishing marks.4 
The day. was already far spent when the Scots in t?].ei: 
three schiltrons moved down the facing hill and struggled through 
the soft ground at the foot of Halidon. This task accomplished, 
they began the escalade of the English slope with vigour, but 
the steady shower of arrows which drove down upon them caused 
heavy losses and threw the ranks of the attackers into confusion. 
/I am moved to this conclusion by three facts. a.The Scots advance( 
from an eminence facing Halidon,i.e.the hi,_;h ground round Lamber- 
ton. b.There is no mention of a stream, but only of a marsh. c. 
Proximity to the sea is indicated by a reference in the Bridling- 
ton chronicle,p.116, to the fate of some of the Scots in the 
flight.-- praeter illos qui versus mare semetipsos ab alto 
praecipitabant" In a visit to Berwick and the neighbourhood I was 
unable to secure any information as to "rievyside ", the locality 
specifically named by the Bridlington chronicler. 
.Expressly stated by the Bridlington chronicler to be that "next 
the sea ". 
Baker of Swinbrook, p. 51. I he Meaux chronicle, p. 370. 
/30 
confusion./ 
The right and centre divisions pushed up a little way towards 
their opponents, but, wearied by the climb and 411ndin no cover 
from the pitiless rain of missiles, eventually dissolved into 
f.Lif ht. Edward and many of his knights immediately mounted and 
engaged in a pursuit, which was pushed for several miles and 
which resulted in the destruction of most of the fugitives. The 
Scottish left, however, advanced with more resolution and 
actually got to grips with Norfolk's division. but while this 
measure of success was achieved, the impetus was so far spent 
that the English had no difficulty in throwing off the attack. 
This section of the Scots was also punished severely in its 
retreat. ïhe regent, Archibald Douglas, several earls, and most 
of the prominent men in the Scottish host were left dead on the 
field, and with them, in the fight and the pursuit, perished the 
great majority of the Scottish hodt. The English loss was 
infinitesimal, thanks to the inability of the attackers to get 
to close quarters. Berwick surrendered on the following day./ 
Section 4. The schiltron on the offensive. 
The tactics employed by the Scots in this battle 
would probably have been successful at Dupplin, where the number 
of their opponents was small. But Edward III at Halidon had a fa] 
force of archers sufficiently strong to allow him to develope in 
security the formation which had won the Disinherited their 
sensational victory of the previous year. It is at once 
demonstrated that the schiltron, although capable of a short 
quick charge on fair ground, was unsuited by its unwieldy nature 
for a long advance over natur!.l obstacles in the face of a 
heavy archery gire. An attack in extended order was also 
rendered out of the question by the superiority of the English 
mounted force, which could have crushed its way through open 
ranks. 
As the Scots could not attack with any prospects of 




success in either open or close or6.er, it is clear that they 
should not have engaged at all, and for this reason Douglas must 
bear the responsibility for the disaster. sustained. It is easy 
to sympathise with the desperate anxiety of the Scots to save 
Berwick from the English, but that anxiety does not constitute 
an excuse for an attack on such an ideal defensive osition as 
halidon Hill. To lose the border fortress of Scotland ifftlis. a 
severe enough loss without throwing away the Scottish field army 
with it. The whole campaign was a repetition of the fundamental 
blunder in theory, previously committed in 1296, that a field 
force is intended to be a support to a fortress, tne truth being, 
of course, the exact opposite. If Douglas nad kept his ground 
near :iorpeth, Edward would certainly have occupied Berwick, but 
he would have hardly undertaken a prolonged invasion of Scotland 
with so strong a hostile force in his rear. Berwick was only 
Berwick, but the force which perished atalidon was the mobile 
stronghold of the whole of Scotland, not to be risked except in 
the most favourable circumstances. 
The handling of the Scottish troops in t o :gattle 
itself was puerile. Douglas conformed to his enemy's d spositisone 
instead of making his own. The attackers should have been arrang_ 
ed in two weak divisions on the right and centre, a str.ang force 
on the left, and a heavy reserve. iloiding attacks by the weaker 
sections would have distracted the attention of part of tie 
defenders, while t -e main Scottish attack would have been poured 
with greatly increase: weight on the most accessible part of the 
English position. It is unlikely that a victory would have been 
won by such means, but a wa; ==.ght have been term_.; rily opened 
to the besieged town, and at least the prese.:oe an unbroken 
reserve would have curbed the English p, su.it,ai.ch was from 
the Scots point of view tne most disastrous _ _ of tne ° 
A thian,;;, that could mat, the cleie ers ait e 
die 
their troops was t the advantage of the Sco .a, as Edw.: : ..... 
hardly have moved hia men fron centre to right witzdu t ma :< <-. 
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the fire of some of his archers. 
The lesson of the loss of Berwick is evident to the 
modern reader, but there is no subsequent action on the part of 
the Scots to show that they realised the true weakness of their 
position. Theoretically Douglas at Morpeth was posted on Edward's 
line of communication with his base at Newcastle and accordingly 
the English should not have been able to proceed wtthx the siege. 
But the fact was that the true English line lay on the waters og 
the North Sea, and that so long as the Scots could offer no 
serious threat to the fleet of transports and supply ships which 
accompanied almost every invading army, they could not be sure of 
holding their coastal fortresses and areas free from attack. The 
influence of sea -power is once more the clue to the smccess of 
the English and the explanation why the Scottish defensive 
strategy, perfect in theory, so frequently broke down in practice, 
through the devastation of the border areas being overcome by the 
introduction of supplies by sea. 42. 
!It is worth noting that owing to the shape of the hill the 
English divisions were not exactly in line, and thus the Scottish 
attack became almost one in echelon. The assaults delivered by 
the right and centre divisions of the Scots were repulsed before 
the left section had got to close quarters. 
.2 Further attention is directed in a later chapter to this most 
important influence on the dffairs of Scotland throughout the 





Section 1. The campaign of 1335. 
After the crushing defeat sustained at Halidon, organ- 
ised defence ceased in Scotland for the time being. The young 
king was removed to France, and, in the absence of a recognised 
regent whom all were willing to obey, the rude feudal system of 
raising levies, which was the only regular resource of the 
country at that time, fell into abeyance. The nobles and barons, 
true to their worst traditions, chose the side which best 
accorded with their own private interests and threw the question 
of patriotism to the winds. The defence of the country fell to 
the lot of the partisan bands and the followers of the popular 
leaders and the few men of high rank who still strove to maintain 
the independence of Scotland. Perhaps the most disastrous feature 
was the inability of the Scots, disunited as they were, to check 
the English invasions by the customary and systematic devastation 
of the exposed areas. On the other hand the situation had its 
hopeful features. So many of the strongholds of the country had 
been levelled by the patriots of an earlier period that it was not 
possible for the English to establish by a system of garrisons so 
firm a grip as had been exercised by the first' Edward. An additior 
al factor in favour of the Scots was the attention which the king 
of England began to direct to France at this time, an interest 
which finally developed into almost complete distraction from 
Scottish affairs. 
As a result of the diverse parts played by the Scottish 
barons in the struggle and of the fact that the people of certain 
districts preferred to follow these leaders than to devote 
themselves to the national interests, there developed a confused 
mass of military operations, some of them of respectable 
magnitude but of quite inferior importance in the main question 
of Scottish independence. All through the medley of private 
claims and broils, however, there can be discerned the constant 
constant/ 
difficulties of the English in securing a definite hold on the 
country as distinct from marching across it, and, later, in 
carrying out their projects with inadequate forces, when once the 
main strength of England had been directed towards France. Tne 
fighting of the year 1335 affords an instance of the former od the 
two problems. 
The action of Edward Baliol in paying homage to 
Edward III for Scotland and in signing away large portions of the 
south at Newcastle on July 12th,1334, /caused widespread anger in 
Scotland. Despite the threats of a popular rising, Baliol was 
deserted at Stirling in August by the Disinherited earls of 
Buchan and Athole, who repeated the mistake of 1332 by proceeding 
north to push their own private interests. Soon after this 
separation the storm broke and Baliol was forced tc retreat to 
Berwick skirmishing with the Scottish insurgents as he went. His 
papers and treasure were lost. At the same time the English 
knights, Talbot, Stirling and Felton, who had accompanied Buchan 
and Athole, seeing that a rising was at hand, attempted to escape 
with a small escort of English archers, but were captured at 
Linlithgow by the Scottish knights, Keith and Ross. Athole him- 
self was also taken shortly afterwards, and Buchan was besieged 
in his castle of Dundarg with a garrison of three hundred follo- 
wers. There he held cut stubbornly, but was eventually forced to 
capitulate at the beginning of 1335.4. 
The news of the disasters in the north was carried by 
Sir Thomas Ughtred to Edward and lLoved him to reprisals. Late in 
1334 he advanced to the eastern borders and undertook the 
restoration of the defences of Roxburgh, which had been destroyed 
by James Douglas twenty years before. Some guard for the Eorthum- 
briar_ marches had become essential as numerous villages were 
burned by the raiders in the winter of 1334- 1335.3 During the 
/,Bain, III, 112`Í . 
/Bridlington chronicle,pp.119 -121; Meaux chronicle,p.372. 
3gee,ux chronicle, p. 374. 
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spring of 1335 a truce was granted to the Scots at the instance 
of the king of France, but in the early days of July Edward 
again invaded Scotland by Carlisle and Rushed rapidly north by 
Dalswynton and Airth -on- the- Forth./.At the same time Baliol crocsec 
the border at Berwick with a division of the army, and, marching 
by a different route, joined Edward in the neighbourhood of 
Glasgow, whence their united forces proceeded to Perth. On the 
way Baliol attacked the castle of Cuxbernauld ,2 which was held by 
nearly two hundred men -at -arms. The garrison attempted resistance, 
but the English fired the tower through the lower windows and so 
smoked out the defenders, who were mostly massacred. 
After so sweeping an invasion from two different quarters 
it might be expected that the south of Scotland would be in a 
state of subjection. But it appears that there was still present 
a considerable body of patriots under the command of the earl of 
Moray 4 The explanation of this state of affairs is that the great. 
wilderness of Jedworth was still largely impregnable to the 
English arms and could harbour in safety the Scottish defenders 
until the storm of invasion had rolled past. having evaded the 
thrusts of Edward and Baliol, the Scots emerged from this refuge 
and attacked the count of Namur, who was following up the English 
advance with two or three hundred troops. The ambushed force took 
refuge on the rock of Edinburgh. The castle, however, had 
remained ruinedísince its capture by Randolph and provided no 
refuge for the fugitives, who were consequently compelled to 
surrender on the following day. The earl of Moray conducted them 
to the border, but was himself captured on his return by the 
constable of Roxburgh castle. 
/Bain,III,1166 -1170. 
lIn reality it seems to have been little but a peel or tower. 
3.Bridlirgton chronicle, p. 122. 
, &Not to be confused with Sir Andrew Moray. 
S'See Bain, III, App. IV. 
6.The Scalacron_ica,fo.219b; the Bridlington chronicle,pp.123 -124; 
Meaux chronicle, pp. 375 -376. 
/3, 
This minor disaster showed Edward the weakness of his 
position in that he possessed no fortress of standing between the 
borders and Stirling. Accordingly, after helping and directing 
Baliol in various forays and punitive expeditions in the vicinity 
of Perth, he saw to the reconstruction of the fortifications on 
the rock of Edinburgh. This being put in hand, he returned towards 
the borders. Not long after he was followed by Edward Baliol, who 
had entrusted the administration of the "conquered" country to 
David of Athole, who had again adhered to the English aide. But 
Plow incomplete the whole enterprise yet remained was soon shown 
by the success of a rebellion led by Sir Andrew Moray, Patrick, 
earl of March, and William Douglas, which resulted in the defeat 
and death of Athole at Kilblain on November 30th. 1. 
The invasion of 1335 was one of major importance and 
represented a great effort on the part of Edward III, but it 
effected very little of permanent value. The attackers were not 
seriously checked, or even resisted, at any point, evidently 
because the Scottish power of resistance in mass was for the time 
being shattered, but the barren nature of this great military 
promenade made it clear that to accomplish a definite conquest 
it was necessary to root out the nests of resistance and to hold 
down the land by a chain of posts with a permanent army of 
occupation. Annual invasions might go on for years, but could 
achieve nothing but the destruction of Scottish lives and property 
Section 2. The French distraction. 
The year 1336 saw a renewal of the English invasion 
and Edward and Baliol again formed their base of operations at 
Perth. From this central point they carried out numerous forays, 
including the expedition of the king to Lochindorb castle to 
relieve the besieged countess of Buchan. The castle of Bothwell 
was fortified in order to guard the western route from Carlisle 
to the Scottish midlands, but it did not remain long in English 
hands. John of Eltham, the king's brother, died at Perth and 
ìBain_,III,Ap,.III. Fordun gives the same date. Bridlington 
,chronicle, p. 12`I. 
/3r, 
and/ 
altogether the campaign was not fruitful in results, although as 
usual the English forces easily occupied the open areas and 
confined the Scots to the more inaccessible districts. It is note - 
worthy that the Flemings, acting in cooperation with the French, 
afforded help to the Scots by sending some arms and supplies by 
sea. As a result frequent collisions took place with the English 
ships so that the English command of the North Sea was no longer 
unchallenged. The campaign. of 1332 was even less decisive and it 
becomes evident that Edward was now more concerned with putting 
the Scots out of action and so rendering useless the Franco - 
Scottish alliance than in securing a permanent conquest. 
In January, 1335,2 the castle of Dunbar was besieged by the 
earls of Salisbury and Arundel, acting under the direction of the 
king, who was at Berwick at the commencement of the operations. 
The garrison was strong and in good fettle, ably commanded by 
Agnes, the countess of March.3The besiegers cut a deep trench 
d 
across the isthmus to prevent any sally by the besieged and plants 
their huts and tents behind this defence. Next they erected 
11 
engines with which they bombarded the castle, but apparently 
without serious effect,,The next step was for the Emglish to 
attempt to reach the foot of the all and with this object in view 
they constructed a large sow under cover of which they might 
undermine the defences. The narrow and difficult nature of the 
approach, however, made the progress of the sow very slow, and the 
garrison was able to destroy it and most of the force which it 
protected by pouring on it pitch and sulphur and by pelting it 
with logs and stones. 
lBrid.lington chronicle,pp.128 -129; Meaux chronicle,pp.377 -378. 
..Bain, III, 1255. 
3The situation of the castle has already been described in the 
first chapter of the second part. 
4Patrick of March had refortified it, and it was probably much 
stronger than at any previous time. 
3k 
Open assault having failed, the siege became a 
blockade which dragged on for several months, entry on the sea 
side of the castle being prohibited by two English galleys which 
lay off the harbour. Attempts made to overcome the defence by 
bribery were futile, and an endeavour to intimidate the countess 
into surrender by threatening to execute her captive brother l 
also failed. At a time when the garrison's stock of food was 
running very low supplies were carried in through the enterprise 
of Alexander Ramsay, who used for this purpose small boats which 
crept along close to the shore at night. To increase the 
embarrassment of the besiegers two successive bodies of troops, 
sent from Berwick to aid in the attack, were intercepted and 
routed by partisan bodies of Scots. 
Finally in June, after the siege and blockade had 
lasted for five months, the English abandoned their enterprise. 
Edward was preparing to go overseas to Brabant, and the earls 
engaged in the attack on Dunbar were determined to accompany him. 
After this repulse and in the absence of further considerable 
help from the south, as the king became more and more deeply 
involved in French affairs, the war degenerated into a succession 
of truces, raids, and surprises, in which the Scots had the 
upper hançl, Perth being taken from Sir Thomas Ughtred in 1339 by 
Robert the Steward, the future king, and Roxburgh by Ramsay in 
1342. a 
Section 3. Failure of the English. 
The credit for the fresh liberation of Scotland which 
was achieved between the years 133b and 1342 cannot justly be 
given to the northern people as a whole. That period indeed 
rather showed a breakdown in the typical defensive strategy so 
frequently and effectively emrloyed against the first two 
Edwards. Of systematic devastation for the purpose of turning anX 
.The earl of Moray. 
&The Lanercost chronicle,fo.230; Bridlington chronicle,p.13Y; 
.Meaux chronicle, p.383; tlemingburgh,ii,p.313; Walsingham,i,p.200; 
John Major , V, XV. 
an/ 
invasion there was little or none. Penetration of the country 
became easy for the English, and the success of the Scots, which 
should ratter be called the failure of the English, was gained by 
a series of haphazard operations following ni regular pian of 
campaign. It follows that what little credit was gained by so 
unsatisfactory a measure of victory must be given to Andrew Moray, 
Ramsay, certain of the Douglases, and other local leaders lho 
struggled bravely on in the face of apparently overwhelming 
misfortunes. That such should be the case cannot be attributed as 
a fault to the commons of Scotland. 'There are sufficiert reasons 
for the breakdown of organised defence without impugning their 
patriotism. Halidcn Hill, unlike Dunbar, was a crusning disaster 
which left the Scots without a field army and with very little 
prospect of raising one in the immediate future. No great 
natural leader of the type of Wallace or Bruce appeared to unite 
and lead the patriots. At the same time administration was 
weakened by the misfortunes of the various regents, and internal 
dissension, which laid the country open to invasion, was caused 
by the complete selfishness of many of the barons, who, in some 
cases at least, drew with them to the English side their personal 
followers and retainers. /It follows from all this that the escape 
of the Scots from conquest was an exceedingly lucky one and that 
it was due to mistaken aims and inadequate means on the part of 
their oponents rather than to any superlative skill in military 
operations shown by themselves. 
Few critics would be found who would put Edward III on 
the same plane with Edward I as an administrator or with Henry V 
as a general. But the military affairs, and certainly the military 
credit, of England are generally supposed to have stood higher ire 
the fourteenth than during the latter part of the thirteenth 
century. This is a misconception, probably due to the fact that 
/There are many documents in Bain,III, showing the alarming number 
of Scots among the so- called English garrisons of the Scottish 
castles at this period. 
1,o 
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the victories of Halidor_, Sluys, Crecy, Neville's Cross, Poictiere 
and Eavaretta won by the English soldiers /overshadow by their very 
magnitude the successes of Oreviyn Bridge, Dunbar, and Falkirk. 
Yet, with the exception of Sluys which gave the English to some 
extent the command of the sea, the victories of Edward III were 
barren ones gained by the exploitation of a novel system of 
tactics, while the minor successes of his grandfather led to the 
subjugation of Males and almost secured the conquest of Scotland. 
The inference is that Edward I11 excelled in trie art of gaining 
victories, but was very deficient in ability in the rscre diffi- 
cult task of reaping the fruits of triumphs in the field:, There 
must then have been qualities in the military management of 
Edward I, which were lacking in that of his grandson. 
It is an axiom of generalship that no invading army 
should advance while there remains in its rear a great fortress 
untaken or unmasked. To violate this rule entails harassed 
communications and a disastrous retreat in case of defeat in the 
field. It will be found that except for the minor case of 
Dirleton in the Falkirk campaign Edward I rigidly observed this 
rule, while Edward III regularly and systematically neglected it. 
. To this neglect can be attributed the frequent outbreaks, ambusheE 
and interceptions, which took place in the English rear between 
133b and 1338. It is true that few castles in the Lowlands were 
in Scottish hands at that time, but fortresses are not built of 
stone walls only. The great forest of Jedworth was the bulwark of 
the Scottish borderers at that time, a stronghold which Edward IIî 
hardly even threatened. Its conquest would have been a task of 
more than one campaign, but it is a fact that the English king 
at Edinburgh or Stirling in 1336 with a subjugated border at his 
/1 make this statement deliberately. Sluys, although fought at sea, 
was essentially a soldiers battle. 
At the same time it should be remarked that of the five land 
battles named Edward was only present at two, and these, lialidon 
and Crecy, the easiest to win. 
his/ 
back would have been infinitely nearer success than he was in 
Lochaber with guerilla warfare rampant in his rear. Edward, in 
fact, did not in either Scotland or France show any knowledge of 
the real means or steps of conquest. He had an unfortunate knack 
of striking deep into his opponent's country without consolidating 
his rear. Thus it is that while Edward I and Henry V take rank as 
great conquerors, Edward III and his son, the Black Prince, must 
be denominated merely raiders on a grand scale. 
To what extent and for how long the English king 
seriously contemplated the possibility of a Scottish conquest it 
is impossible to say. The observer, denied an insight into the 
workings of Edward's mind on the subject, /.can only judge by 
external events. From the time of his failure in the Weardale 
campaign the king had cherished a desire to punish the Scots, but 
it seems improbable that he had any idea of securing the whole of 
the north before the victory of Halide/1. Rather was he drawn into 
that conflict by the bribe of the border districts offered by 
Baliol. But the sweeping success outside Berwick and the collapse 
of Scottish resistance opened the prospect of securing Scotland 
under a vassal king and the campaigns of 1335 and 1336 represent 
whole- hearted attempts to establish English domination. These two 
campaigns, however, seem to have exhausted Edward's interest ih 
the subject. The inclination towards France became marked and 
from that point Baliol was used as a catepaw to keep the Scots 
distracted and prevent their rendering effective aid to the French, 
This branch of Edward's policy was to some extent successful, but 
that cannot absolve him from the charges of vacillation and of 
throwing away the substance to grasp at the shadow., 
The conclusion is that it was Edward's poor generalship 
l.In any case it seems very probable that Edward did not know his 
own mind in this matter. 
Ivo permanent English conquest of France was possible in the Middle 
Ages, but such a conquest of Scotland might have been acnieved. 
generalship/ 
and lack of stern perseverance that saved Scotland at this time. 
We look in vain for any new departure or innovation in means of 
warfare among the Scots. Military practice in the northern 
country presents a dead level of mediocrity only relieved by such 
exploits as Ramsay's relief of Dunbar and the gallant defence of 
that stronghold by the countess of March. 
Part III. 
The Franco -Scottish Alliance. 
Chapter I. 
Neville's Cross and Otterburn. 
Section 1. Dau d's invasion. 
The invasion of 1346 was the first of the Scottish 
attempts, usually disastrous in their result, to relieve an ally 
who was well able to safeguard his own interests. The weaknesses 
of a national policy which aimed at making gcrifices for a 
country from which little could be expected in return is suffici- 
ently obvious. In a military sense it is only necessary to point 
out that the object of distracting the attention of the English 
could have been achieved more easily with a minimum of risk by a 
series of vigorous and well -directed raids with a mobile force. 
In the early days of October David, 4loved by the 
representations of the French as to trie danger to Calais, crossed 
the western march with an organised force of two thousand men- 
at -arms and a large host of hobelers and light troops. /The 
enterprise undertaken by the invaders was the siege of the 
of Liddel in the Carlisle 
the besiegers advanced to 
and timbers. Fascines had 
first 
castle 
district. After a few days' blockade 
the assault under cover of heavy beams 
been constructed for the attack and 
with these the moat was rapidly filled. The stormers were then 
able to reach the foot of the wall which they broke through with 
iron tools. When an entrance had been effected, little mercy 
was shown to the defenders, and the constable, Sir Walter Selby, 
¡'ïhe Lanercost chronicle,fo.241. 
c,A fascine is a bundle of brushwood or rushes, or even a wicker 
basket filled with earth (though this is usually known as a 
gabion), used in large quantities for filling up a moat, sunken 
road, or other natural obstacle. 
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Selby,/ 
was put to death by David's orders./ 
After this minor success the Scots proceeded through 
eilsland and North Tynedale by ïaanercost, Naworth, and Redpath, 
wasting the country as they went. The Tyne was crossed ut '_iexhua 
or Corbridge, but this district was spared in order that the Scots 
might draw their provisions from it. From the Tyne valley the 
raiders proceeded up the Devil water and thence down the valley of 
the i)erwent towards Durham, which city they approached from the 
west. 
The foraging detachments in the Scottish van had been 
commanded throughout the caìpaien by the knight of Liddesdale. On 
October 12th he was surprised in a fog at Merrington at dawn and 
routed by the vanguard of the English forces, which had been 
gathering in the neighbourhood of Richmond under the direction of 
the archbishop of York and the northern wardens. The encounter 
was probably an accidental one and not deliberately planned by 
the English. A rapid march north from the rendezvous, rendered 
necessary by the nedd of saving Durham from the advancing Scots, 
precipitated the collision.3 
Bain,IIl1670; Lanercost chronicle,fo.241b; Meaux chronicle,III,6O 
The assertion that the Scots passed the Tyne near Newcastle and 
approached Durham by Beaurepaire is negatived by the document in 
Bain,III,1bO1, which refers to the devastation done by David and 
.his host in the neighbourhood of Blanchland Abbey. 
3With reference to this incident it may be remarked that the Scots 
were as a rule singularly successful in avoiding surprises. With 
the noleble exceptions of the capture of William at Alnwick and 
the rout of Bruce at Methven Wood, there is no example of a disas- 
ter sustained by lack of watchfulness. This is in strong contrast 
to the fact that many successful enterprises were carried out by 
the Scots themselves, frequently in hostile territory., Unfortunate 
ly there is no definite indication of the method of protection 
utilised by the Scots, but it seems probable that they had no 
definite system. In their own country the peasantry could be 
relied upon to give information of any threatened attack, while in 
a raid into England the office of scouts would be performed by the 
foragers and plunderers who spread over the districts round the 
invaders. 
Section 2. The battle. 
After the minor success gained at the expense of the 
knight of Liddesdale and his followers, the English marched rapid- 
ly northwards to save Durham which the Scots were approaching from 
the west. On this side Durham is dominated as far as the banks of 
the Wear by the steep declivity on whose crest is the locality 
known as Neville's Cross. From the foot of this hill towards the 
west there stretches for some considerable distance a plain 
comparatively free from natural obstacles. Across this open ground 
the Scots were slowly advancing when the English force, inter- 
posing itself between the invaders and the outskirts of Durham, 
took up position o' the lower slopes of the 
The English force consisted of close on a thousand men - 
at -arms with several thousand archersi.Among its leaders were the 
archbishop of York, Percy, Neville, Mowbray, Scrape, and Rokeby. 
In the march north from Richmond by Barnard castle and Bishop 
Auckland the English were arranged in three columns under the 
command of the archbishop, Percy, and Rokeby. It was the divisions 
of the archbishop and Rokeby which had routed the force under the 
knight of Liddesdale. The three columns would naturally form the 
three divisions3_in which the English were arranged for the battle, 
each section having, as had become usual, archers on its flanks. 
The Scots were also drawn up in three divisions under the leader- 
ship of the earl of Moray, assisted by the earls of Strathearn 
and Fife, the king, with Sir Malcolm Fleming and the earl of 
The battle could not be fought on the crest, which is much too 
narrow to contain -a a large array of troops. Moreover, if the 
defenders had taken position higher up the hill, they could easily 
have been flanked and could not have manoeuvred. 
Meaux chronicle,III,p.61, gives nine thousand, but this possibly 
is an exaggeration. 
2 'roissart,Ch.138, declares that the English were in four sections, 
but this cannot be accepted in the face of the assertions of the 
Lanercost and Meaux chronicles. Froissart's account is very 
faulty. He makes the English gather at Newcastle. 
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of/ 
Dunbar, with Robert Stw art. Up to the last moment David had been 
sceptical as to the reported English advance, and it was not till 
the enemy were already feeling his outposts that he prepared for 
a decisive action by arraying his force on a slight eminence 
facing the English position. 
It was the intention of the invaders to regain on the 
defensive in their position and there to await an attack from the 
English which they felt confident of repulsing. The English, 
however, had no idea of throwing away the advantage of the ground 
and set to work to provoke the Scots into assuming the offensive. 
With this end in view they detached a body of several hundred a 
archers, who advanced into the open ground between the armies 
and proceeded to tease their opponents with a well? directed fire 
from fairly long range. The obvious counterstroke was for David 
to sweep away the skirmishers or compel them to retreat by a g 
charge of a section of his hobelers, and the adoption of this 
course was urged upon him by certain if his older officers. The 
advice was given in vain. The Scots began to grow restive under 
the provocation of a fire to which they could make little or no 
return, and the impatient king ordered an advance of the whole 
army against the English position. 
The charge, so rashly undertaken, was gallantly carried 
out. Under a heavy fire of arrows the Scots pushed across the 
intervening space and hurled themselves on the English divisions. 
In this advance they suffered heavily from the rain of missiles 
with which they were assailed, but by keeping together and using 
e 
their shields and helm4ts to the best advantage they avoided the 
ruinous loss which might have been expected. /But the charge Xpd 
had weakened the attackers in a direction much more serious by 
Sapping their initial energy and rendering them more liable to 
exhaustion in the close combat which ensued. 
At first the furious rush of the Scots drove back the 




English, but the defenders rallied in their turn and hell their 
ground bravely. A fierce and protracted struggle at close quarters 
followed, the attackers relying chiefly on their axes. At one 
stage in the combat the exhaustion produced by the fierce efforts 
of both sides caused a momentary pause. Soon, however, the fight 
was renewed, and the Scots, suffering from the effects of their 
charge,began to lose ground. The battle, however, was by no means 
lost, when the earl of Dunbar, apparently fearing a rout in which 
he would be involved, took to flight. his example was followed by 
the men of his division and also by some of the troops on the 
other wing and in the rear. But in the centre round the king there 
still remained a closely- packed body of men on whom the English 
closed. After making a brave resistance the Scots succumbed to 
exhaustion and were captured in large numbers. David, who had 
fought gallantly and had been wounded in the face by an arrow, 
was taken by a squire, John Copeland. A pursuit followed, but was 
not very successful, as the English were themselves tired out 
and had suffered some considerable loss in the combat. The battle 
had lasted from nine till noon.Many earls and knights had fallen 
or were captured. 
Section 3. Otterburn. 
At the beginning of Auguat,1368, the earls of moray, 
Uoulas, and Dunbar crossed the eastern march with a body of three 
thousand borderers. This raid was only part of a greater movement, 
as another force of Scots entered the Carlisle district at the 
same time. Douglas pushed rapidly south, crossed the Tyne, and 
proceeded to ravage the northern part of the bishopric of Durham. 
Meanwhile the earl of Northumberland, who was responsible for the 
eastern border, stationed himself at Ainwick and sent his two sons 
/Baker of Swinbroke,pp.172 -173; Meaux chronicle,III;p.6í -62; 
denry Knighton, pye. 42 -44; l a-ier cost chronicle, fos. 242, 242b; 
Froissar t, Ch. ?.z8. 
airoissart's statement that the Scots crossed. the Tyne at Brance- 
Peth is unintelligible, as the place is south of Durham. 
sons,/ 
Henry and Ralph Percy, with a number of knights to Newcastle. The 
attack had come as a surprise and the full forces of the English 
were not yet assembled. 
After harrying the bishopric Douglas recrossed the Tyne 
and for a period of two days took post close to the fortress of 
Newcastle. Skirmishing took place at the barriers and in this 
Douglas had the fortune to capture the pennon of Henry Percy. 
The Scots then continued their retreat, stormed Ponteland castle,, 
and camped on the rising ground of Otterburn in Redesdale, a 
little way above the river. The bulk of the force wished to push 
on to join their comrades near Carlisle:, but Douglas insisted on 
waiting for two or three days to give Percy a chance to fight.a, 
Meanwhile Eenry Percy had made a forced march from 
Newcastle with a body of English considerably superior in number 
to tine Scots. On the night of August 5th in bright moonlight he 
attempted to surprise the camp of Douglas. The surprise was, 
however, ineffective and was ably countered by the Scots. Under 
cover of light skirmishing parties they evacuated their camp and 
formed their array on a knoll a little distance aoff. The English 
charge was s,ent on an empty bivouac and in consequence the 
attackers fell into some confusion. 
Douglas then led an effective counter -attack which drove 
back the English. There followed a desperate struggle in the heart 
of the camp in which the Scottishi leader was struck to the ,ground 
by repeated blows of spears and axes and mortally wounded. The 
uncertain light prevented the knowledge of his fall from spreading 
and a rally of his men resulted in the rescue of his body and the 
capture of the younger Percy by Maxwell. The Scots, ably directed 
by Dunbar and Moray, and led on by the Sinclairs and Sir James 
Lindsay; bore up bravely against the superior numbers to which 
¿About six miles north -west of Newcastle. 
/This was a typical piece of chivalry, but by no means in accord- 
ance with the views of the borderers whose motto was rather 
"strictly business ". 
4 l , 
which/ 
they were opposed. The strain of the forced march and the failure 
of the surprise attack now began to tell on the English, who 
'commenced to straggle and lose cohesion_. Henry Percy made a 
desperate attempt to rally his men_, but this effort only led to hi: 
being taken prisoner by Montgomery. This was the final blow and 
the English, losing heart at the loss of their leader, scattered 
and fled. They were vigorously pursued by the victorious Scots 
and los$ heavily, several knights and men -at -arms being captured. 
The battle had in fact been an exceptionally sanguinary one and 
probably nearly half of the English force was destroyed or taken. 
The Scottish loss ran into Several hundreds. 
On the following day news came to the raiders that 
the bishop of Durham was approaching with a strong body of rein- 
forcements. The Scottish borderers, tired by their exertions but 
determined to keep the field, formed in a strong position and 
confidently awaited the English attack. The bishop, however, aftei 
reconnoitring the hostile ranks, decided that the risk to be 
incurred in assaulting so strong a position was too great and drev 
off his men. The Scots then burned their camp and retired quietly 
across the border to Melrose, while at. the same time the raiding 
force in the neighbourhood of Carlisle also recrossed the border." 
Section 4. Decline of the schiltron. 
Both Neville's Croes and Otterburn were feoldiers' 
battles" in the sense that they were finally decided by the 
staying power and endurance of the troops on both sides rather 
than by complicated manoeuvres. Neither was essentially an archery 
combat and in neither did the Scottish schiitron reappear in its 
customary form. 
David's invasion of the north of England was faulty both 
in conception and in execution. Raids should have been preferred 
to a formal invasion, and, when once that Invasion was nrvdertaken, 
battle should have been avoided except in the most favourable 
circumstances. As a conquest of the north was out of the question 
¿Froissart, T e Journey, Chs. 236 -243. 
question/ 
the aim should have been to do as much damage as possible 
without endangering the invading force in open combat. 
To liken Neville's Cross to iialidon Hill is a mistake. 
In the latter battle the Scots were in regular schiltron order 
and, as at Dupplin Moor, were defeated and almost destroyed by 
the main power of the English archers. In the former the action 
of the bowmen served to precipitate the combat and to force the 
Scots to fight under unfavourable conditions, but it cannot be 
said to have exercised any serious influence on the actual 
fi -hting. Doubtless the Scots suffered severely from the archery 
fire in their quick advance, but the battle was won by the stubb- 
orn resistance of the English men -at -arms and the bowmen in hand- 
to-hand fighting, coupled with the exhaustion of the Scots. 
The result of the fight was surprising in face of the 
fact that the Scots usually gained the upper hand in a combat 
settled at close quarters. For this particular and exceptional 
instance of disaster the preliminary exertions of the Scots were 
not alone responsible. It is evident that the attackers had not 
the customary large proportion of spearmer. in their ranks and 
that they relied chiefly on their axes and maces. The temporary 
unpopularity of the pike may have been due to the disaster sustai- 
ned by the schiltron at Ralidon. It is true that a man carrying 
Only short weapons could protect himself more effectively with 
his shield when crossing the open under archery fire, and to this 
fact the partial success of the Scottish advance may be attributed 
But it is equally evident that when the moment of actual contact 
came the spear was the most profitable weapon. Additional factors 
contributing to the defeat of the Scots were the comparative 
ineffectiveness of the charge against a dismounted enemy, and the 
undoubted weakness in morale and lack of confidence in their 
leaders which existed in the northern ranks in this campaign. 
It is almost superfluous to say that David should 
have won the battle outright or at least should have sustained a 
Mere check instead of a crushing defeat. As the English were out 
cr range of the Scottish position they had to send their archers 
archers/ 
forward to provoke their opponent: to battle. /.lf David had been 
content to sweep the skirmishers from his front, as he could 
easily have done, the English would either have had to break off 
the fight or would have had to advance en masse within range of 
the Scots. In the latter case an equal advance on the part of 
David's army would have brought about a combat on level ground 
in which the Scots could have enjoyed the benefit of their 
superior numbers without any preliminary disadvantage. Neverthe- 
less this superiority was not an overwhelming one, as has some 
times been suggested. The most extreme proportion which can be 
allowed is one of three to two. 
The fighting of the battle of Otterburn was only 
justified by its favourable result. The raid had been a successful 
one and had achieved its limited object. The natural sequel was to 
prosecute the retreat either towards Carlisle or over the border, 
and the Scottish leaders who advocated these courses were 
certainly right, while Douglas was in the wrong. If Henry Percy 
had elected to halt near the borderers' camp and, after giving a 
much needed interval of repose to his wearied men, to give battle 
in daylight when his archers could have been used to the fullest 
advantage, it is difficult to see what could have saved the Scots 
from defeat. As it was, the bowmen were of little use in the 
deceptive moonlight and shadows, and the advantage of freshness 
was on the side of the Scots. In this case there was no weakness 
in morale in the northern ranks, fighting as they were under a 
proved leader in whom they had the fullest confidence. 
The erroneous strategical ideas of Douglas were fully 
redeemed by his tactical skill and personal bravery. The 
temporary withdrawal from the camp under cover of the skirmishers 
was a master -stroke of war. At once it took the edge off the 
English offensive by avoiding the first fierce rush and tempting 
the men to leave their ranks to pillage. Then atX the decisive 
moment the counter- attack was launched with devastating results. 
In this respect the combat resembles that of Homildon Hill. 
reeults./ 
In it Douglas himself took part and in doing so he exhibited the 
soundest judgement. Generally speaking a general's place is in 
the rear, not in the front, and it is no part of his duty to run 
unnecessary risks, but at Otterburn the circumstances were 
exceptional. In the absence of reserves or flanking movements the 
general's part Ìlas played out as soon as the Scottish counter- 
stroke was launched, and there remained to be performed only the 
duty of the family head and personal chief. In short the Scotti,:s4 
leader combined the roles of general and soldier with exemplary 
skill. 
As at lieville's Cross both sides fought on foot and the 
spearmen played ni outstanding part in the struggle. When combat 
was joined the affair became one great serixnzaage without ordered 
ranks or divisions, in which the influences for victory were very 
similar to those operating in the battle outside Durham. In this 
case also they operated against the side superior in numbers and 
deficient in leadership. Particularly noticeable is the fact that 
the fall of Douglas exercised no serious effect on tree Scots and 
that his lieutenants, tried border warriors, were sufficiently 
skilful to carry on the attack and secure the victory. 
- 
i;hapter II. 
The Army of the Stuarts. 
Section 1. The raising of troops. 
During the reigns of the first four Jameses Scotland 
enjoyed a period of comparative immunity from the aggression of 
her southern neighbour. This interval of repose, due to the joint 
influences of the French wars and of the dynastic struggle 
between the houses of York and Lancaster, enabled the Scots to 
develope their military system to an extent never reached before. 
Up to the time of Alexander III the northern armies were rude 
levies of semi - savage warriors, and during the war of Independenc 
they were composed largely of volunteer patriots, the country 
being too much disturbed by English invasions and garrisons and 
by the defection of her barons to permit of a regular conscriptio 
But in the fifteenth century the question of independence was 
settled and the barons, though they frequently indulged in 
rebellions against the crown, acknowledged the Stuart dynasty as 
the rightful rulers of the country and were united in resistance 
to English attacks. 
In the modern use of the term there was no standing 
army in Scotland at this time, but that admission does not 
preclude the existence of professional soldiers, of whom there 
was a considerable number. Every baron from the king downwards 
had his band, varying in numbers according to the wealth and 
rank of the master, of retainers and men -at -arms, who were on 
constant service and whose sole duty in life was the support of 
their leaders cause and the guardianship of his person. Although 
not organised as part of a unit these men -at -arms, well equipped 
and efficient in the management of their weapons through 
constant practice, constituted in time of war a formidable corps 
of veterana to leaven the mass of raw troops. In addition each 
royal burgh, frequently threatened by the jealousy of neighbour - 
ing barons, kept up a burgh guard of enlisted and trained men, 
men, / 
who, in part at least, strengthened the national forces in time 
of war. f, 
Apart from the nucleus of trained troops the mass of the 
army was composed of levies raised in time of war only. Nominally 
every man between the ages of sixteen and sixty was liable for 
service, but in practice it is doubtful if sucn a levy en masse 
could be carried out except in particular districts for the 
purpose of defence. To make the law effective would have necessi- 
tated the existence of a register compiled by census and kept up 
to date. Nevertheless the chances are that few ablebodied men of 
suitable military age could escape service in the case of a 
national emergency, even if they had wished tc do so. The some- 
what sketchy methods of enforcing the levy would be strengthened 
by public opinion and the martial instincts of a warlike people. 
For military purposes the responsible officers were the baillies 
in the burghs and the sherxiffs in the country districts. 
l'or offensive purposes troops were raised by the reguïa_ 
feudal levy. Lands were granted to barons in denominations of 
mark and the assessment of troops was fixed according to the 
value of the grant. The burghs were also held liable to send 
quotas of soldiers, though this obligation might on occasion be 
remitted on payment of a fine., The maximum period for which the 
king could demand service in one year was forty days. The 
An armed guard was a necessity for the mediaeval burgh, as other- 
wise the common lands would have been stolen and the barons of the 
district might even have carried their feuds into the streets of 
the town;e.g.the Kennedys and Montgomeries in Ayrshire. 
aSee the Register of the :great Seal of Scotland. 
the expedition was confined to a raid it was sometimes held 
expedient not to disturb the trade of a town by demanding its 
quota. Thus Dundee and Perth purchased immunity from participa- 
tion in the Norham raid; Lord High 'xreasurer's Accounts, I, p. 313. 
The/ 
necessary summons to the host was sent by special messenger to 
the sheriffs of the counties concerned. /In certain cases only the 
quotas of particular districts were called out. On apsex paper 
the scheme was a good and equitable one, but in practice it 
laboured under the disadvantages of slow mobilisation, difficulty 
of enforcing the obligations, and limited time for an offensive 
campaign. 
An important consideration was the financing of the 
army. The feudal quota was under the obligation of feeding itself 
during the prescribed period and of providing its own arms and 
equipment, so that the campaign was free from expense on their 
account. But it is questionable whether this benefit was not more 
than offset by the lack of uniformity which prevailed in equip- 
ment and the difficulty of enforcing a lixeigeex proper provision 
of weapons; the obligation of the troops to feed themselves 
often led to straggling and unorganised foraging. 2, 
When service was required beyond the specified period 
of forty days the king had to pay wages, which varied in amount 
according to the nature of the work.3.Such service was, of course, 
most necessary in the case of fortresses which were held by means 
of permanent garrisons, and, irhe later days of the period, in 
the case of specialised troops,` such as gunners, whose work 
demanded continuous attention and training. The king had also to 
provide the artillery for the campaign. Even these expenses, 
comparatively small as they were, occasionally placed the king 
/Lord High Treasurer's Accounts,I,p.320; "The 14th day of Februare, 
giffin to Symon Spardour, to pas with the kingis lettrez to the 
schirefis of (seven counties) to warne all within the bowndis to 
remane with the king the 6th day of April and 40 days theref tir? 
¿Theoretically the soldier should have brought his food with him; 
but considerations of transport would negative this. 
,Lord nigh Treasurer's Accounts,I,p.326; "Giffin to ilk man 
(gunners) in the owk of wage 20/ -.0 
king/ 
in financial difficulties. Recourse was then had to loans, but, 
in the absence of an organised system of finance, the king could 
only borrow on his personal security or by pledging his own 
property. 
Section 2. Weapons. 
During this period laws were frequently passed by the 
Scottish parliament regulating the equipment with which each man 
was required to provide himself. For this purpose the people were 
divided into sections according to the wealth, fixed or movable, 
possessed, and, although the ;larks of division might vary, the 
regulations as to the types of weapons remained more or less 
constant. The inference that may drawn from the multiplicity 
of statutes on this subject is that the law was more honoured in 
the breach than in the observance and that as a consequence the 
provisions had frequently to be reenacted. 
When the various statutes dealing with the subject are 
put together, it is found that there were three classes of men whc 
had equipment both offensive and defensive. At the head of the 
list came the barons, knights, wealthy traders, "gentlemen" in 
short, who had an income of more than twenty pounds in the year 
or a total property of more than one hundred. The members of this 
class were required to provide them selves with horses, body 
armour, and the usual offensive weapons of the heavily armed 
cavalryman. So seldom is this class mentioned in comparison with 
the others, that it seems probable that most of its members 
readily ccmplied with the laws on the subject, a fact hardly 
surprising as they constituted the military aristocracy of the 
country. 
Next came those who had goods to the value of twamIx 
fifty pounds or an income of ten pounds. They formed the heavy 
¡he Exchequer Rolls of Scotland,VII,p.292, contain a reference tc 
loan furnished by the king's goldsmith on the occasion of a 
campaign. 
heavy/ 
infantry, the backbone of the army. /They had to provide themselves 
with a bannet, or steel cap, with its pefane, or extension, a 
gorget, breast and back plates, armoured gauntlets, and greaves 
for defence. For offensive purposes their weapons were sword, 
spear, and dagger. This class together with the final one, 
composed as it was mostly of traders, gave a good deal of trouble 
by neglecting the regulations. 
The final class was composed of those who had property 
of comparatively small value.4heÿ were required to possess an 
iron hat, a reinforced body jacket, and a buckler of leather or 
wood, together with bow, sheaf, sword, and knife. The axe was 
accepted as a substitute for the bow, and was probably much more 
popular. It is specially noticeable that there is practically no 
mention of the spear with regard to this class, which must have 
been the most numerous. Apparently the schiltron must have been 
composed of the members of the second class and must therefore 
have been limited in numbers. The spear was specified as eighteen 
feet, or six ells, in length. In addition there were a large 
number of "naked men" who were liable for the levy, but who could 
only come with such weapons as they could get. Generally speaking 
the final class was only used for national defence and was 
exempted from service in raids over the border. 
The duty of enforcing the regulations was in the 
hands of the sheriffs and baillies and must have proved an 
onerous one. Scotland was at this time deficient in the means for 
manufacturing the better types of weapons and these had according- 
ly to be imported from the continent. Merchants trading abroad 
were encouraged to bring back arms with them, and in this respect 
the alliance with France proved of real value. To ensure that 
each member of the community was equipped with the proper weapons; 
Members of this class may, of course, have fought on horseback 
occasionally. 
Sometimes it is fixed at twenty pounds, sometimes not mentioned 
at all. 
weapons,/ 
assizes of arms or wapinschaws were held at fixed intervals. In 
peace times there were usually four in the year, but when war 
threatened they might become as frequent as one each fortnight. 
As a rough and ready check they were very useful, but there was a 
good deal of evasion, and it is difficult to see how, without an 
elaborate system of registration, such could be avoided. 
Throughout the statutes frequent provisions can be 
found relating to the encouragement of archery. The system adopted 
was to set up in each parish, preferably near the church, a butt 
at which practice could. take place. Regulations were made that on 
holidays each man must carry out a certain amount of shooting, 
but even the limited practice enjoined on the peasantry was 
largely neglected. In an attempt to make the task a sport, as it 
was in Engliand at that time, football and golf, the alternative 
methods of recreation,were banned, This proved equally useless 
and to the end of the chapter the Scots remained sadly deficient 
in expert bowmen. 
In considering the causes of this state of affairs it 
must be remembered that the crown of Scotland was lacking in 
executive power at this period. The laws promulgated by the 
parliament form a body of well -reasoned provision for national 
defence, but were, unfortunately, ineffectively applied. In many, 
in fact in the majority of districts, the king's writ did not run, 
and the real executive power was in the hands of the local earl or 
baron, who put into force these regulations which suited himself. 
Archery seems to have appealed very little to the Scots, whose 
military genius rather lay in the direction of close quarter 
fighting.' In the face of this popular dislike the king could do 
little. If the barons, especially the great Douglas confederation, 
had chosen to enforce the laws on the subject, something might 
have been achieved, but this they did not do. 
Section51 3. The scheme of defence. 
In a period of comparative peace the most warlike 
area of the Scottish lowlands was naturally the border district. 
In that region, where every man was a soldier, the borderers had 
had/ 
evolved a system of raiding tactics peculiar to themselves. The 
display of war was noticeable by its absence, and a campaign 
became a matter of business with a profit and loss account in 
cattle and men. Generally speaking the border lords could be relit 
ed on to repel the minor enterprises of the English, and the 
bickering which went on incessantly in the Debateable land was 
not allowed to affect the ordinary military arrangements. Unfor- 
tunately the lack of control exercised over the raiders and the 
lax ideas of meum and tuum which prevailed in the south eventually 
brought the inevitable consequences. At a time when definite 
periods of peace between England and Scotland became possible 
the harmony of affairs was constantly interrupted and trade injur- 
ed by the operations of the bands which lived by the sword. Thus 
the initial benefit of the border system was negatived by its 
subsequent disadvantages. 
More serious invasions could not be regarded so lightl 
as mere border forays and regular provision nad to be made towardE 
meeting them. Moreover, as the attack might come either by land 
or by sea, the system of defence had to be of twofold nature. If 
a strong attack was made by a considerable English land force, 
warning was given by means of a system of bale- fires, or beacins, 
áhich had 'been established by law. / hen this warning reached the 
court and the fact of an invasion was definitely established, 
orders were issued for the levying of the host and its concentrat- 
ion near the threatened part of the Lowlands. This, however, 
would take time and meanwhile the enemy would be pushing on. The 
duty of the borderers then was to check the advance as much as 
possible. In this task they were supported by the border strong- 
holds whihh the enemy could noL leave in his rear with impunity. 
In 1481 the Parliament of James III ordered that all fortresses 
in the neighbourhood of the borders should be put in a state of 
defence with men and artillery, and that the owner should hold 
the castle either himself or by the medium of a trusty deputy. 
Acts of the Parliament of Scotland,i,p.716, and ii,p.44. 
!!Ç 
deputy./ 
By the following year there were fifteen holds on the borders in a 
state of defence. The king nimself took responsibility for the 
victualling of Dunbar and Lochmaben, the buttresses of defence for 
the eastern and western marches respectively, and special attentió 
was to be directed to liermitage, which commanded Liddesdale. 
By the operation of this chain of castles the hostile 
action was hindered. Three choices, each with its attendant 
disadvantages, were left to an invading force. The attackers 
could pass between two units in the chain and thus dangerously 
restrict their own line of communication. They could take one of 
the holds by siege which would consume valuable time. Finally 
trey could mask one or more of the castles, and thereby seriously 
weaken their own force by the detachment which would be necesary. 
This reliance upon a line of fortresses for defence is 
important as it marks a departure from the old system of devastat- 
ion and retreat. The reasons for the change are fairly obvious. 
In the passing of time the Lowlands had become too settled and 
prosperous to be abandoned lightly. The military force of Scotland 
had increased and the probability is that by the time the castles 
had been passed an army could be concentrated much lar er in 
numbers than the invading force. finally, the fact that the strong 
holds were of stone and were furnished with guns made a prolonged 
resistance much more probable. This change in strategy was 
inevitable owing to social development, and it was a wise one. The 
chances of a defini$e attempt at conquest by the English were very 
small, and the late of Scotland no longer depended upon the fort- 
unes of a single field army which was temporarily irreplaceable. I 
An attack by sea was more difficult to guard against, 
but an element of compensation existed in the fact that such an 
inroad could be only temporary and local. It might indeed cause a. 
1I make this statement deliberately. The wnole resources of the 
country were now available for defence against what could only be 
the attack of a part. The rapid recovery of the Scots after 
Flodden and Pinkie is a proof of the change of circumstances. 
a/ 
good deal of damage, but the landing party could not move very fai 
from its floating base and could not remain in the districX 
indefinitely. In 1482, When an invasion was threatened by Edward 
Iv, active measures were taken to e eguard the coast as far as 
possible. The menaced coastline was divided into sections, each 
six miles in length and a mile in depth. Every section had a 
local captain appointed and provision was made to call out the 
local levies immediately a hostile fleet appeared.l.The system was 
not tested by attack and cannot therefore be criticised, but it 
was probably t.s good a one as could be devised at the time. 
The military system of the Jameses was not a perfect 
one and, even such as it was, could not be put into full opera- 
tion by the crippled executive. Nevertheless it was as good a 
scheme as the times would allow, as good as that of most 
continental countries of the period, and far in advance of any 
development that might reasonably be expected from the chaotic 
and disunited state of the country during the major portion of 
the fourteenth century. At any rate it was a system, not a 
concomitance of brave men and fortuitous circumstance to make the 
best of a bad job, as had been the case in the War of 
Independence. 
/Acts of the Parliament of Scotland,ii,p.139. 
Chapter Ill. 
James IV and Sea -Power. 
Section 1. Influence of sea -power on Scottish military affairs. 
Not until the reign of James IV can the Scots be said 
to have possessed a fleet capable of attempting the defence of tb 
coast. On the other hand English attempts to secure the command 
of the sea date back to the ninth century and attained notable 
success on numerous occasions. Thus there is the double influence 
to be considered, the lack of sea -power by the Scots and the 
possession of it by their enemies. 
The first seafaring opponents with whom the Scots 
came into conflict were the Norsemen. The fact that their attack 
could not be met on the water led to innumerable raids and a few 
settlements on the mainland and to the loss for a considerable 
period of the northern and western isles. This foreign occupation 
was the cause of a good deal of lawlessness in the western high- 
lands and, to some extent, in Galloway, as it distracted the 
attention of the Scottish kings at a time of attempted organisa- 
tion. Moreover the islands provided a refuge for fugitive rebels 
and outlaws from the mainland. Fortunately for the Scots the 
Norsemen were too far from their base of operations to maintain 
their possession, but it will be recalled how Alexander III was 
unable to concentrate his force to meet naco's attack and how he 
was compelled to rely upon the climate and the exhaustion of his 
enemies for his success. 
It is doubtful if the lack of a fleet exercised any 
great influence on the conduct of the offensive campaigns of the 
Scots in the north of England. The main duty of ships in such 
expeditions would have been one of supply, a duty fully performed 
by the Scottish foragers. There is no indication that any raiding 
army in the northern counties ever suffered seriously from& a 
shortage of food. Sucn a shortage could, indeed hardly exist in 
a comparatively wealthy agricultural district for individuals so 
easily satisfied with rough fat= as were the Scots of the period. 
/6 ] 
period./ 
It is true that the necessity of foraging occasionally led to the 
undue dispersion of the invading army. This danger might have beer 
obviated by the presence of a supply fleet, but such an advantage 
would have been more than counterbalanced by the fact that the 
army would have been restricted to a narrow line of operations in 
immediate contiguity to the coast owing to the necessity of keepir 
in touch with its ships. Swift -sailing vessels might have carried 
raiding parties to pekmnts far south on the English coast, but 
such pin -pricking could have accomplished nothing of value. 
It was in defence that the Scots suffered most severe- 
ly from the maritime supremacy of their English enemy. Most of the 
serious invasions of the north were carried out with the support 
of a fleet of transports as the best means of overcoming the 
devastation policy generally adopted by the Scots. An attacking 
force could not subsist for many days in Scotland without supplies 
landed on the seaboard. Lack of these supplies would have stifled 
many of the English movements at their birth and would have 
curtailed the activities of most of the others. When a detailed 
examination is made the result is astonishing. The battle of 
Dunbar need not have been fought and Edward I could not have over- 
thrown Baliol so easily. The Falkirk campaign could not have been 
carried out at all. The campaign of Bannockburn would have come to 
an even more premature conclusion.d.Edward Baliol's landing if Fife 
would have been impossible. Berwick could have been supplied with 
food and reinforcements from the sea and the battle of Halidon 
Hill could thus have been avoided. Minor considerations, which 
only add nore weight to the overwhelming influence exerted by sea - 
power, are that Scottish communication with France would have been 
rendered safer, that trade with the continent would have been 
facilitated, and that the English could not have held isolated 
fortresses on the Scottish coast by revictualling the garrisons by 
sea. As Scotland was in the Middle Ages a self -sub; porting country 
/Though in this case the English seem to have relied more on land 
transport, and thereby crippled their advance. 
/ . 
country/ 
in food supplies, the question of a blockade does not arise. 
The fact that the Scots did not at any early period 
attempt to meet the menace of the English at sea,eneed occasion no 
surprise. Supplies of homegrown timber of a suitable variety and 
size were very limited, and the day of organised imports had not 
yet arrived. The equipped yards and the expert workmen necessary 
for the turning -out of a sufficiently large number of vessels did 
not exist, although isolated cases of shipbuilding on a moaest 
scale can be found. The national instinct of the people did not 
lie towards seafaring. ('In any case it is very doubtful if a 
Scottish fleet could have put up a successful fight at this period 
against an English one of equal or superior size. Before the 
general adoption of artillery maritime battles consisted largely 
of missile combats at close quarters together with a limited 
amount of ramming and a considerable amount of boarding. In 
boarding the Scots would assuredly have held their own, and might 
even have done so in the management of the great mangonels or 
catapults often employed; but it is only too evident that in the 
missile combats the superiority of the English archers would have 
told its usual tale and that the decks of the Scottish vessels 
would have been swept with arrows, as were those of the French at 
Sluys in 1340. 
Section 2. The war -vessel of the period. 
In the strict sense of the word there were practically 
no ships of war in Northern European waters in the later Middle 
Ages. In the Mediterranean the war galley was in common use, but 
the sailing vessel, intended solely for the carrying out of 
hostilities, had not yet been generally adopted. The explanation 
of this fact is that there was no constant demand for a war fleet 
and that few communities could face the cost of maintaining a 
large number of vessels purely for naval purposes. 
On the other hand practically every sailing vessel was 
IThe Scot did not become a Bailor till the invention and adoption 
of the marine engine. 
capable of being adapted to warlike pursuits on very short notige. 
Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries piracy of a 
peculiar kind was frequently practised and every merchanÑ ship 
had to take precautions to meet a possible attack. These prepara- 
tions were also made with the view of making an attack if a 
suitable opportunity appeared, and in this lay the peculiarity of 
the piratical practices of the time. Althouh countries might be 
at peace with each other on land, it was generally recognised 
that no such state of affairs existed at sea./ Thus a perpetual 
warfare was waged on certain traffic routes, and most merchant 
captains and crews started on a voyage with the intention of 
adding the spice of a little profitable piracy to their prosaic 
and legitimate function of trading, always provided that they 
could fall in with a foreign vessel of inferior strength. Too 
often the crew of a captured ship and the ship itself fell victims 
to the desire of their captors to cover up their tracks and leave 
no traces of their plundering. In certain regions this provoca- 
tive form of fighting was particularly fierce. ihe rivalry of the 
Norman seamen with those of the Cinque Ports was of long standing 
and had to no small degree contributed to the causes of the 
hundred Years' War. 
The prevalence of maritime warfare necessarily made every 
country engaged in overseas trade to any appreciable extent the 
possessor of a number of potential ships of war. The general 
adoption of artillery aided this development by making the arming 
of vessels practically universal. In early days every sailor was 
capable of playing his part in a hand -to -hand fight, but only the 
larger ships could afford an equipment of mangonels and a guard of 
expert archers. The introduction of guns made the arming of a 
vessel of moderate size a comparatively inexpensive process, as 
the necessary complement of gunners could usually be provided by 
the crew itself after a little practice. 
(This attitude may be compared with the "No peace beyond the line" 
theory of the Elizabethan sailors. 
The more settled state of Scotland 4nd the exisyence 
of the alliance with France had led to an increase in the over- 
seas trade of the northern country and the consequent possession 
of a number of merchant -cum -war vessels. Thus it was that the 
most famous ships of the reign of James IV, the "Yellow Carvel" 
and the "Flower ", were merely converted merchantmen, and that the 
leading admirals of the time, Sir Andrew Wood and the Bartons, 
were primarily trading captains. The only real roan -of -war posseese 
by the Scots was the "Great Michael ", whose building proved 
rather a costly experiment. Nevertheless the part played by James 
IV in the sudden advance of the Scottish marine was not limited to 
the construction of this single vessel. By his judicious reliance 
on Woods and other captains and his constant encouragement of 
trade development he was primarily responsible for the whole 
movement. 
The sailing ship of those days stood fairly hogh out of 
the water and was broad in relation to its length, being bluff- 
bowed and spare- sterned. The waist was low, but fore and aft were 
two large erections known as the forecastle and sterncastle, or 
poop. It was in these castles that most of the guns were mounted. 
Those of heavier calibre were used for breaching the hull og the 
hostile vessel, wnile the lighter guns, or falconets, swept the 
decks. Ürapnels for holding ships together to facilitate boarding 
were provided, and in some cases boarding netting was fixed to the 
bu1warks and lower rigging. Some distance up the masts were 
fighting tops, small enclosures planned to hold a few men who from 
their position of vantage might hurl down missiles upon the 
enemy's decks. Ports were not generally cut for the guns in the 
body of the snip, but rather in the castles. 
The "Great Michael" was far in excess of the ordinary 
size and had an extra castle amidships i ddition to the usual two 
at bow and stern. It was fitted with a complete tier of guns oh 
the lower deck so that broadside firing was possible. The number 
of guns carried seems enormous by modern standards, but it should 
be remembered that most of them were of small calibre. As the 
strength of such a vessel lay in its artillery, provision was 
L__!Reference is marie to the admirable models in the Scottish 
was/ 
rather made for preventing boarding than for helping it. The 
equipment of fighting tops and of external galleries was extensivE 
The impression gained is that such a ship was a unit of consider- 
able fighting value, but that it must have been very difficult 
to manoeuvre with any degree of speed. /. 
Section 3. Wood and Andrew Barton. 
It is greatly to the credit of James IV that he 
turned from the nobles, who would have made him their catspaw, to 
the commons in his search for help in the strengthening of the 
country. It was through. this change in policy that Andrew Wood of 
Largo in Fife came into prominence. In 1488 great damage was done 
to Scottish shipd in the firth of Forth by five English vessels, 
although the two countries were nominally at peace at the time. 
To stop this nuisance Wood was sent out to fight the "pirates" 
with the "Yellow Carvel" and the "Flower ". An encounter took 
place o 'Dunbar in which, despite the su- 2erior numbers of his 
opponents, Wood was entirely successful. All the hostile vessels 
were taken and were brought captive with their crews into the pori 
of Leith. 
Such a rebuff as this could not be accepted quietly by 
the English authorities. Henry VII promptly appealed for volun- 
teers and promised large rewards to the captain who might defeat 
wood and bring him a prisoner to England. After some hesitation, 
due perhaps to Wood's formidable reputation, the post was claimed 
by Stephen Bull. To him were given three large vessels, well 
armed and manned with picked crews, and with these he sailed 
north to the firth of Forth in the summer of 148. 
Wood was at this time engaged initrading voyage to 
Flanders with his two vessels, and it was Bull's plan to inter- 
cept him on his return. Accordingly the English ships lay close 
behind the isle of May with the intention of surrisinl the Scots 
at a time when the prospect of a speedy arrival in harbout 
Museum, Edin-burt;r . 
harbour/ 
might have rendered them careless. The time of waiting was passed 
in attacks upon_ Scottish fishing vessels, several of which were 
captured. Bull ransomed the captains of these small craft, but 
kept a certain number of the men prisoners so that he might be 
informed of the identity of approaching vessels. 
Soon after dawn one morning the English lookout saw 
two vessels coming round St. Abbs Head. On being promised their 
freedom the captive fishermen identified them as Wood's ships, 
and the English accordingly sallied out to meet them. Wood had 
not expected an attack, but he was not the man to be caught off 
his guard and before the hostile fleet closed the Scots were 
fully prepared for the encounter. On both sides the decks were 
cleared and the guns loaddd. Crossbowmen were stationed at various 
points of vantage on the ships. The crews of the fighting-tops 
were provided with fireballs and limepots to drop on the hostile 
decks. Finally wine was served out all round to hearten the 
sailors for the conflict. 
The English were superior in numbers and in heavy 
artillery, but these advantages were counterbalanced by the 
seamanship of Wood. Realising that a game of "long bowls" would 
favour his opponents and that he must strive to render their 
heavy guns useless, he quickly got to the windward of the English 
ships. Once in this position the Scots were able to come rapidly 
to close quarters with their enemy and thus to reap their 
advantage of their own skill in handstrokes. Similarly this 
manoeuvre allowed the Scots to use their lighter artillery with 
full effect. The fight continued fiercely under the gaze of 
hundreds of anxious spectators who thronged the neighbouring 
shores, but at night the opponents separated. Dawn of the next 
day found them close together and the combat ras renewed as 
stubbornly as ever and continued for some hours, while a south 
wind and an ebbing tide carried the contending vessels up the 
coast of Fife. As they approached Inchcape off the firth of Tay 
the Scots put forth still greater efforts and at length succeeded 
in overcoming the $uuii resistance of the English. Bull and his 
? 
his/ 
crews were taken with their ships to Dundee, but were soon 
afterwards sent home with rich presents by Jamesf The victory was 
due to the managing ability of Wood and the personal skill of the 
Scots at close quarter fighting. The long duration of the struggle 
conveys the impression that at certain stages the fighting cannot 
have been very deadly, or there would have been no survivors at 
all. Probably the artillery ras comparatively ineffective in 
damaging the opposing vessels.. 
In the spring of 1511 Andrew Barton with two ships, the 
"Lion" and "Jenny Pirwyn ", entered the Channel and robbed ships 
of all nationalities, on the ingenious plea tnat the Scots were 
at war with the Portuguese and that the pirated goods were 
contraband of war. As English vessels were suffering severely, 
henry VII]. in June sent the Lord Admiral, Sir Edmund Howard, and 
Lord Thomas Howard with two ships to deal with the raiders. The 
English vessels were separated by stress of weather and severL.l 
weeks elapsed before anything could be done. In August Lord 
Howard fell in with Barton in the Downs and gave chase. The 
English ship speedily overhauled the "Lion" and a close combat 
resulted. howard and his men boarded the Scottish vessel and 
fought their way to the main deck in the face of a stout resis- 
tance. The fall of Barton, mortally wounded by an arrow shot, 
brought about the surrender of his men. Meanwhile the Lord 
Admiral had pursued the "Jenny Pirwyn" and taken possession of it 
by similar methods after an equally stubborn resistance on the 
part of the Scots against superior numbers. lhe prisoners and 
ships were taken to Blackwall, but the captives were almost at 
1n any case it would have been difficult to hold them prisoners 
officially during a period of peace. 
DPitscottie ,pp.155 -158. The purpose of the fireballs is obvious; 
possibly the limepots broke on impact and scattered their blinding 
contents. The use of lime was, of course, an old trick; e.g. 
Hubert de Burgh in the Channel it the early part of the reign of 
Henry III. 
at/ 
once pardoned and released by Lenry./ 
As in the case of Wood's victory over Bull it is 
noticeable that the contest was won by close quarter fighting 
and that little reliance was placed in the damaging powers of the 
guns carried. Even so late as the time of the Armada the ship 
artillery, although it frequently didlgreat damage, was seldom 
capable of sinking or entirely disabling a hostile vessel. Of 
fleet actions and schemes of manoeuvre in James IV's time there 
is no trace. The number of vessels available was not great 
enough to permit of a regular trial of strength for the prize of 
seapower. In the sequel Scottish maritime fortunes again sank 
into obscurity and in the sixteenth century, subsequent to the 
battle of Flodden, the Scots were unable to resist the sea-raids 




Flodden Field. `, 
Section 1. The "Ill Road ". 
In August, 1313, James IV, acting in the interests of 
the French and against the wishes of many of his nobles, sent his 
defiance to Henry Viii who was at that time before Terouenne in 
northern France. A great muster of the Scots was ordered, and 
while this was proceeding Lord home, the Lord Chamberlain, 
entered Northumberland with a strong raiding party. Much damage 
was done and a good deal of plunder collected, mostly in the 
shape of cattle. But as the raiders were returning towards the 
border they were ambushed and comple$ely surprised by Sir Edward 
Bulmer, the sheriff of Durham, at Millfield, a spot within two 
miles of Flodden. The Scots made some resistance, but were over - 
whelmed by the volleys poured in by the English archers and took 
to flight with heavy loss in slain and prisoners, an inauspicious 
opening for the campaign. 
The muster which took place at the Burgh Moor of 
Edinburgh about the middle of August must have been greatly 
facilitated by the improved system of mobilisation referred to in 
the second chapter of this part. The executive power of James IV 
was, for Scotland, a strong one and the assembly would be fully 
representative of the military strength of the country. Such 
being the case the army was the greatest ever put in the field by 
the Scots. Nevertheless the estimate o one hundred thousand, 
generally given by the chroniclers, is a gross exaggeration. To 
supply such a force for a campaign of two or three weeks was an 
impossibility. Probably forty thousand is a generous limit for the 
`The chief authorities on the battle, hall, the 2aX State Papers 
of henry VIII, and Thomas Ruthal, are in fairly close agreement 
as to the details of the struggle. 
A.Sir Richard Baker,p.260; Hall's chronicle,p.556. 
the/ 
size of the Scottish army at any point in the campaign. It is 
evident that so large a force could not be supplied by the higher 
military categories, so that the lower classes must have been 
extensively drawn upon. This fact accounts for the numerous 
desertions which took place during the days preceding the battle. 
In feeding the troops primary attention would be given to the 
better armed section, and many of the "naked men" would be left 
to shift for themselves. When allowance has been made for the 
deserters, sick, casualties, and stragglers, it will be fairly 
safe to put the number of the Scots engaged in the actual battle 
at a little over thirty thousand, against about two thirds that 
number of English. The northern host was accompanied by a batter- 
ing train of seventeen heavy guns, together with several lighter 
pieces of ordnance. 
On August 22nd James, whose sole object was to create a 
diversion in favour of the French, crossed the border in the 
vicinity of Coldstream. Wark castle was destroyed and Norham besie 
ged.l.`T'he latter fortress was one of the strongest on the boEders, 
having a double line of moat and wall, and should have been able 
to make a prolonged resistance. The warden, however, made too free 
a use of his powder and other defensive stores, with the result 
. that after a six days' siege he was left without means of resist- 
ance and was compelled to surrender the castle to destruction. The 
news of this disaster, which took place on the 29th, was a sore 
blow to Surrey, who was hastening north and who had hoped that 
Norham would hold back the Scots for some time.d, 
Surrey had been informed of the siege on the 25th, when 
near York, and had issued orders for a general levy in the north- 
/As Wark is, allowing for the windings of the Tweed, ten miles from 
L 
Norham, it was probably thrown down by a detachment from the main 
body. It is unlikely that James could cross the Tweed, destroy 
jark, and then march ten miles downstream with his whole host so 
rapidly. 
,HHaìl, pp. 55`ï -559; Baker, p. 260. 
northern/ 
counties, the rendezvous to be at Newcastle on September 1st. On 
August 26th he himself marched north from York with a few hundred 
men in dreadful weather and over roads which were buried in mud 
and water. The concentration of the English forces at Newcastle 
was duly accomplished without accident and by the beginning of 
September Surrey had close on twenty thousand men. He was further 
reinforced by the arrival by sea of the Lord Admiral with one thou 
sand more, probably experienced troops and seamen sent to stiffen 
the levies. 
Meanwhile James had not been idle. The capture of Nor - 
ham was followed by an advance south and the capture and destruc- 
tion of Etal and Ford, fortresses of much inferior strength to 
Norham. Then, as Surrey's advance from Newcastle to Alnwick was 
reported, the Scottish army formed an entrenched camp in a strong 
position on Flodden ridge across the Till from Ford castle. James 
kept his own headquarters in the castle and did not move into the 
camp till the destruction of the fortress was begun on September 
5th. While at Ford he received from Surrey at Alnwick a challenge 
to fight a pitched battle on plain ground. On the 6th Surrey arri- 
ved with his whole force on Wooler Haugh from which he was able to 
appreciate to the full the strength of the Scottish position. 
Looking from the English bivouac across the Millfield valley, 
scouts could ascertain that James's right wing was covered by a 
marsh, his left by the unfordable Till, and his front by a steep 
slope swept by the fire of his guns. /.On the 7th the English gener- 
al renewed his challenge to fight on the level ground of the Mill - 
field, but James, realising the strength of nie ground, and the 
fact that Surrey's force, through a hurried mobilisation and 
rapid marches, was inadequately supplied, wisely contented 
himself with expressing his willingness to fight, but only in his 
own position. 
/,The eminences of Flodden and Branxton are not lofty, but their 
approaches are steep and narrow owing to the presence of small 
cliffs and scaurs where the ground has broken away. 
As a frontal attack on the Scottish position was out 
of the question, the English leaders crossed the Till on the 8th 
and marched northwards along the east side of the stream. The 
ground was broken and wooded, the bad weather continued, the 
shortage of supplies was greater than ever, but despite these 
handicaps the English van had reached the neighbourhood of Twizell 
Bridge by nightfall, while the main body bivouaced at Barmoor 
Wood, nearly opposite the Scots. James had a general idea of the 
direction of the hostile march,/,but for all practical puuposes he 
had lost touch with the enemy, a most serious fault under the 
circumstances. In the forenoon of the 9th the English vanguard 
crossed Twizell Bridge without interruption by the Scots, while 
the rear portion was brought across the Till by Surrey by the 
bridge near the Millfiel4 The Scots could not prevent the 
crossing at Twizell; it was between four and five miles distant 
from their camp, an interval which the clumsy artillery would 
have taken at least two hours to cover. Moreover the bridge was 
deep in the Till valley and movements round it could not be 
distinguished from Flodden Edge by the naked eye.3. 
luall states that James believed that the English were making for 
the Lothians in order to ravage that fertile district. 
oC 
Hall, p. 5GJ onwards. 
3.I have satisfied myself on this point by a personal trial. Never- 
theless I do not take the usual view of Pitscottie's account in 
?r4 
this matter. Isis general description of the campaign is very fault 
but it has been misinterpreted in this instance. The general 
assumption is that the master gunner offered to James to cut 
Twizell with his guns and so divide the English army. Hume Brown 
and, apparently, Andrew Lang, seem to have supposed that this was 
to be a repetition of Stirling Bridge, and Mr. Lang suggests that 
it was impossible; which it certainly was. But did Pitscottie 
mean Twizell Bridge? He only mentions the bridge of Till. The 
crossing at the Millfield was within easy striking distance of the 
Scots and could have been destroyed before Surrey crossed. The 
English van, which must have crossed Twizell at an earlier hour, 
would then have been in a trap. Thus James indeed "should have no 
displeasure at the one half, while the other should be devoured." 
This seems a rational explanation of the gunner's suggestion, 
which James rashly refused. Pitscottie, p. 181. 
Section 2. The defeat of the Scots. 
The English host was now reunited and advanced towards 
the foot of Branxton hill in four divisions. The right wing, which 
was originally the vanguard, was some distance in advance of the 
others, so that the attack tended to be one in echelon. This wing 
was composed of two sections, a smaller and a larger. The former 
under Sir Edmund Howard formed the extreme right or western flank, 
for the English were now fighting with their backs to Scotland. 
The larger section constituted the bulk of the right wing and was 
commanded by the Lord Admiral. In tne centre was Surrey himself 
with the main part of his army, and on the left wing the command 
was held by Sir Edward Stanley. In rear of the right wing wasa a 
reserve of cavalry under Dacre. 
As the English advanced James became alarmed lest they 
should occupy Branxton hill which formed, as it were, a step up to 
Flodden Edge. Accordingly he abandoned his strong position, fired 
his camp and its litter, and under cover of the smoke, which 
rolled thickly between the two hosts, moved rapidly down by 
Branxton towards the plain. The army was arranged rather in a 
crescent shape, having the royal division in the centre and two 
advanced wings of two divisions each. The extreme section on the 
left was composed of Home's borderers and tiuntly's Gordons; next 
on the left wing came the Strathmore troops of Errol and Crawford. 
On the right the extreme flank was held by the Highlanders under 
Lennox and Argyle, and the.inner division was that of Bothwell. 
There was, apparently, no axOa reserve. The unintentional echelon 
advance of the English led the Scots to direct their attack mainly 
against the right and centre of the opposition, so that their own 
right was liable to be taken in reverse by the English left. as it 
came up. 
As the armies approached eacl(other a short artillery 
duel took place in which the Scottish `gunners were quickly worsted 
possibly owing to the fact that from their elevated position they 
could only employ a plunging fire, which is never very effective 
except against fortifications. The first clash came on the extreme 
west where Sir Edmund Howard's little wing was attacked by Home 
/ 7 
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and Huntly. The Cheshire men were overwhelmed by the superior 
number-; of the Scots and Tunstal, Harbottle, and Berkeley were 
killed, and several prisoners taken. The successful progress of 
the Scots was checked by a charge of the reserve cavalry under 
Dacre and by the marked preference shown by Home's men for 
plundering as opposed to fighting. As Dacre's Tynedale horse also 
resorted to pillage and even attacked their own camp, fighting on 
this wing ceased. Almost simultaneously the Lord Admiral and the 
Fercies broke the next division of the Scots and killed Crawford. 
The main mass of the Scots led by the king and drawing with them 
Bothwell's division now hurled themselves upon Surrey's centre. 
At first the rush was successful and the English recoiled; but 
James was killed by repeated wounds within a short distance of the 
English general and the victorious division of the Lord Admiral 
fell on the defenceless flank of the attackers. At the same time 
Sir Edward Stanley overthrew the Highlanders on the Scottish right 
wing, slew Lennox and Argyle, and forced his way up and across 
the slopes of Branxton, which was left defenceless by the absence 
of any Scottish reserve. The central division of the invaders was 
now hemmed in in front and on both flanks, pelted with arrows and 
constantly harassed by the bilimen. Nevertñeless the spearmen 
held stubbornly together till darkness ended the conflict. Only 
the fact that the start of the battle had been delayed till four 
o'clock in the afternoon enabled them to do so. Surrey's army, 
with its right wing partly destroyed and its centre badly 
battered, was in no state to carry on active night operations, 
and the Scots, who were probably still superior in numbers, were 
able to withdraw across the fords of the Tweed at Coldstream. 
home and his borderers kept the field till the following morning. 
The loss of the Scots may have been about eight 
thousand./All their artillery fell into the hands of the victors 
and was removed to Etal. In proportion to the number of the 




fallen the loss in men of high rank was enormous, and the Scottish 
nobility fully redeemed itself on this occasion. The English loss 
was probably about two thousand and a good number of their 
stragglers and would -be pursuers were swept up as prisoners by 
the retreating Scots". 
Section 3. James's errors. 
It is sufficiently clear that the invasion should 
never have been undertaken. James had other grievances besides the 
motive of helping France, but they were comparatively trifling. 
The Franco- Scottish alliance was one for mutual defence and the 
Scots had payed a much greater part than the French in carrying 
the plan into operation. There existed no real danger to Scottish 
independence at the period of James's reign, a danger which could 
have formed the only rational excuse for an attack on the English 
border. The Scottish king threw away the strength of his country 
for the sake of an idea, a very chivalrous action but not practi- 
cal leadership., 
Once set on foot the expedition might have been more 
profitably directed against Berwick than against the fortresses 
on the south side of the Tweed. It is very probable that with his 
large numbers, his powerful artillery, and the cooperation of his 
little fleet, dames could both have captured the town and held the 
line of the Tweed against any attempt by Surrey to raise the siege 
He would then have had some tangible gain to show for his expendi=- 
ture of men and money, some pawn for negotiation, instead of an 
untenable district in a hostile country. The fortifications of 
Berwick cannot have been much, if any, stronger than those of 
Norham, and there would have been a Scottish party in the town 
pall,p.163 onwards; Ruthal's letter to Wolsey; State Papers of 
Henry VIII, Scotland, IV,i; Pitscottie,pp.182 -183. 
/So long as the spirit of nationalistic patriotism is the ruling 
sentiment, the idealistic leader must take a back seat and the 
practical Frederick II type hold the field. Whether this is a 
desirable state of affairs is another matter. 
town/ 
itself. It is surprising that James, after encouraging the Scotti 
sh marine forcer, did not employ his new arm on the one occasion 
on which it would have been really useful, instead of sending it 
to France. 
The uses to which an entrenched camp may be put are two 
in number. It may be employed as a base from which the striking 
force may aim blows at the enemy when suitable occasions arise, 
or it may be utilised as a purely defensive position. The 
Scottish camp at Flodden Edge could have been used in either of 
these directions; in James's hands neither course was ado.ìte;d. Up 
to the point of Surrey's departure from Wooler the leadership of 
the Scottish king was sound, although the calls upon hie ability 
had not been great. From that time everything went wrong. In the 
first place proper touch with the enemy was not maintained, an 
unpardonable error in an army as full of natural skirmishers and 
scouts as the Scottish one. As a result of this 7(re1essness the 
importance of the division of the English host was not realised. 
This division gave James his great opportunity of defeating the 
enemy in detail. He could either have held the Lord Admiral's 
detachment in check by his camp and have fallen upon Surrey with 
his whole host, or have closed or cut the bridge at Millfield 
and then used his army to hurl the Admiral into the Till. Retreat 
across the narrow bridge in face of a furious attack would have 
been impossible. 
When this great chance had been thrown away the Scotti 
sh king had still a certainty of success, if not of victory. 
Well provisioned and supplied he could have worn out Surrey in a 
waiting game and compelled him to retreat across the Till. If the 
English had been tempted to attack, the Scots in their strong 
position and with their superior numbers could easily have repul- 
sed the assault. In practice James systematically adopted the 
wrong course; he stood still when he should have attacked and 
attacked when he should have held his ground. Whether this is to 
be attributed to his overkeen sense of fair play or to his lack 
of generalship is a debateable point. 
In the strategical conflict which preceded the 
battle the Scottish leader defeated himself. In the tactical 
conflict he was overcome by the superior leadership of the 
English commanders. James's methods of fighting an action were 
too much like those of a bull to be successful. The death of the 
king himself and the havoc in the ranks of the Scottish nobles 
show that personal leadership rather than cool direction was the 
order of the day. In contrast to this rash behaviour stands the 
intelligent fashion in which the English divisional commanders 
came to the help of their distressed centre and the ability with 
which the cavalry reserve covered the shattered right flank at a 
critical moment. k similar reserve on the Scottish side ready to 
charge Stanley's men as they climbed the slopes of Branxton might 
have made all the difference. 
Strategically the Flodden cam)aign does little but 
emphasise the futility of organised invasions of England as 
opposed to raids. Tactically it demonstrates several points. The 
effectiveness of the strong fortress was slowly passing. The 
English archery was no longer so dreadful a weapon as it had been 
in the past, for it was not the archers who devastated the Scottis 
ranks. The Highlander with his small allowance of defensive 
armour, could not resist the attack of well- protected then -at- arras. 
Most important of all, the day of the spearman with his overlong 
and cumbersome weapon had gone. Opposed to the bill which could 
cut as well as thrust, the eighteen foot spear was of little use 
in offensive action, and this characteristic weapon of the 
Scottish mediaeval army was soon to be superseded by the shorter 
and handier pike. 
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Chapter V. 
Sin nary and Conclusion. 
Section ï. Scottish strategy, offensive and defensive. 
Offensive operations by the Scots in the Middle Ages 
were confined to the single sphere of the north of England and 
can be divided into two chronological periods. In the twelfth 
century the object of the invasions was the conquest and retentio7 
of the northern counties; in the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth 
and sixteenth, the aim was simply to cause diversions of the 
strength of England from more vital points at home or abroad. 
Permanent conquest necessitated the existence of elabor- 
ate siege equipment and a disciplined army of occupation at a 
time when Scotland possessed neither the one nor the other. In 
occupying a district which is meant to be held indefinitely, care 
must be taken to secure possession of the fortresses, the fetters 
of the country, and to conciliate the inhabitants by respecting 
their lives and property. The armies of David I and of William the 
Lion could not do these things. Their attempts at sieges were gene 
rally unsuccessful, and the composition of their bands rendered 
sporadic jlundering inevitable. The leaders were not reponsiblo 
for this state of affairs; the state of civilisation in Scotland 
e 
was not yet far enough advanced to allow of the formation of a wei 
disciplined host,or, which was more important, of a properly organ- 
ised system of supply which would have rendered wasteful foraging 
unnecessary. It may be, however, that the attacks, failures as 
they were, served the purpose of a true defensive at a time when 
the lack of unification in Scotland would have made the country a 
prey to an organised English conquest. 
The mistaken nature of the policy of running risks on 
behalf of France has already been commented on. The true military 
sphere of raids of diversion in the north of England was to draw 
away the southern forces from an attack on a northern fortress or 
district or to bring pressure to bear on the southern government 
and tnus secure a favourable peace. Thus the attacks made by 
by/ 
Bruce and his lieutenants were truly defined in their scope and 
resulted in the saving of Berwick and in the extraction of the 
peace of Northampton from an exhausted enemy. The successful 
handling of these raids required a high degree of perseverance at 
a time when things might be going badly elsewhere. When thef qualm 
ty was lacking disaster followed, as in the battles of Dunbar and 
Ialidon Hill. On the other hand, even when Walter was hard pressed 
in Berwick, Bruce steadfastly refused to risk a battle for the 
town. Pitched battles, as distinct from combats, had to be 
avoided in these expeditions. Neville's Cross and Flodden were 
avoidable disasters brought about by violation of this rule. 
Otterburn was a successful battle, but it brought to the Scots 
only a gain in prestige. The most disastrous campaign which the 
English fought in thoir own country, that of Weardale, did not 
contain a single open action. 
In this work, where detailed attention can only be 
directed to the more outstanding actions, the cumulative effect 
of raids has not been stressed. No account can be taken of the 
scores of minor parties which crossed the English border at 
various periods, but the mass result cf these operations was very 
great. This system of warfare gradually created a line of defence 
which was difficult to pass, but it also brought about in a later 
stage of the country's development as state of anarchy which was 
with difficulty corrected by the later rulers. 
The traditional form of defensive strategy among the 
Scots was that of devastation and retreat accompanied by a spirit- 
ed guerilla warfare against the outposts and detacbxientssof the 
invaders. This policy was the growth of circumstances; although 
it was most suitably and concisely expressed by Bruce, it was 
not the product of any one leader's mind, but the fruit of 
necessity. Its weak point was the possibility of the invading 
force being supplied by the sea, but this resource in turn was an 
uncertain one as such a line of communication could be too easily 
interrupted by a spell of rough weather. kt the best an attack - 
fax ing force could only subsiet for a limited number of days in 
in/ 
the devastated belt before a retreat became imperative. In this 
respect the absence of fixed points of defence was an essential 
factor in the scheme of resistance. Such points became fixed 
points of attack, redeeming the invasion from being a mere blow 
at the air and, when taken, giving positions to the English in 
which they could post garrisons to hold down the country. The 
initial success of Edward III was as great as that of Edward I 
but, owing to the absence of the strong points thrown down in the 
war of Independence, his period of power was shorter and its 
tenure less secure than that of his grandfather. 
The success of the scheme depended upon two agencies. 
In the first place the farmers and peasants of the Lothians had *é 
exercise great unselfishness in yielding up their holdings and 
houses to destruction; even in fact, in most cases, to carry out 
the destruction with their own hands. There is no case on record 
of a widespread refusal to lay waste the land when an invasion 
threatened. The part of the commander was to avoid decisive de- 
feats which would allow the attacking force to disperse its 
detachments and so to supi,ort itself by foraging operations 
conducted over a large area. The duty of the defending army wet tc 
keep in close proximity to the English force and thusm, by a 
constant threat of attack, to compel it to maintain its concen- 
tration within its own lines. Such a policy did not absolutely 
prohibit pitched battles, but allowed them when the situation was 
strongly in favour of the Scots; examples of this form of action 
are found in Stirling Bridge and Bannockburn. Dunbar was a 
defeat which he Scots the lesson of strategy; Falkirk was an 
honest error of judgement; Dupplin Moor was the unfortunate 
result of overconfidence; for Halidon Hill there is no excuse; it 
must remain on record as the crowning blunder of Scottish 
generalship. 
The loss sustained by the Scots through this system 
o/ defence was, of course, enormous. It did not lie so much in 
the destruction of the houses, which were flimsy structures and 
easily rebuilt, or in the devastation of the farms, which were 
were/ 
poorly cultivated, as in the retarding of civilisation in the 
most fertile district of Scotland. When the war of Independence 
was finally over and a spell of quiet was secured by the divers- 
ion of English attention to France, the districts of the Carse 
and of Lothian became more prosperous and thickly peopled. This 
development, which was the result of the success of the old defence 
sive policy, led inevitably to a change of methods and to the 
abandonment of that policy. The wealthy areas could no longer be 
abandoned to ravage unless the situation was desperate. The incr- 
easing population and the greater power of the eecutive led to 
the creation of more than one line of defence. The field army was 
once more destined to fight a decisive action on the borders. 
Greatest change of all, the policy of dispensing with fortresses 
as fixed positions of defence was reversed, and the border castles 
took their places as important factors in the new scheme. 
Section 2. Battle Tactics. 
The battle record of the Scottish army in the Middle 
Ages is not an imposing one from the point of victories gained. 
Yet there is little doubt that man for man on fair ground and 
under equal conditions they were a match for their southern 
opponents. This is no mean compliment when it is remembered that 
the English infantry with their robust physical development, their 
martial training and instincts, and their high morale, were 
considered at the time of the Hundred Years War the most formid- 
able troops in western Europe. 
The secret of the comparative failure of the Scots 
lies in trie lack of certain essential divisions in their army. 
The mediaeval host had three arms, the infantry, the archers, and 
the cavalry./.The Scots constantly lacked archers and usually, 
owing to the curious attitude of a large section of the barons, 
cavalry. The lack of horsemen was partly supplied at a later date 
/In the modern army the same division exists; artillery has taken 
the place of the archery force, and aeroplanes have partly 
usurped the functions of the cavalry. 
date/ 
by the appearance of the hobeler:, but the absence of a missile 
force remained a fatal handicap till the general adoption of 
artillery. It followed that the Scots had to endeavour to make 
one arm do the work of three. In this respect they shared the 
disadvantage of the French who, with their lack of archers and of 
reliable infantry apart from the miserable levies of the peasants 
were reduced to contend with cavalry alone or to supply the gaps 
by mercenaries or dismounted men -at -arms. 
So great a deficiency in the appropriate divisions 
of the army could only be remedied by the artificial aids of 
defensive armour or of strong positions. To equip any host, let 
alone one raised from a peasant population, with armour which 
would combine the advantages of complete protection from archery 
attacks and of adequate mobility was frankly impossible. The sole 
remaining solution lay in the choice of position, and in Scotland 
the pro(iem was solved as early as the battle of Stirling Bridle. 
The necessary position was one which possessed secure protection 
on the flanks and a natural obstacle, such as u river or a bog, in 
front. This compelled the attacking force to advance in detail 
and prevented all arms coming into operation simultaneously; in 
fact it restricted the English to the employment of one arm and 
thus put them on an equality with the defending force. When a 
quick offensive movement was undertaken as a supplement to the 
strong position the English archers, who could not cross first 
and unsupported, were left out of the action. If the enemy could 
be drawn into a barren stretch of country where maintenance was 
impossible and a retreat was the only alternative to an attack, 
the advantages of such a position were all the greater. In their 
constituent elements there is little difference among the lines 
occupied by the Soots at Stirling Bridge, at Bannockburn, and at 
Stanhope Park. 
The necessity of possessing an infantry force, whick 
could act quickly and effectively against a body of cavalry 
before the latter could be supported by archers, led to the growti 
of the schiltron. A looser formation would have left vulnerable 
vulnerable/ 
gaps through which the horsemen could have penetrated the mass. 
In practice and confined to itn own particular sphere this body 
was the most successful development of Scottish warfare aided, as 
it was at the tome of the war of Independence, by the fact that 
the English did not possess any great infantry force for fighting 
at close quarters apart from the Irish and Welsh, who were not 
very trustworthy troops. It was only when misguided attempts were 
made to adapt the schiltron to another form of operation that that 
formation gradually fell into disuse. Yet even in the last blaze 
of Scottish mediaeval warfare at Flodden it was only by reverting 
to the old formation that the centre of the northern host held 
its gròund till dark against comoined attacks. 
The disadvantage of the schiltron was that it could 
only be composed of experienced men. With untrained troops its 
rapid advance could only lead to moss of position and confusion. 
In the early part of the fourteenth century thé Scottish troops 
had the best of all training, practice in the face of the enemy. 
gnen the more peaceful period came the careful provision made for 
the arming of the country does not seem to have been supplemented 
by any regulations for drill or manoeuvre. By this time also the 
practice of fighting offensive battles against a superior enemy 
had returned and this led to attempted advances inclose formation, 
over long intervals of difficult ground which the best troops 
could not have carried out. The English had the additional advan- 
tage of having supplied their deficiency in footmen by the exped- 
ient of dismounting a large portion of their men -at -arms. Thus the 
movements of the Scots under a devastating missile fire against 
the close ranks of an enemy, which would constitute a formidable 
obstacle under any circumstances, were foredoomed to failure. Ther 
was no place for the offensive battle in Scottish tactics./ 
Section 3. Generalship. 
If an exception is made of the battle of the Standard, 
/It is not too much to say that at Halidon Hill the Scottish foot: 
men had about as little chance as the Dervishes at Omdurman. 
Standard,/ 
the earliest encounter under review in this volume, no case can 
be found of an engagement being lost through the misconduct of 
the Scottish infantry. -Whatever the directions which they had to 
follow, they obeyed them to the best of their ability. It was onl; 
when they were given impossible tasks to carry out that they 
failed in their execution. The tremendous losses sustained by the 
footmen in many of the unsuccessful battles constitute a testim- 
onial to their enduring efforts to pull victory out of the fire. 
It follows that, after due allowance has been made for the 
disadvantages under which the northern armies always laboured, the 
respqeibility for most of the defeats must be laid at the door of 
the leaders of the host. 
In the Middle Ages military power was mostly in the 
hands of the barons who constituted, as it were, the military 
aristocracy. This was an inevitable sequel to the feudal system 
of landholding, which made the tenants-in-chief the king's 
lieutenants in the national levy. While all men of rank were 
soldiers, there were practically ni professional leaders of armisf 
From his a x axaxx very nature the soldier of fortune was an 
adventurer or shandless man. As an adviser or as the leader of a 
contingent of mercenaries he was welcome, but it was very rarely 
that he rose to the command of an army. In most cases the barons 
would not have tolerated such promotion over their heads, though 
there. is little doubI that such men as Walter Manny had as much 
military intelligence as most of the barons put together. Occas- 
ici(álly a country, especially England, produced a king who could 
bring to his natural position of leadership great military 
intelligence. Generally, however, the multiplicity of the king's 
duties prevented his becoming proficient as a general and he was 
dependent upon the advice of a council of barons with no more 
ability in the matter than himself; this was almost constantly 
true in the case of France. 
As a general rule the barons made good fighters, but 
most indifferent leaders. When the list of English successes 
gained at the expense of the Scots is examined, it is found that 
that/ 
at Dunbar, Falkirk, and Halidon Hill the king led the army and 
that in the latter two cases he directed its movements in person. 
At the Standard and at Neville's Cross the northern barons of 
England did not show any outstanding skill; rather it was the 
Scottish leaders who showed ineptitude. At Flodden Surrey did not 
show himself in any way a distinguished master of war. Edward II 
was the only English king defated in plain battle by the Scots, 
and it is out the question to say that he controlled the English 
army at Bannockburn. In brief the tide of English success rose 
highest during the reigns of her two general- kings, Edward I and 
Edward III, and that of Scottish victory during the period of 
Bruce. The Scottish barons had the melanchply privilege of 
possessing a long list of such incompetent generals as Archibald 
Douglas and Donald, earl of Mar.c4t cannot be plausibly alleged 
that the failure of the baronial leaders was due to the fact that 
the successful principles of Scottish war had not been adequately 
demonstrtated. They appeared clearly under Wallace in a defensive 
sense and developed under Bruce in an offensive direction. Yet 
after the peace of Northampton there appeared a molt unfortunate 
neglect of the lessons learned at so great a cost, and repeatedly 
the most elementary rules of Scottish warfare were violated in 
glaring fashion. It is not easy to find an explanation of this 
negligent behaviour. English leaders dici apply the teaching of 
Dupplin Moor to some practical purpose, and even the French xa 
tried to avoid in later actions the primary error of the Crecy 
catastrophe. But the Scottish barons, in a fashion almost 
systematic, forgot the old tricks and failed to produce any new 
¡His abilities seem to me to have been greatly overrated; the 
"cunning" which is generally attributed to him does not come into 
evidence in the risky operations and manoeuvres of the 1513 
campaign. 
.2Waliace is, of course, an exception to the list of royal leaders; 
but neither was he a baron. The man was, in fact, a genius and 
there are no rules for such. 
/g1 
new/ 
ones. Even in an inbred aristocracy depending on brawn rather than 
on brains, something better than this was to be expected. Perhaps 
it was due to the fact that most of the barons were absent from 
Scotland at the period of the war of Independence. The more 
probable explanation is, however, that no pains were taken to pass 
on the fruits of acquired experience from one generation to anoth- 
er. Scotland in the Middle Ages could not foster a Staff College, 
but it might have possessed a few elementary rules and regulations 
in written form. Yet the fact remains that, apart from Bruce's 
testament, there exists nothing approaching a text book on the 
principles of Scottish warfare. 
The redeeming feature is the prolific crop of 
partisan leaders which Scotland invariably produced from the ranks 
of the knights and of the common people in times of danger. This 
is a tribute to the undoubted military ability of the commons, 
which has appeared even more markedly in modern times. It was also 
the primary explanation of% the fact that Scotland was able to 
maintain her independence, a performance which, despite the 
defeats suffered in the process will remain on record as a wonder- 
ful effort in the face of natural disadvantages, misdirected 
leadership, and an exceptionally formidable enemy. Our summing up 
must be in favour of the people and adverse to their leaders as a 
whole. 
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